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Traditional  forms  of  legal  positivism entailed  an  externalised,  objective  approach 
largely inspired by the natural sciences. This approach did not treat validation and 
description as separate or independent endeavours. Nor did it recognise a distinction 
in their respective subject-matter. What could be described in a normatively neutral 
manner  could  be  validated  objectively,  and  vice  versa.  This  perception  changed 
considerably with the advent of H.L.A. Hart’s “internal point of view”, that is, the 
insight  that  certain  aspects  of  the  law  are  more  appropriately  explained  from the 
viewpoint  of  the  participant  than  from  an  external,  science-derived  one.  A 
consequence of this contribution was a disjunct between description and validation. It 
was  acknowledged  that  some  legal  phenomena  incapable  of  being  objectively 
validated  could  nonetheless  be  described  in  a  “general”  or  normatively  neutral 
manner.  Ultimately,  this  gave rise to  the view that  generating normatively neutral 
descriptive  accounts  of  legal  phenomena  (i.e. what  is  termed  “methodological 
positivism”), and the separation of law from moral and other normative standards (or 
“substantive  positivism”)  comprise  logically  distinct  and  independent  endeavours. 
And  hence,  it  is  possible  to  devise  general,  normative  neutral  accounts  of  legal 
phenomena without  reference  to  either  the  objectively  validable  or  the  normative 
aspects of law. 
In  my  view,  the  above  contention  does  not  always  hold  good.  That  is,  it  is  not 
necessarily  the  case  that  a  legal  phenomenon  can  always  be  comprehensively 
described without reference to the law’s objectively validable aspects or normative 
iv
aspects.  I  begin  by  examining  the  relation  between  description  and  validation.  I 
contend that legal phenomena are characteristically different from other social and 
normative  phenomena.  Identifying  the  distinguishing  characteristics  of  legal 
phenomena requires validation. Description bereft of validation will not be able to 
determine  if  the  phenomenon  under  study  is  a  legal  phenomenon  or  not. 
Consequently, at least some degree of validation is necessary for a descriptive account 
of a legal phenomenon.
The  bulk  of  the  dissertation  concerns  the  relation  between  description  and  the 
normative  aspects  of  law.  I  explore  this  through  a  specific  example,  viz.  the 
mechanism governing the state’s (specifically the executive’s) enforcement of legal 
rights. My view is that not only is the state obligated to do so, but also this obligation 
is formally and substantively distinct from the legal obligations imposed on ordinary 
individuals. Just as Joseph Raz’s exclusionary reasons entail a reason to refrain from 
acting for other reasons, so does this type of obligation entail a reason to refrain from 
acting on the basis of other, competing obligations. Hence it can be characterised as 
an “exclusionary obligation”. I refer to it by the term “bound condition”. So here I 
seek  to  demonstrate  that  (a)  conventional  accounts  do  not  adequately  explain  the 
state’s role in enforcing rights, and (b) this can be achieved only if we recognise the 
state to be under a bound condition in such circumstances.
I next attempt to show that the source of this bound condition lies in the normative 
aspect  of  law,  and hence varies  with each separate  right.  Thus a  description  of  a 
particular right must also extend to the normative source specific to that right. This 
vprecludes the possibility of a general, normatively neutral account extending to all 
instances of legal rights.
1CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION
I. BACKGROUND
Legal  positivism  is  associated  with  two  component  elements.  One  comprises  its 
substantive claims. These exist in several versions, which we shall examine in detail; 
what is important is that most if not all of them envisage validating law on the basis of 
something other than the moral nature of their content. The second element concerns 
the endeavour to generate a descriptive, normatively neutral account of law. Stephen 
Perry refers to them as “substantive” and “methodological positivism” respectively – 
nomenclature we shall also use throughout this thesis. He as well as some others also 
endorse  the  claim  that  the  two  constitute  logically  independent  and  distinct 
endeavours.1
Speculating on which of these is more central or fundamental to positivism is surely 
difficult,  even  pointless.  At  the  same  time,  the  descriptive  aspect  has  gained 
significantly  more  attention  from  scholars  than  it  had  before.  It  also  underlies 
arguably the most intensely debated issue in legal positivism today. Briefly stated, this 
centres around the claim, in some form or another, that describing a moral or other 
normative  evaluation  (i.e. which  lies  outside  the  ambit  of  substantive  positivism) 
amounts to an endorsement of that  evaluation, and therefore cannot be considered 
1 Cf. Perry 1996: 361; Perry 1998: 427. See also Hart 1994: 244.
2normatively neutral.2 Adherents of positivism vehemently deny this contention, and 
contend that  a  description  may remain  normatively  neutral  even  if  what  is  being 
described is not so.3 
This leaves several questions unanswered. Is this disjunct between substantive and 
methodological positivism itself valid, or at least sustainable? Little attention has been 
paid to this question, which I find surprising. The positivist description/endorsement 
debate rests on the assumption that a descriptive account conforms to the requirement 
of positivism even when what is described does not. At first this question may seem 
strange. After all, one may describe not only the morality of slavery but also the legal 
practices,  concepts  and institutions that  developed around the slave trade,  without 
being required to endorse either. But will such a description of legal phenomena be 
adequate from a legal point of view? That is, is mere description without reference to 
substantive positivism’s validating criteria capable of specifying the features that give 
the  phenomena  the  character  of  law?  Or  is  specifying  these  characteristics 
unnecessary,  and the resultant descriptive account complete or adequate (whatever 
these terms may mean) notwithstanding this shortcoming? 
Hence  at  this  juncture,  clearly  a  deeper  understanding of  how the two aspects  of 
positivism relate to each other is called for. It will not only help us better understand 
positivism itself,  particularly in  the context of law and legal phenomena, but also 
2 See e.g. Dworkin 1985: 148. See also Perry 1996; Perry 1998.
3 See Hart 1994: 244.
3provide  significant  insights  into  the  debate  on  description  and evaluation.  What  I 
endeavour here is to address one aspect of the above. This thesis does not concern the 
validity of law per se. Rather, it looks at the role that the fact of validity plays in the 
description  of  law,  particularly  the  description  of  legal  phenomena  such  as  the 
enforcement of legal rights. 
II. THE CLAIMS OF POSITIVISM
1. Substantive Claims
Before we proceed to our main arguments, we must be clear about what we are up 
against, that is, which claims, aspects or constructions associated with positivism we 
are targeting. It is not possible to address all of of them at once; there are simply too 
many of  them.  Take even positivism’s  substantive claims.  Different  scholars  have 
construed the basis of positivism in their own way; one author lists no less than nine 
versions, and then states: “No positivist thinker defends all the position listed above. 
Hardly any two authors who claim to be positivists support the same sub-set of theses 
among those which have been mentioned.”4 
Three  theses  generally  are  considered  to  be  constitutive  of  legal  positivism:  the 
Conventionality Thesis, which holds that the criteria on the basis of which laws are 
validated are themselves authoritative “due to a convention among officials to regard 
4 Nino 1980: 519-20.
4its criteria as standards that govern their behavior [sic] as officials”; the Social Fact  
Thesis, according to which these criteria gain their authority by virtue of certain social 
facts (such as, according to Austin, the existence of a sovereign habitually obeyed and 
who in turn is not habituated to obey anyone else);  and the Separability Thesis, which 
states  in  its  commonest  form that  legal  validity  is  not  necessarily  dependent  on 
conformance with criteria of morality.5 Even these are susceptible to further divisions. 
For  example,  the  exclusive  positivist  position  (which  holds  that  legal  validity  is 
necessarily  not  dependent  on morality),  is  said to look towards  yet  another  thesis 
called the Sources Thesis, according to which “the existence and content of law can 
always  be  determined by  reference  to  its  sources”.6 (Dyzenhaus  distinguishes  the 
Separability Thesis from the Identification Thesis, or “the thesis that a determination 
of what law is does not depend on moral criteria or argument.”7 He points out that the 
one does not entail the other. Only the Identification Thesis and not the Separability 
Thesis  applies  to  Hobbes,  for  example,  since  according  to  him  subjects  must 
recognise the sovereign’s  commands  as  not  only  commands but  also  (presumably 
morally) the right reason.8) 
5 See e.g. Himma 2009.
6 Himma 2009.
7 Dyzenhaus  2000: 706.
8 Ibid.
5In this context, let us look at Dworkin’s characterisation:9
(Laws) can be identified and distinguished by specific criteria, by tests having 
to do not with their content but with their  pedigree or the manner in which 
they  were  adopted  or  developed.  These  tests  of  pedigree  can  be  used  to 
distinguish valid legal rules from spurious legal rules . . . and also from other 
sorts  of  social  rules  (generally  lumped  together  as  ‘moral  rules’)  that  the 
community follows but does not enforce through public power.
This may seem unremarkably similar to the Sources Thesis, but it contains several 
features that are significant to us. To begin with, his purpose behind this is similar to 
ours, namely to set up a target to direct his critique at. For this reason, he specifies not 
only what positivism is, but also what purpose it serves. The objective of any theory 
of law is to identify legally valid rules, that is, those rules that are enforced through 
public power; this also entails  distinguishing valid rules from invalid ones. Hence 
substantive positivism entails separating law from its merits10 (Austin) or morality11 
(Hart) because these are not reliable parameters for determining if a rule is a valid law 
or not. And the reason they are not, according to Dworkin, is because they relate to 
the content of the rule. Consequently, positivists place reliance on considerations like 
9 Dworkin 1977: 17.
10 “The existence of law is one thing; its merit or demerit is another. Whether it be or be not is one 
enquiry; whether it be or be not conformable to an assumed standard, is a different enquiry. A law, 
which actually exists, is a law, though we happen to dislike it, or though it vary from the text, by 
which we regulate our approbation and disapprobation.” Austin 1954: 184.
11 “Here we shall take Legal Positivism to mean the simple contention that it is in no sense a 
necessary truth that laws reproduce or satisfy certain demands of morality, though in fact they 
have often done so.” Hart 1994: 185-86.
6the rule’s pedigree. This is in the nature of a formal rather than substantive attribute; it 
neither  affects  nor  is  affected  by  the  rule’s  content  (inclusive  positivists  hold 
otherwise, which we shall address later).
The advantage of these formal attributes is that validity may be determined from an 
objective, normatively-neutral position. Even if, as Hart asserted, a description of a 
normative evaluation need not endorse that normative position, surely the evaluation 
itself  cannot  be  done  normatively  neutrally.  Normative  evaluation  is  necessary 
subjective.  If  in  a  system slavery  is  considered  moral,  and  if  we  are  to  morally 
evaluate a law governing the slave-owner’s right, we must do so from the perspective 
of that morality, and how its demands are best satisfied. We may claim this still does 
not amount to endorsing the morality of slavery, that is, we do not really believe in 
slavery,  and  that  we  have  adopted  this  position  only  for  purposes  of  argument. 
However,  even  in  such  a  situation  it  still  holds  that  we  have  to  proceed  on  the  
subjective assumption that slavery is moral. On the other hand, if formal criteria form 
the basis of evaluating a law’s validity, no such subjective assumption is necessary. 
All we have to do is ascertain, objectively, if the criteria are satisfied. Even describing 
a  normative evaluation does not  require  any such assumption,  which is  why Hart 
could still locate it within positivism.12 
It  can  also  be  argued  that  objectivity  is  also  where  several  theses  of  positivism 
apparently  tend  to  converge.  For  example,  the  existence  of  social  facts  such  as 
Austin’s sovereign can be objectively determined. This means that the authority of 
12 Hart 1994: 244.
7laws’  validating  criteria  derives  from  facts  that  are  themselves  objectively 
ascertainable.  Similarly,  so  can  questions  like  whether  a  rule  is  derived  from  a 
particular source, whether it possesses certain specified formal attributes and so on, be 
resolved solely by referring to observable facts. 
At  this  stage,  we may  cobble  together  our  conception  of  positivism’s  substantive 
claims. This draws largely from the Sources Thesis, but also incorporates key features 
of the Separation, Social Fact and other theses. It entails simply that the legal validity 
of a rule is to be determined by objectively ascertaining if it possesses certain formal 
attributes, and not by testing its  content against  moral or other normative criteria. 
Admittedly,  it  reflects  a  strongly  exclusive  positivist  approach.  But  this  is  only 
inevitable.  Methodological  positivists  do  not  contend  that  positivism’s  substantive 
claims and methodological objectives are related. 
2. Methodological Positivism
Positivism’s  methodological  aspect  also  entails  several  components.  Hart  himself 
describes  his  theory  as  general  and  descriptive;13 general  as  in  not  specific  to  a 
particular legal system or culture, and descriptive in being morally neutral and not 
having any justificatory aims.14 Marmor contends positivism should be understood as 
a descriptive, morally neutral theory; by “descriptive” he means an “account (that) 
13 Hart 1994: 239.
14 Ibid. at 239-40.
8does  not  purport  to  justify  or  legitimize  any of  its  subject  matter”,  and  “morally 
neutral” refers to a theory that does not entail either a stance on a moral or political 
issue or any moral or political evaluation.15 He also points out that “descriptive” has 
been used in contradistinction to “normative” (by which he means  “the realm of 
judgments  that  reflect  moral  evaluations,  or  evaluations  like  moral  judgments”), 
which  is  misleading,  because  (a)  descriptive  and  normative  are  not  necessarily 
mutually exclusive, and (b) the term “normative” can mean any of several things.16 
Perry  also  understands  methodological  positivism  as  descriptive  and  normatively 
neutral, which addresses law “in the manner of ordinary science”.17 His criticism of 
Hart stems from this point. He claims Hart goes beyond merely describing observable 
phenomena when he tries to elucidate the meanings of insufficiently understood legal 
concepts: “The description should, so to speak, be passive, mirroring whatever the 
observer finds; the aim should not be to transform, even in so apparently an innocuous 
way as by ‘clarification,’ that which is being observed.”18 Moreover, he also seeks to 
understand concepts like authority and obligation from an “internal” perspective, that 
is, from the viewpoint of a participant rather than that of a detached observer. But, 
Perry contends, this “internal conceptual analysis” must extend also to addressing the 
normativity of law, that is, questions like when authority and obligation are justified. 
Effectively, this approximates Dworkin’s interpretivist theory, and hence cannot be 
15 Marmor 2006: 683.
16 Ibid. at 683-84.
17 Perry 1996: 361.
18 Perry 1998: 443.
9considered  positivism.19 A rebuttal  to  this  argument  may  be  discerned  within  the 
Postscript  to   The  Concept  of  Law itself.  Hart’s  disenchantment  with  excessive 
empiricism  as  ignoring  law’s  internal  aspect,  is  well  documented.20 But  what  he 
denies  is  the  contention  that  describing  an  evaluation,  even  a  moral  evaluation, 
amounts  to  endorsing it.21 Other  commentators  have  also  pointed  out  that  Perry’s 
conception  of  internal  conceptual  analysis  differs  from  Hart’s,22 and  is  in  fact 
narrower than the latter.23
It  is  this  issue  of  evaluation,  and  the  effect  it  has  on  the  distinction  between 
description and endorsement, that has attracted arguably the liveliest debate regarding 
methodological positivism. Stephen Guest points  out that  certain aspects  of Hart’s 
descriptive theory, such differentiating between primitive and modern municipal legal 
systems carry with it the implication that it is good, that is, morally good, to perceive 
legal facts in such terms.24 This conflation of desirable and moral is certainly open to 
question. Julie Dickson carves a distinction between evaluation and moral evaluation. 
She  begins  by  pointing  out  that  today’s  jurisprudence  allows  for  only  two 
philosophical  positions  or  “methodological  camps”,  viz. “descriptive”   and 
“normative”.25 This  is  misleading  in  a  palpable  way.  Qualities  like  simplicity, 
comprehensiveness and clarity, are desirable in all theories, including descriptive legal 
19 Ibid. at 461-62.
20 See Hart 1959: 236-37.
21 Hart 1994: 
22 See e.g. Moore 2002:94.
23 Moore 2002: 96.
24 Guest 1996: 29-30.
25 Dickson 2001: 30.
10
theories.  Hence,  when theorists  seek to  know whether  their  theories possess these 
virtues adequately,  whether they are communicable easily enough and so on, they 
must “ be in the business of making evaluative judgements” in this particular sense.26 
She then engages with her understanding of Perry’s thesis, which is that when one 
steps  beyond the merely descriptive-explanatory approach and tries  to explain the 
law’s  normativity,  adopting  an  approach  that  involves  moral  evaluation  becomes 
necessary.27 This  she  disagrees  with.  According  to  her,  a  phenomenon  such  as 
obligation or authority can be understood from the internal point of view through the 
process  of  “indirect  evaluation”.  The  key  to  this  is,  “[I]ndirectly  evaluative 
proposition such as ‘X is important” does not entail a directly evaluative proposition 
that this same X is good. ”28 She takes the example of an agnostic observing a Roman 
Catholic mass.29 Such an observer will surely make judgments about which rituals are 
important for the purposes that the mass is intended to serve. But this will not amount 
to acknowledging that that ritual is good or bad; the observer remains neutral about it: 
“[A]ccording to the approach which I am attempting to elucidate here, the agnostic 
observer  need  not  share  those  values,  nor  himself  take  a  stance  on  whether  the 
participants are correct in their ascriptions of spiritual and moral value, in order to 
understand  which  features  of  the  mass  are  important  and  significant  for  those 
participating in it.”30 
26 Ibid. at 33. At 33-34 she quotes Perry (1998: 438) as saying much the same thing.
27 Ibid. at 37.
28 Ibid. at 64.
29 Ibid. at 67-68.
30 Ibid. at 69.
11
Brian Leiter address this issue by distinguishing between epistemic and moral values. 
The former comprises evidentiary adequacy, simplicity, explanatory consilience and 
other  “truth-conducive  desiderata”  -  “Honor  those  values  –   even  the  explicitly 
pragmatic ones like simplicity –  and, we hope, we will acquire knowledge.”31 He 
somewhat differs from Dickson’s view about the need for a middle ground between 
descriptive and normative (which her indirect evaluation is intended to provide), and 
holds that distinguishing between epistemic and moral values, and incorporating the 
former in descriptions, is enough to account for hermeneutic concepts like obligation 
and authority.32
III. OBJECTIVES
Substantive  positivism  separates  law  from  non-law.  Methodological  positivism 
endeavours towards a normatively neutral study of law and legal phenomena. As we 
have seen, some have contended that the two entail independent enquiries, either of 
which can be pursued independently of the other. The question is, when we endeavour 
to describe a phenomenon, whether normative evaluation or otherwise, how do we 
know whether  what  we  are  describing  is  a  legal  phenomenon  or  not?  Or,  if  the 
phenomenon is complicated, which aspects of it are legal in nature and which are non-
legal? To draw an analogy from the natural sciences, if a substance changes colour 
under certain circumstances, an adequate description must point out if the change is 
31 Leiter 2003: 34-35.
32 Ibid. at 42-43.
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physical  or  chemical  in  nature or,  if  both  are  involved,  which  aspects  are  due to 
physical and chemical changes respectively. If the description cannot do so, then it 
cannot be considered comprehensive or even adequate. And likewise, it is necessary 
for our description to state if its subject is a legal phenomenon or not. Otherwise, we 
will  achieve  something  indistinguishable  from a  description  of  a  moral  or  social 
phenomenon. For example, Hart’s internal aspect concept applies to social rules of all 
kinds, of which legal rules constitute only a subset.33 Hence a descriptive account of 
the nature of a  law’s  internal  aspect  does not  itself  determine whether  its  subject 
matter comprises of legal rules and not social rules of any other kind, and in fact must 
presuppose them to be legal rules. Thus we may hold that a conceptual link does exist 
between methodological positivism and some method of separating legal from extra-
legal standards. Also, this method can only be substantive positivism. Otherwise the 
resultant  may  not  remain  descriptive  or  general,  and  so  no  longer  satisfy  the 
requirements of methodological positivism.
It is not necessary that every aspect of a legal phenomenon must be separable from 
non-law in this manner. However, unless at least some aspects are identified as legal, 
the phenomenon as a whole cannot be treated as a subject of jurisprudential enquiry 
(for the sake of convenience, we shall call these “validable aspects”, and refer to as 
“non-validable aspects” those aspects that cannot be identified as legal). Secondly, for 
a  descriptive  account  of  these  validable  aspects,  an  external  approach  is  more 
appropriate than an analysis from the internal perspective. And lastly, this description 
33 Hart 1994: 56-57.
13
must extend to not only the nature of these aspects but also their functioning. This last 
point is best understood through an example. Hart’s internal point of view34 requires 
that at least some people in a society, specifically officials, must treat the concerned 
rule as a standard for evaluating not only their own but also others’ behaviour. But this 
“critical reflective attitude” arises from society’s acceptance of the rule, which may or 
may not result from its status as law. Be that as it may, the legal rules involved can 
themselves specify certain conducts to be observed by actors, certain procedures to be 
followed,  and  even certain  defined  reasons  for  action  provided  to  the  actors.  My 
contention  is  that  all  these  are  either  prima  facie apparent  from  the  rules,  or 
ascertainable by analysing them from an external perspective.
Thesis I: Substantive positivism and methodological positivism are necessarily  
conceptually linked:
This entails: (a) a descriptive account of a legal phenomenon usually comprise 
of two aspects, the validable aspects, or those aspects that can be objectively 
validated, and the invalidable aspects, which cannot be objectively validated, 
and whose description involves taking recourse to concepts such as indirect 
evaluation35 (Dickson),  epistemic  values36 (Leiter),  or  even  Hart’s  internal 
aspect;37 (b) a description of a legal phenomenon will not be adequate as a 
theory  of  law unless  some  of  its  aspects  are  identified  as  legal;  (c)  this 
34 Ibid. 
35 Dickson 2001: 64.
36 Leiter 2003: 34-35.
37 Hart 1994: 56-57.
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identification  has  to  be  done  objectively,  on  the  basis  of  substantive 
positivism; (d) these legal aspects are more appropriately described from an 
external point of view; and (e) a descriptive account of them must extend to 
both the nature and the functioning of these aspects.
Let us now look at what makes for an effective theory. Surely one criterion must be 
that the theory must comprehensively achieve what it sets out to do. So if a theory 
seeks to generate a descriptive and general account of a particular legal phenomenon 
(or at least its non-normative aspects), it must cover all aspects of that phenomenon. 
Further, it must achieve this using appropriate methodologies. Hence, a descriptive 
account  of  its  validable  aspects  must  be  generated  using  the  tools  of  substantive 
positivism  and  from  an  external  point  of  view,  not  through  internal  conceptual 
analysis.
My  second  thesis  holds  that  this  is  impossible.  That  is,  there  exist  certain  legal 
phenomena  whose  validable  aspects  cannot  be  described  exhaustively  or 
comprehensively from an objective, external point of view. In this thesis I explore one 
particular  example,  namely  the  state’s,  specifically  the  executive’s,  role  in  the 
enforcement  of  legal  rights.  State  enforcement  is  widely  acknowledged  to  be  an 
essential characteristic of legal rights; some like Bentham and Austin even use it to 
define the concept.38 My contention is that this occurs in a specific manner. Once a 
legal  right  becomes  recognised,  the  state  (that  is,  the  executive)  automatically 
38 See e.g. Bentham 1970: 265; also Austin 1911: 398.
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becomes bound or compelled to enforce it. This fact of being bound displays certain 
unique  properties.  Its  existence  may  be  determined  objectively  by  examining  the 
manner in which the law requires the state to behave when enforcing rights. However, 
its source cannot be resolved or identified solely on the basis of objectively validable 
standards. To generate a comprehensive descriptive account of this bound condition, it 
source  and  its  origin,  recourse  has  to  be  taken  to  standards  that  are  formally 
insignificant and not capable of objective validation, i.e. standards that lie beyond the 
domain of substantive positivism.
Thesis II: A descriptive account of the law’s validable aspects is not possible 
without reference to certain extra-legal standards:
This entails: (a) there exist certain standards of conduct which we may term 
“the bound condition”, and which are in the nature of exclusionary reasons as 
they  pertain  to  obligations  rather  than  rules;  (b)   the mechanism  of  the 
(executive  branch  of  the)  state’s  enforcement  of  legal  rights  cannot  be 
described  except  by  incorporating  the  bound  condition;  (c)  the  bound 
condition does not belong to the invalidable aspect of legal phenomena; (d) 
nonetheless,  the  source  of  this  bound  condition  does  not  derive  from 
objectively validable rules.
16
IV. METHODOLOGY AND CHAPTERISATION
The study is divided into four substantive chapters, apart from the introduction and 
conclusion:
 Chapter 2 addresses the nature of positivism. I examine positivism’s genesis in 
the natural and social sciences, the purposes it intended to serve at each stage 
of development and, most crucially, what it separated and excluded from its 
subject-matter in furtherance of its objectives.
 In Chapter 3, I examine the meaning of the term “bound”. My object here is 
twofold. The first is to demonstrate through examples that certain phenomena 
cannot be explained through conventional reasons or motives for action, but 
only  by  invoking  a  concept  like  the  bound  condition,  which  functions 
differently  from  the  former.  My  second  objective  is  to  identify  the 
characteristics of this bound condition.
 Chapter 4 relates legal rights to the bound condition. Here I seek to establish 
that when a right is to be enforced, a conduct is imposed on the state that 
satisfies all the characteristics of the bound condition.
 Lastly,  Chapter  5  addresses  the  source  of  this  bound  condition.  It  is  my 
objective here to determine that  this  source lies not within but outside the 
system of formally recognised laws.
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Chapter 2: The Positivist Agenda
In this chapter, I explore the conceptual link between substantive and methodological 
positivism. Two observations are pertinent here. First, legal phenomena are manifestly 
structurally and functionally different from both natural and social phenomena. This is 
important because any descriptive account of legal phenomena must also explain what 
gives them their  legal character,  that  is,  what distinguishes them from natural  and 
social phenomena. Secondly, it has been observed that the debate about substantive 
and methodological positivism, about whether legal theory can and should offer a 
normatively-neutral descriptive account of law and so on, is unique to legal theory.39 It 
can be conjectured that the two observations are not unrelated. That is, the basis of 
this debate lies in the singular features of legal phenomena that distinguish them from 
natural and social ones. Consequently, a deeper understanding of the relation between 
substantive and methodological positivism may shed light not just on the significance 
of validation to description (and consequently, how much need a description of law 
account for validation), but also on how precisely legal phenomena differ from natural 
and social ones.
My contention here is as follows: We saw earlier how  the legally validable aspects of 
a legal phenomenon can be separated from its other aspects. Secondly,  legal rules 
manifestly operate in a manner distinct from scientific, social and moral rules. Which 
means that within a legal phenomenon, the functioning of its legally validable aspects 
39 Leiter 2003: 30-31.
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differs from its other aspects. A descriptive account of the phenomenon must therefore 
be able to describe the functioning of each aspect, which means that it must be able to 
distinguish the legally validable aspects from the others. In other words, a descriptive 
account of a legal phenomenon, in order to be complete, must incorporate elements of 
substantive positivism.
Chapter 3: The Bound Condition
From this chapter onwards, I focus on my second thesis. In this chapter I examine a 
term I use in a specific way, namely “bound condition”. The ordinary meaning of the 
term is used in the sense of “binding statute” or “binding precedent”. I propose to use 
it in a much stronger sense. 
To start with, we must establish the need for such a concept. Going by common-sense 
thinking, one would assume that the more “mature” a legal system is, the more it will 
enforce legal  rights.  However,  several  counter-examples exist.  A legal system like 
Nazi Germany’s actually had a consistent record in enforcing rights when they did not 
clash with the state ideology. Indeed, there are even a few instances where rights have 
been  upheld  even when it  conflicted  with  ideology!  On the other  hand,  the most 
“mature”  of  legal  systems  have  had  a  long history  of  not  enforcing  legal  rights. 
Conventional theories of legal right do not extend to explaining how and under what 
circumstances these instances occur. Hence the need to move beyond them, and look 
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for more unconventional explanations.
The second part of the chapter is devoted to characterising the bound condition. So 
what precisely do I mean when I say an entity is bound to a course of conduct? Does 
it,  for  example,  refer  to  a  substantive  reason  or  a  normative  requirement  of 
rationality?40 And  if  the  first,  then  what  kind  of  a  reason?  Is  it  structurally  and 
functionally  similar  to  what  are  known  as  ‘acts  of  will’?41 In  this  regard,  Raz’s 
classification of  first-order  and second-order  reasons42 is  relevant.  The  rest  of  the 
chapter is devoted to distinguishing the bound condition from both first-order and 
exclusionary second-order reasons. 
Chapter 4: Legal Rights and the Bound Condition
In Chapter 3 we define the bound condition. At this stage it exists only as a hypothesis 
of sorts, or at best as a pattern of behaviour generally applicable to several state and 
private  entities.  In  the  fourth chapter,  we relate  this  bound condition to  the  state, 
specifically  to  the  state’s  enforcement  of  legal  rights.  I  begin  by  examining 
conventional non-normative theories of legal rights. Contemporary theories confine 
themselves to the relation between right holder and duty bearer. In the process they 
pay little attention to the state’s role; one could even say they take it for granted that 
40 See e.g. Broome and Piller 2001;  Chapman 2005.
41 “What kind of conduct is denoted by the words ‘act of will’ may not be entirely clear, but 
certainly legislating and commanding are included.” MacCormick 1973: 101.
42 See Raz 1999: 35-40.
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once the holder’s right is recognised, the state routinely, even inevitably, enforces it. 
On  the  other  hand,  older  theorists  like  Bentham  and  Austin  characterise  rights 
exclusively  in  terms  of  enforcement  by  the  state.  But  here  again,  they  attribute 
enforcement to the will or volition of the state; that is, rights are enforced because the 
state  desires  it  so.  To  my  mind,  both  treatments  are  inadequate.  Treating  state 
enforcement as a given amounts to an oversimplification. Especially so in the light of 
examples discussed in Chapter 3, where even the most “mature” among legal systems 
have failed to enforce rights. Similarly, treating enforcement as a matter of state will 
(or sovereign will) leaves vital questions unanswered. Will implies discretion. Does 
the state indeed enforce rights at its discretion? And therefore may even decline to 
enforce at times? Manifestly, this is inconsistent with legal rights as the concept is 
generally understood.
Two facts  become clear  here.  One,  the  state  does  enforce rights.  Two,  it  does  so 
irrespective of its will, without exercising any kind of choice, discretion or judgment. 
The question that arises naturally here is whether conventional first-order reasons can 
account for this conduct. I contend they cannot. Next, we examine rights enforcement 
in terms of the bound condition.  The objective here is to establish that the state’s 
behaviour  in enforcing rights exhibits all the characteristics of the bound condition 
that we identified earlier.
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Chapter 5: Source of the Bound Condition
This final chapter represents the culmination of our present exercise, where all the 
disparate elements so far established are brought together. Thus far we have argued 
for  a  conceptual  link  between substantive  positivism and the  validable  aspects  of 
methodological positivism; we have ascertained the nature of bound behaviour; and 
we have  established  that  the state  exhibits  bound behaviour  when enforcing  legal 
rights. Our next objective is to determine the source of this condition. That is, if the 
state is indeed bound, what is it bound to? 
This may be split into several smaller questions. Now that we have established that 
first-order reasons do not apply to rights-enforcement, the question remains whether 
this  bound  condition  is  itself  susceptible  to  a  simpler  explanation.  Setting  aside 
conventional first-order reasons (which we have already discarded), arguably the most 
significant possibility relates to Hart’s internal aspect. Due to paucity of space, I shall 
be compelled to address this issue only sketchily; the issue merits a dissertation to 
itself. At the same time, there exist several prima facie indications that taking recourse 
to the internal aspect does not really apply to the present situation. Stated briefly, state 
enforcement  is  one  of  the  main  characteristics  that  give  legal  rights  their  legal 
character. Consequently, any description of it must also recognise its legal character, 
that is, validate it on the basis of substantive positivism.   
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On the other hand, there exist many instances, even in mature legal systems, where 
the  state  has  evaded  enforcing  a  right  through  legislation  and  other  means. 
Consequently, to suggest that an entity is bound to something over which it has the 
power to amend and alter, must amount to a paradox. And yet the state must needs be 
bound to something, that is, some kind of standard of conduct. The only explanation 
left  is  that  the  source  of  the  bound  condition  is  extra-legal  and  thus  cannot  be 
validated objectively.
This  indicates  a  paradox.  In  order  to  be  complete,  a  description  of  the  rights 
mechanism must identify all the elements that give it the character of law, including 
the source of the bound condition. But the nature of this source is such that it cannot 
be identified objectively; we can only objectively determine that it lies beyond the 
realm of objective identification.
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CHAPTER 2 – THE POSITIVIST AGENDA
I. OVERVIEW
Methodological  positivism  endeavours  to  describe  legal  phenomena  from  a 
normatively  neutral  point  of  view.  It  entails,  as  Perry  puts  it,  the  separation  of 
morality and the  study of law rather than law itself.43 Similarly, Hart claims that a 
description  of  a  (presumably  moral  or  at  least  normative)  evaluation  can  still  be 
considered a (morally neutral) description.44 This  suggests that a descriptive account 
will remain acceptable to positivism even if its subject-matter is not morally neutral 
(and therefore not validated by substantive positivism), as long as the account itself 
refrains from endorsing a moral position.
The  question  is,  will  the  resultant  qualify  as  an  account  of  law?  Hart  may  well 
describe The Concept of Law as an essay in “descriptive sociology”,45 but this may be 
taken to gloss over certain important facts. Chances are that a descriptive sociologist 
may be content to merely identify and describe certain social practices, without going 
deeply into the source of these practices. We cannot assume that the sources will as 
central to her research agenda as the practices themselves. To the student of law, on 
the other hand, a social practice is of little use until it is identified as legal in nature. 
43 Perry 1998: 427.
44 Hart 1994: 244.
45 Ibid. at vi.
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Hence the source of a phenomenon, particularly whether the source is validated as 
legal or not, constitutes a fundamental enquiry as far as legal theory is concerned.
The  manner  in  which  validation  and  description  relate  within  legal  positivism is 
curious.  Description and validation are  present  in  the positivist  discourse of other 
disciplines also. But it is only in regard to legal positivism that scholars contend that 
description and validation constitute  logically  independent46 or  distinct47 enquiries. 
There  is  more  to  it.  Remarking  on  methodological  positivism’s  claims  of  pure 
descriptivism (specifically, Perry characterising it as such), Leiter comments: “Now it 
is curious that this kind of methodology debate is found nowhere else in philosophy, 
not even in the domains of practical philosophy, of which Perry insists jurisprudence 
is properly a branch.”48 The implications of this observation may be extended to the 
entire debate about substantive and methodological positivism. Only in the study of 
law are validation and description considered logically independent claims. Natural 
science, for example, does not even acknowledge that a distinction exists between 
validation and description (or that they comprise distinct endeavours within the larger 
framework of its discourse), leave alone treat them as logically independent entities. If 
the existence of a putative natural phenomenon cannot be ascertained empirically, it 
will  remain  pseudo-scientific  no  matter  how  normatively  neutral  a  manner  it  is 
described in.
46 Perry 1998: 427.
47 Perry 1996: 361.
48 Leiter 2003: 30.
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This calls a deeper appreciation of how description and validity relate to each other 
across  disciplines.  Such  an  endeavour  will  yield  insights  into  not  only  how 
substantive and methodological positivism relate in legal theory, but how law differs 
from  other  disciplines  like  the  natural  and  social  sciences.  It  will  also  help  in 
determining the validity of the claim that substantive positivism and methodological 
positivism constitute logically independent claims within legal positivism.
II. POSITIVISM AND NATURAL SCIENCE
I. Science in Ancient Greece
The roots of positivism lie in the natural sciences. Here we find the first systematic 
attempts at separating objectively valid knowledge from invalid knowledge. The need 
for such a separation was also first felt here. Moreover, social and legal positivism 
both freely acknowledge their origins in, and debt to, natural sciences methodology.49 
From the time of Plato onwards right till the age of Copernicus, the natural sciences50 
saw a steep decline in the Western world.51 Teleological, or goal-directed, objectives 
49 See e.g. Lenzer 1975: 220; Bix 2003: 34-35.
50 In this discussion, I use “natural science” to refer only to the physical sciences, which have 
achieved a degree of exactitude still denied to disciplines like biology or psychology. It must be 
kept in mind that the philosophy of natural science is not my central goal, and this excursus is 
only for the purposes of illustration and comparison with somewhat analogous developments in 
the study of law. Because of the exactitude they have attained, the physical sciences offer a more 
powerful and relevant illustration than other sciences do.
51 Koestler 1959: 55.
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were used to not only explain or account for,52 but also justify, natural phenomenon.53 
In the  Timeaus,  Plato postulated that  the order  and beauty of the universe can be 
explained only as the outcome of an intelligent creator consciously imposing order on 
pre-existing chaos. This ultimately leads to the assertion that the world must be a 
perfect sphere, and likewise, all planetary motion must also be perfectly circular.54 
Similarly, according to Aristotle, everything that exists in nature contain a principle of 
motion and a principle of stationariness.55 Some kinds of motion are natural, and some 
are unnatural  depending on the substance an object is made of.56 For fire,  upward 
movement is natural while downward movement is unnatural. On the other hand, for 
earth, it is downward movement that is natural, while upward movement is unnatural 
to it.57
Conformance with a priori teleological principles, such as Platonic and Aristotelian 
ideals  formed the  predominant  validating  criteria  in  ancient  Greek  science.  When 
observational data conflicted with such ideals, as it often did, philosophers sought to 
reconcile the two in the most efficacious manner possible. For example, the motion of 
planets across the sky posed a severe challenge to Plato’s ideals of uniform circular 
52 “It is the central logical property of teleological characterizations that they explain what they 
characterize.” Wright 1972: 204.
53 “The theological philosophy afforded an issue by likening all phenomena whatever to human acts 
– directly, in the first instance, by supposing all bodies to have a life more or less like our 
own . . ..” Lenzer 1975: 286-87.
54 Plato, Dialogues: Timeaus 33-34 at 448-49.
55 Ibid.: Book 2 Chapter 1at 268.
56 Ibid.: Book 1 Chapter 2 at 360.
57 Ibid.
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motion. It was observed that they follow an erratic path, at certain times deviating 
from a straight line in zigzag patterns. Several truly bizarre cosmological models were 
proposed to account  for these deviations.  “Astronomy,  after  Aristotle,  becomes an 
abstract sky-geometry, divorced from physical reality. Its task is to explain away the 
scandal of non-circular motions in the sky.”58
2. Renaissance: The Paradigm Shift
It was only in the Sixteenth Century that Western scientists engaged with the truth 
once again.  A priori postulates began to lose their importance, and consonance with 
reality became the sole criterion for validating hypotheses. This paradigm-shift was 
characterised by three seminal discoveries, each of which had a disastrous effect on 
what we may term the Platonic conception of the universe.
First Copernicus devised his heliocentric theory, which comprised an alternative to 
Ptolemy’s scheme that was not only simpler and more elegant than the latter, but also 
more consistent with observed data. Kepler then established that the orbits of planets 
were elliptical rather than circular in character. This implied that the perfect circular 
motion so essential to the Platonic conception did not hold true. The death-blow was 
58 Ibid. at 77.
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struck by Galileo’s discovery of Jupiter’s moons, which proved conclusively that the 
Earth was not the centre of all celestial phenomena.
How pervasive was this shift from Platonic a priori reasoning can be gleaned from a 
cursory  glance  at  the  scientific  literature  of  the  period.  Galileo’s  rare  Sidereal  
Messenger, for instance,59 is notable for not only its meticulous recording of celestial 
phenomena observed, but also for the manner in which it bases its conclusions on 
these observations.60 It place for either  a priori postulates or the teleological ideals 
they embody. His conclusions do not refer even disparagingly to the natural state of 
things, of Platonic ideals, or of other such considerations that dominated science till 
very recently.
3. Nature of Separation in Natural Sciences
Perhaps the most noticeable difference between the old science and the new relates to 
the role played by description. The Greeks devised their elaborate models to establish 
a  congruence  between  observed  data  and  their  teleological  postulates.  The  post-
Copernicans  eschewed  teleology,  and  created  models  that  best  reflected  observed 
data. 
Kepler  discovered that elliptical  planetary orbits  are more consistent  with existing 
59 Carlos 1880.
60 Ibid. at 44-48.
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data than circular ones. It tallied remarkably well with empirical observations made, 
which allows us to call it a fairly complete descriptive account of how or the maner in 
which planets orbit the sun. Yet Kepler said little about the factors that cause such 
behaviour. It was not until Newton arrived at his law of gravitation and applied it to 
planetary  motion  that  this  issue  was  resolved.  Newton’s  solution  did  not  involve 
teleology either. It did not even really explain “why” planets move elliptically; all it 
did was apply his law of gravitation to describe how gravity interacts with the planets’ 
momentum, and the resulting dynamic equilibrium binds planets to elliptical paths. 
The new  science thus separated the teleological, which examines why a phenomenon 
occurs, or the larger, external causes behind its occurrence; and the mechanical, which 
is restricted to explaining and describing how it occurs. 
Science did not at this point expressly exclude from its purview teleological and other 
rules  not  objectively validated.  Historically,  sciences  developed hand-in-hand with 
what  are  known as  pseudo-sciences  –   astronomy with  astrology,  chemistry  with 
alchemy.61 While  to  an  extent  this  is  due  to  their  overlapping  subject-matter, 
methodological  considerations  also  played  a  significant  role  here.62 What  is 
noteworthy is that even the methodological changes introduced after Copernicus did 
not immediately have much impact in separating science and pseudo-science. For the 
most  part,  they  contended  that  certain  phenomena  were  better  explained  by  not 
invoking teleological considerations.
61 Kasak 2006: 84.
62 Koestler 1959: 115.
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Yet  even  this  limited  endeavour  did  entail  some  validation.  What  observed  data 
invalidated were those specific projections or predictions of predominant theories that 
conflicted  with  it.  Galileo’s  discovery  of  Jupiter’s  moons  surely  invalidated  one 
component of Platonic cosmology, namely that all bodies revolve around one central 
axis.  Similarly,  Kepler’s  discovery  of  elliptical  orbits  invalidated  another  aspect, 
namely uniform circular planetary motion. The  cumulative effect of these and other 
discoveries was all  cosmologies rooted in Platonic ideals were invalidated in their 
entirety.
Gradually, natural science dispensed with teleology and became wholly descriptive. 
Pseudo-sciences  like  astrology  gradually  ceased  to  be  regarded  as  scientific. 
According  to  Paul  Thagard,  this  happened  only  in  the  eighteenth  century,  when 
figures like Voltaire and Swift attacked it.63 Leibniz was possibly the first  scientist of 
note who attempted a non-normative understanding of nature.64 The process reached 
its  culmination  in  Laplace,  who  actively  sought  to  free  science  from  divine 
intervention.  A widely  documented  if  possibly  apocryphal  story  goes  that  when 
Napoleon asked him why he did not mention God anywhere in his book on celestial 
mechanics, Laplace replied, “Sire, I had no need of that hypothesis.”65
63 Thagard 1978: 224.
64 See Bouquiaux 2008. 
65 See e.g. Bouquiaux 2008: 99; Odom 1966: 535.
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4. Natural Science Today
Today’s conception of natural science bears several fundamental  characteristics, of 
which three play a significant role in this dissertation. First, it comprises exclusively 
of  descriptive  explanations  based  on  empirical  validation.  Such  explanations  are 
regarded  as  complete accounts.  That  is,  any  teleological  or  other  unverifiable 
considerations  are  simply  excluded  from their  purview.  Secondly,  science  cannot 
admit more than one valid explanation of a particular phenomenon. A phenomenon 
may hold more than one  possible explanations, explanations that have not yet been 
either validated. But when one account gets validated, it automatically invalidates all 
other competing explanations, until of course some newer facts are discovered that 
validates a competing theory at the expense of the presently-accepted theory. Hence 
when  it  is  established  that  planets  move  in  elliptical  objects,  it  automatically 
invalidates those theories that postulate circular orbits. Just as significantly, it  also 
renders  superfluous  all  theories  that  postulate  planets  move  in  a  particular  orbit 
(whether  elliptical,  circular  or  of  some other  shape)  because  that  is  the way they 
ought to move.
The third characteristic is of utmost significance to us. In science, description and 
validation converge into one. A theory is said to be valid when (a) it  conforms to 
existing observed data, and (b) it is able to predict or anticipate future data. The closer 
it  describes  the  phenomenon,  the  more  valid  it  is  as  a  theory.  In  the  previous 
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paragraph we had discussed how only one theory can be considered valid at a given 
time. So if a theory is able to describe a phenomenon better than other competing 
theories, it not only validates itself but also, in the process, invalidates the others. This 
is also a consequence of our first point. When a discipline altogether excludes from its 
purview  the  normative,  the  invalidable  and  the  intangible,  then  not  only  does 
description  comprise  the  total  extent  of  what  the  discipline  calls  for,  but  also 
descriptivism forms the sole criterion for evaluating a theory’s merit.
IV. POSITIVISM IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
1. Origins
It  is  interesting  to  note  how  the  same  immediate  cause  or  stimulus,  namely  a 
diminution in the Church’s supremacy, engendered radically different consequences in 
natural science on the one hand, and on the other the various social, legal and other 
sciences collectively known today as the “humanities”. In the former case, it led to the 
need for objectivity, empirical validation, and a mechanical understanding of natural 
phenomena.  On  the  other  hand,  the  identical  process  of  distancing  from Church 
doctrine led to the growth of natural law!66 An indeterminacy present in natural law 
theories, their basis in postulates that could not be empirically validated, ultimately 
led to the rise of the positivists. Ironically, both natural-law theories and objectivity 
and empiricism in the natural sciences developed together, resulting from a shared 
66 Bodenheimer 1974: 31-32.
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common drift away from divine law.
Auguste Comte, widely acknowledged to be the father of sociology, also pioneered 
the  application  of  scientific  methods  to  the  social  sciences,  as  well  as  the  term 
‘positivism’ itself. Possibly his most enduring contribution to the social sciences is his 
theory of the ‘three stages’. According to this, not only human evolution itself,67 but 
also every branch of science,68 passed through three distinct stages – the theological, 
the metaphysical, and the scientific. The characteristics of the first two include “the 
preponderance of imagination over observation”, and “the exclusive investigation of 
absolute  ideas.”69 On the  other  hand,  the  scientific  spirit  is  characterised  by  “the 
steady subordination of the imagination to observation”.70
The social  sciences  like  sociology and political  science  had  not  progressed  much 
beyond the first two stages: “The present condition of political science revives before 
our eyes the analogy of what astrology was to astronomy, alchemy to chemistry, and 
the  search  for  the  universal  panacea  to  the  system  of  medical  studies.”71 In  his 
opinion, therefore, it was necessary to inject a dose of scientific enquiry into the social 
sciences.72
At times, however, he bears a more than passing resemblance to the metaphysical 
67 Lenzer 1975: 285.




72 Ibid. at 220.
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thinkers. While he gives considerable significance to observable facts, he tempers it 
by emphasising equally the importance of theory: “If it is true that every theory must 
be based upon observed facts, it is equally true that facts cannot be observed without 
the guidance of some theory. Without such guidance, our facts would be desultory and 
fruitless;  we could not retain them: for the most part  we could not even perceive 
them.”73 And again: “Our meteorological observations, as we call them, show us how 
useless may be vast compilations of facts and how really unmeaning, while we are 
destitute of any theory whatever.”74 He even debunks, on somewhat specious grounds, 
the possibility  of theory emerging from facts  -  people who hold that  belief  know 
nothing of how the human mind works, namely by anticipating observations by some 
hypothetical conception of that phenomenon.75
As positivism developed,  so  did  these  issues  get  resolved.  For  example,  Weber’s 
classic essay “The ‘Objectivity’ of Knowledge in Social Science and Social Policy”76 
explicitly addresses both questions. The circumstances in which it was written are 
noteworthy.  It  was  to  commemorate  the  establishment  of  the  journal  Archiv  für  
Sozialwissenschaft  und  Sozialpolitik.  The  article  is  actually  an  exegesis  on  the 
editorial policy of the Archiv. In the process, it also dwells at length not only on the 
objectives of the journal, but also the relationship between natural and social sciences, 
the notion of objectivity, and so on.
73 Ibid. at 73.
74 Ibid. at 286.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid. at 359.
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Weber specifies certain questions that are appropriate for scientific enquiries. These 
include  the  appropriateness  of  a  means  to  a  particular  end,  the  secondary 
consequences  of  applying  that  means,  the  cost  of  the  whole  exercise  in  terms of 
detriment to other values, and so on.77 
Turning an assessment of this  kind into a decision is  certainly  not the 
business of science,  but of the desiring person: he weighs and chooses 
between  the  values  concerned  according  to  conscience  and  personal 
viewpoint. Science can help him to a  consciousness that   all   action – 
naturally  likewise in  some circumstances  a  lack of  action –  has  as  its 
consequence  endorsement of  particular  values;  but  today that  this  also 
involves the consistent rejection of other values is too readily overlooked. 
Making a choice is his own affair.78
He  then  resorts  to  the  interesting  if  somewhat  politically  incorrect  device  of  a 
fictitious Chinaman. By this presumably he means an individual far removed from 
Western  value-systems,  and  consequently  someone  who  cannot  identify  with 
arguments that  appeal  to  Western values.  According to  Weber,  a methodologically 
correct proof in social sciences is one that is recognised as correct by even such a 
Chinaman.79 Logical arguments must also pass a similar test in order to be considered 
77 Ibid. at 361.
78 Ibid. at 361-62.
79 Ibid. at 365.
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valid.80
Positivism in the social sciences makes a distinction between assessments on the one 
hand, and value judgments and decisions on the other. Assessments are derived from 
logical relationships between facts and recognised standards. They are in the nature of 
conditional if-then-else statements. What they do is present a choice to the decision-
maker. The latter’s decision, the subjective factors that fuel it, and so on belong to the 
realm of value judgment, and are therefore excluded from the purview of positivism. 
Assessments, on the other hand, are descriptive in nature.  Both Comte and Weber 
emphasise  the  use  of  scientific  methodology  in  the  study of  social  phenomena. 
Specifically, Weber’s distinction between assessment and value-judgment is telling in 
this regard; while the first expressly eschews subjective choice, the latter expressly 
incorporates it.
3. Validation in the Social Sciences
Validation  in  the  social  sciences  would  involve  distinguishing  phenomena  that 
conform to  the  definition  of  “social  fact”  from those that  do not.  This  is  seldom 
required.  One,  social  facts  are  difficult  to  identify  with  precision.  How does  one 
demarcate “valid” from “invalid” families, or ethnic groups, or socio-economic strata? 
And  secondly,  even  in  cases  where  a  clear-cut  distinction  is  both  feasible  and 
80 “Although he might be ‘deaf’ to our ethical imperatives, can and certainly often will reject this 
ideal and the concrete evaluations flowing from it, this in no respect detracts from the scientific 
value of such conceptual analysis.” Weber 2004: 365. 
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desirable, giving recognition to one entity will not affect the status of other entities 
that  are  not  similarly  recognised.  Within  a  society,  Christians  may  be  easily 
distinguished from Muslims,  but  surely it  is  meaningless  to  treat,  say,  Islam as  a 
“superior”  religion  just  because  there  exist  in  the  society  more  Muslims  than 
Christians. 
The same can be said of social or moral rules. The existence of such a rule within a 
society is  determined by whether  the people in  the society follow it  or  not.  Now 
suppose most people in a society consider Θ to be a moral rule, while a small minority 
treats its converse Θ' as moral. A descriptive sociologist will naturally recognise Θ as 
moral rule within that society. What will be the effect of such recognition on Θ'? Its 
content may be considered immoral if viewed in the light of Θ, but it is surely not 
altogether invalidated, that is, formally invalidated, merely because it is inconsistent 
with a rule already recognised as moral. Neither will Θ' be considered an inferior rule 
in  some  way,  merely  because  fewer  people  within  the  society  follow  it.  In  the 
sociologist’s description, the two rules Θ and Θ' may exist side by side as (equally) 
moral rules, differing only in that a greater proportion of the population follows one to 
the exclusion of the other. 
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V. POSITIVISM AND LEGAL THEORY
1. Legal and Social Positivism
The  growth  of  legal  positivism has  paralleled  similar  developments  in  the  social 
sciences. Like the latter, it is a reaction to both the theological and the metaphysical. 
Just as law is a social  phenomenon, so has its study been likened to the study of 
society. Hart claims right in the preface of The Concept of Law that his exegesis may 
be regarded as an essay in descriptive sociology.81 
Even Comte’s principle of the three stages82 finds startlingly similar reflection in legal 
positivism. Austin is famous for speaking out against the putative superiority of the 
law of god over the law of man,83  while Bentham is remembered for his peevish 
outburst against natural rights: “That which has no existence cannot be destroyed — 
that  which  cannot  be  destroyed  cannot  require  anything  to  preserve  it  from 
destruction.  Natural  rights  is  simple  nonsense:  natural  and  imprescriptible  rights, 
rhetorical nonsense — nonsense upon stilts.”84 
However, important differences exist between the two forms of positivism. Unlike 
social  positivism,  which  emerged  from the  need  to  study  social  phenomena  in  a 
81 Hart 1994: vi.
82 Lenzer 1975: 219.
83 Austin 1954: 184-85.
84 Bentham 1997: 53.
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scientific manner, legal positivism was created with an explicit agenda of separating 
law itself, and not the study of law, from extrinsic factors. 
This is not a trait exclusive to positivism alone. Separating law from non-law lies at 
the heart of all theories of law. Divine-law and natural-law theories do so too, except 
that the validating criteria they use are in the nature of  a priori standards. One of 
positivism’s most significant differences with the first two lies in its explicit rejection 
of such a priori validating standards.85 It treats as two separate and independent issues 
the question whether a rule is a law, and the question why it has been made a law; that 
is to say a law’s validity and its desirability. As Austin states:86
The existence of law is one thing; its merit or demerit is another. Whether 
it be or be not is one enquiry; whether it be or be not conformable to an 
assumed standard, is a different enquiry. A law, which actually exists, is a 
law, though we happen to dislike it, or though it vary from the text, by 
which we regulate our approbation and disapprobation.
Hitherto all  significant legal theories had conflated validity with desirability,  or  at 
least derived from the second the criteria for the first.  Characteristically, they also 
85 I reiterate here that while legal positivism comprises a priori separation as well as an a posteriori 
separation components, both these occur within the larger a posteriori orientation of positivism. I 
characterise positivism’s larger orientation as a posteriori in nature because it separates valid and 
invalid knowledge on the basis of whether they possess certain empirically verifiable 
characteristics, and not on whether their content conforms to some criterion of morality or 
desirability.
86 Austin 1954: 184.
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took for granted the circumstances in which a rule became a law. Both divine-law and 
natural-law thinkers implicitly assumed that lawmakers were also somehow bound by 
the  conditions  that  determined  whether  a  law  was  desirable  or  not,  and  thus  ex 
hypothesi,  valid  or  not.  To  a  divine-rights  theorist,  for  example,  just  as  a  law’s 
desirability derives from divine mandate, so does the temporal ruler’s authority. And 
hence the ruler’s adoption of rule as law is only incidental to the rule’s conformance 
with divine law, from which fact its legal validity really stems. 
In the light of this, it is perhaps not a coincidence that Austin simultaneously liberated 
both law and ruler from a priori constraints. His definition of sovereign in fact rests 
on unconstrained authority – he famously characterises sovereignty in terms of the 
bulk of  the populace habitually  being in  obedience to  a  person or  body,  and that 
person or body not being habituated to obey anyone else.87 Equally famous is  his 
characterisation of law: “Every law or rule . . . is a command. Or, rather, laws of rules, 
properly co called,  are a  species of commands.88” Commands are characterised by 
three components,  viz. (a) a wish or desire by one person that another should do or 
forbear to do something, (b) an “evil” (i.e. sanctions) emanating from the former in 
case of non-compliance, and (c) an expression  or intimation of that desire.89
The unfettered discretion Austin gave to the sovereign meant that her role as legislator 
was no longer incidental to the law’s validity. Consequently, the questions (a) whether 
87 Ibid. at 193-94.
88 Ibid. at 13.
89 Ibid. at 14-17.
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at  all  a rule was law and (b) the reasons why the rule  was (or ought to be) law, 
constituted two distinct and mutually independent enquiries. Austin postulated that the 
question whether a rule was law should be answered by looking solely at whether it 
had been made law,  i.e. whether the sovereign, exercising her independent will, had 
conferred on the rule the status of law. Austin’s seminal contribution, then, was to 
shift the location of a law’s validity from the reason-why to the factum of being made 
law.
It  may  be  remarked  parenthetically  that  Austin’s  conceptions  of  illimitable 
sovereignty and law-as-command are often misunderstood as suggesting nothing less 
than  a  despotism,  where  an  absolute  sovereign  enforces  commands  on  pain  of 
sanctions. Even Hart talks of “ .  .  .  the analysis of law in terms of the sovereign, 
habitually obeyed and necessarily exempt from all legal limitation . . ..90” As a matter 
of fact,  it  is Bentham who explicitly links law to sovereignty.91 Unlike Austin,  he 
refrains from characterising sovereignty in terms of illimitable or absolute power. His 
definition of sovereignty points to a person or assemblage of persons to whom the 
entire political community is supposed to obey.92
Austin stops short of linking law or legality to the notion of sovereignty. What he 
actually states is: “Laws and other commands are said to proceed from superiors to 
90 Hart 1994: 79.
91 Bentham 1970: 1.
92 Ibid. at 18.
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inferiors.93” After holding god to be emphatically the superior of man,94 he goes on to 
say that to a limited extent (italics mine), the sovereign can be considered the superior 
of the subject of citizen.95 By this, the sovereign is reduced to a special case within the 
genus “superior”.
Austin’s contributions  to methodological positivism are often overlooked. Most of 
The Province of Jurisprudence Determined addresses the validation of law. His other 
works,  which  were  published  posthumously  under  the  title  Lectures  on 
Jurisprudence96 and to this day have not achieved the renown they so clearly deserve, 
deal more specifically with methodological positivism. 
For instance,  take his essay, originally titled “On the Study of Jurisprudence” and 
found in Volume III of the 1863 edition of the Lectures,97 but renamed “On the Uses 
of the Study of Jurisprudence” and relocated to Volume II of the 1911 fifth edition 
revised  and  edited  by  Robert  Campbell.98 It  starts  by  stating  that  the  appropriate 
subject of jurisprudence is positive law, or law established by the authority of the 
sovereign or supreme government. More specifically, it concerns elements common 
across legal systems: “Though every system of law has its specific and characteristic 
93 Austin 1954: 24.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
96 Austin 1863; Austin 1911.
97 Austin 1863: vol. 3 at 349.
98 Austin 1911: vol. 2 at 1071. To add to the bibliographical confusion, the essay has also been 
appended to some editions of The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, including the one I 
have referred to here, under the second title. So as to avoid further ambiguity, in this dissertation I 
cite references exclusively from 1911 edition of the Lectures; this also applies to the 
aforementioned essay.
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differences, there are principles, notions, and distinctions common to various systems, 
and  forming  analogies  or  likeness  by  which  such  systems  are  allied.99”  Austin 
concedes that while some of these elements are common to all legal systems, even 
“scanty and crude systems of rude societies”, others are restricted to legal systems that 
have attained a certain level of development, i.e. “the ampler and maturer systems of 
refined communities”.100 Even these elements pertain to legal systems solely by virtue 
of their levels of development, and not on the basis of some a priori consideration. He 
goes on to define his conception of “general jurisprudence” thus: “I mean, then, by 
General Jurisprudence, the science concerned with the exposition of the principles, 
notions,  and distinctions  which  are  common to systems  of  law: understanding by 
systems of law, the ampler and maturer systems which, by reason of their amplitude 
and maturity, are pre-eminently pregnant with instruction.” 101
This  is  a  clear  statement  of  what  can  be  regarded  as  the  positivist  agenda.  It  is 
significant  to  us  in  two other  respects.  The  first  is  his  insistence  on likening  the 
project to a science. He even distinguishes this science from the science of legislation, 
which “ . . . affects to determine the test or standard (together with the principles 
subordinate or consonant to such test) by which positive law ought to be made, or to 
which positive law ought to be adjusted.102 The second concerns his distinguishing 
“ampler and maturer” legal systems over more primitive ones. We shall examine this 
99 Ibid.: vol. 2 at 1072.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid.: vol. 2 at 1073.
102 Ibid.: vol. 2 at 1072.
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in detail when we address H.L.A. Hart’s contributions.
3. Influence of H.L.A. Hart
Hart’s initial contributions were in the direction of methodological positivism. They 
related to how legal concepts may be analysed more accurately. In one of his earliest 
papers, “Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence”,103 he addresses how the meaning of 
a legal term may be more accurately determined not by construing it isolation but 
through  considering  complete  sentences  in  which  the  term plays  its  characteristic 
role.104 Hence instead of positing the question “what is a right”, if we first take the 
sentence “X has a right over Y” and then analyse the implications of this sentence, we 
may better understand what a right means. Another important essay, “Positivism and 
the Separation of Law and Morals”,105 addressed issues of substantive positivism. It 
did not break new ground in positivist thought, but for the most part endeavoured to 
defend substantive positivism (and  separation of law from morality).  It was only in 
his seminal work The Concept of Law106 that he began to develop positivist thought in 
a manner that broke away from Austinian traditions. It contains several key points of 
departure from established positivist conventions. Here we shall discuss only a few 
that concern us directly. 
103 Hart 1954.




Hart recognised that rules are of two types. Primary rules impose upon humans the 
requirement to perform or abstain from certain actions.107 They impose duties, confer 
rights, recognise liberties and so on. Primitive legal systems may comprise entirely of 
primary rules. But they suffer from three drawbacks. In the absence of any recognised 
standard of legality, uncertainty prevails whether a particular rule is law or not. Since 
such a legal system will  not feature a procedure for changing laws,  it  is  static in 
nature. Thirdly, it relies on diffuse social pressure for the application of rules, leading 
to inefficiency.108  
These defects are remedied by what Hart calls secondary rules, which are rules that 
relate to primary rules themselves, not to humans directly as primary rules do. These 
are of three types. “Rules of recognition” enumerate certain characteristics that a rule 
has to feature to be deemed law. “Rule of change” determine the method by which a 
rule  can  be  enacted,  altered,  or  discarded.  And  “rules  of  adjudication”  identify 
adjudicators in cases of dispute, and also lay down the procedure to be followed.109 
According to Hart, these secondary rules are what distinguish a modern municipal 
legal system from a primitive one. 
Another of Hart’s most important contributions was on the nature of (primary) rules. 
Arguably the Austinian theory’s greatest weakness was its reliance on sanctions.110 
107 Ibid. at 81.
108 Ibid. at 91-93.
109 Ibid. at 94-97.
110 Hart 1994: 19.
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Hart’s response was to craft a conception of “command” that was not based upon the 
threat of sanctions. Pointing out that the term “command” is most commonly used in 
military contexts, he holds that when a general commands a sergeant, the latter is 
expected to comply not out of fear of sanctions but respect for authority.111 He holds: 
“It  is  obvious  that  the  idea  of  a  command  with  its  very  strong  connection  with 
authority is much closer to that  of law than a gunman’s orders backed by threats, 
though the latter is an instance of what Austin . . . misleadingly calls a command.112
At a later stage, though, he points out that the phrase “being obliged” and “having an 
obligation” connote two different things – it could be said the bank clerk was obliged 
to hand over the money, but is manifestly incorrect to say that when the gunman 
threatened him, he  had an obligation, or was  under an obligation, to comply.113 A 
person may remain under an obligation to do something,  even when the threat of 
sanctions no longer exists.114
This leads to the third of Hart’s contribution that we shall discuss here, and also the 
one most significant to our thesis. One of the three grounds on which he distinguishes 
rules from mere habits115 is that rules possess what he calls an “internal aspect”. This 
is that social rules exist not only as guidelines but also as reflective standards. “ [I]f a 
social rule is to exist some at least must look upon the behaviour in question as a 
111 Ibid. at 20.
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid. at 82.
114 Ibid. at 83.
115 Ibid. at 55-56.
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general  standard to be followed by the group as a whole.116” For example,  in  the 
course of a chess game, a player will not only move the queen in the way prescribed 
by the  rules,  but  also consider  the  rules  generally  applicable  to  all  players.  So if 
another player moves the queen in a manner not permitted by the rules, she (the first 
player) would consider her consequent criticism legitimate, solely due to the existence 
of the rule.117 This demand for conformity manifests itself in a normative vocabulary 
(“ought”, “must”, “should” etc.) traditionally associated with rules but not with habits.
Hart of course concedes that not all participants in a legal system must acknowledge 
this  internal  aspect  of  rules.  It  is  enough  if  all  citizens  or  subjects  acknowledge 
primary rules as imposing obligations on them individually, and comply with them for 
whatever  reasons.  On  the  other  hand,  officials  must  accept  secondary rules  as 
common  public  standards  of  official  behaviour,  obligating  themselves  and  also 
providing them with a ground of criticism if any other official deviates from them.118
A related notion is that of internal and external points of view.119 The first is held by a 
participant  in  the  system,  who  acknowledges  the  existence  of  the  rules,  and  the 
consequent pressure on participants to conform. The external point of view can be of 
several types. An observer from outside the group, without accepting the rules herself, 
can contend that the people inside the group accept the rules, and thus proceed to 
116 Ibid. at 56.
117 Ibid. at 57.
118 Ibid. at 116-17.
119 Ibid. at 89-91.
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ascertain how the internal point of view will apply onto the latter. Or the observer can 
altogether  ignore  the  internal  aspect  of  the  rules,  and  merely  describe  individual 
behaviour as facts. This is something like observing that in a chess game the players 
move their rooks only horizontally or vertically, without acknowledging that the rules 
of the game are what prevent the players from moving their rooks diagonally.120
The second external perspective involves the observer being “content to record the 
regularities  of  observable  behaviour”.121 Such  regularities,  combined  with  other 
behavioural occurrences like hostile reactions, punishments or reproofs, might lead 
the observer to inductively ascertain the nature of the rules. This is what is associated 
with the “scientific” point of view. According to Hart, the drawback of such a fact-
stating, predictive discourse is that it can capture only the externalities of the system. 
In order to gain insights into the internal aspects of the system, it is necessary to 
examine how officials and their actions are related to secondary rules.122 Elsewhere he 
states that not taking the internal point of view
 . . . jettisons something vital not only to the understanding of law but of 
any form of normative social structure. For the understanding of this the 
methodology of  the  empirical  sciences  is  useless;  what  is  needed is  a 
‘hermeneutic’ method which involves portraying rule-governed behaviour 
as  it  appears  to  participants,  who  see  it  as  conforming  or  failing  to 
120 Ibid. at 89.
121 Ibid.
122 Ibid. at 99.
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conform to certain standards.123
Hart thus proposes a middle-path between “scientific” positivism and a normative, 
possibly subjective approach. It  remains descriptive because the observer does not 
identify  herself  with  the  system,  neither  does  she  endorse  the  subjective 
considerations, or even we may say the normative orientation, of the system. At the 
same  time,  it  evades  some  of  the  descriptive  drawbacks  of  a  purely  “scientific” 
methodology, and yields a richer account. 
VI. THE WAY FORWARD
1. Three Zones in the Study of Law
The above discussion highlights several considerations. Among the most crucial is the 
changing connotations of the term “descriptive”. Within the framework of classical 
positivist jurisprudence, “descriptive” and “prescriptive” occupied distinct, mutually 
exclusive  spaces.  The  latter  pertained  to  the  normative  aspect  of  a  law  –  its 
desirability,  the  nature  of  its  objectives,  and  its  efficacy  in  fulfilling  them. 
Descriptivism, on the other hand, addressed “law as it is” (to use Austin’s phrase) – 
questions like whether the law is formally valid or not, and also about “the principles, 
notions, and distinctions which are common to systems of law”.124 The descriptive 
123 Hart 1983: 13.
124 Austin 1911: vol. 2 at 1073.
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aspects  of  the  law  can  be  identified  and  validated  objectively,  its  prescriptive  or 
normative aspects cannot. But Hart, through ideas like the internal aspect of rules, and 
also  by  extending  the  scope  of  description  to  cover  evaluation  of  a  participant’s 
actions,125 advanced the view that even the non-normative aspect of rules, or those 
aspects “common to systems of law”, contain elements that do not lend themselves to 
objective validation from an external point of view. As we saw, Dickson disagrees 
with this approach, and postulates that evaluation, or “indirect evaluation” (to use her 
term)  should  comprise  an  intermediate  “camp”  between  the  descriptive  and  the 
normative.126  This is not a universally accepted position even among methodological 
positivists.  Leiter,  for  example,  explicitly  rejects  it,  and  claims  that  if  one 
distinguishes between epistemic values  and normative values, one may incorporate 
the former within the descriptive aspect.127
We shall not take sides about who is correct, that is, whether evaluation lies outside 
the descriptive or not. Let us restrict ourselves to contending that there exist three 
separate zones. The first is the normative component, which lies outside the domain of 
positivism. What remains, that is, the descriptive component, can be split further into 
two components. One lends itself to objective verification. And the other comprises of 
those elements whose functioning can be understood only hermeneutically, from the 
point of view of a participant. This intermediary zone between the normative and the 
objectively  validable  comprises  what  has  been  variously  described  as  “indirectly 
125 Hart 1994: 244.
126 Dickson 2001: 33. 
127 Leiter 2003: 42-43.
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evaluative propositions” (Julie Dickson)128 and “epistemic values” (Brian Leiter).129 
We shall  refer to this as the  invalidable aspect of the descriptive component.  The 
difference between it and the normative zone is that components located here still 
correspond to the requirement of generality that Hart postulates as a requirement of 
positivism. However, detractors of methodological positivism such as Stephen Perry 
claim this zone extrudes into the normative.130 
All this we have seen earlier. We are not interested in these questions, i.e. the relation 
between the intermediary zone and the normative, and whether a distinction exists 
between the two. Rather, our concern is with how the intermediary zone relates to the 
objectively validable aspect of law. Or, to put it another way, what is the significance 
of validity to our understanding of law?
2. The Significance of Validity
Even in our discussion of the natural sciences, we did not enquire just why validity is 
so  significant  to  it.  Stated  in  very  simple  terms,  it  is  because  natural  science 
endeavours to establish a causal link between an act and its consequences. So if I burn 
two molecules of hydrogen in one molecule of oxygen,  I  know I will  obtain two 
molecules of water. This is because the science behind this chemical reaction (that is 
to say, the descriptive account of the mechanism – the threshold energy needed to 
128 Dickson 2001: 64.
129 Leiter 2003: 34-35.
130 See Perry 1998: 461-62.
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break down covalent bonds, the formation of covalent bonds between one oxygen 
atom and two hydrogen atoms, the energy released in the process) has been validated 
innumerable times and found to be consistent across a broad range of circumstances. 
As against this, take a discipline like astrology, which has as of this point not been 
validated as a science. It might postulate a link between celestial bodies occupying a 
certain position and, say, the likelihood of my falling down a staircase and breaking 
my neck on a particular day. It might provide a description of how the celestial bodies 
act  in  concert  through  some astral  plane  to  affect  either  my  destiny  or  my  will, 
causing me to lose my footing. The prediction may even be accurate; I may indeed 
fall down the stairs on the specified day. But notwithstanding all this, the question 
remains: can we regard this descriptive account as  true? Maybe, maybe not. All we 
can  say  for  certain  is  that  the  explanation  has  not  been  validated as  true.  And 
consequently, we cannot rely on it the way we can place reliance on something that is 
validated as a scientific truth.
The law also seeks a definite correlation between actions on the one hand, and on the 
other  hand  consequences  in  the  form  of  claims,  obligations,  privileges,  powers, 
liabilities and the like. I may not know for sure that I will fall down the stairs and 
break my neck on a certain date, but I do know that if before I die I make a will, sign 
it,  and have it  attested by two witnesses,  the persons  named as  beneficiaries  will 
receive my property in accordance with the terms I have specified in the document. 
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Hence, just like when I burn hydrogen in oxygen, I may reasonably expect that my 
actions will yield the result prescribed under the law. On the other hand, this holds 
true only if the rule I rely upon has been validated as law. It is perfectly possible to 
rely on a rule which has not been validated as law but, regardless of whether or not I 
actually know about its  lack of validity,  there is  little cause for me to  reasonably 
believe  that  the  consequence  of  my  action  shall  be  according  to  what  the  rule 
stipulates. In other words, validation entails a reasonable belief that the rule, whether 
scientific or legal, shall be observed. This is why it is so significant to natural and 
legal spheres alike.
3. Validation in Law
We recall that in the natural world, description and validation converge. This is itself a 
consequence of two other characteristics. One, at a given time, there can be only one 
valid explanation for a natural phenomenon. And two, a description account amounts 
to  an exhaustive account  of  the particular  phenomenon,  because today’s  scientific 
paradigm does not countenance anything beyond what is validable.
In  the legal  domain also,  multiple  laws governing a  particular  phenomenon is  an 
anomaly, since it engenders the possibility of more than one prescribed conduct in a 
given situation. On the other hand, the second of the foregoing characteristics,  viz. 
descriptive accounts being exhaustive of the phenomenon under study, certainly does 
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not apply to law. This is for two reasons. First, the law has a normative component. 
Even the non-normative portion contains elements that can be understood (and hence 
described) from the internal point of view rather than from an external perspective 
basing itself on objective validation. Secondly and consequently, unlike in the natural 
sciences, description here necessarily does not confine itself to objectively verified 
facts. Hence, to this extent, description and validation do entail logically independent 
objectives as Perry has pointed out.131
Paradoxically,  this  also  establishes  description’s  dependence  on  validation  in 
jurisprudence. As we noted, ideally there should be only one prescribed conduct in a 
given situation. Suppose two rules exist, one specifying at least two witnesses in order 
for a will to be valid, and another only one witness. Both rules cannot apply at at the 
same  time,  because  if  a  will  is  witnessed  by  only  one  person,  it  will  be  invalid 
according to the first  rule and valid according to the second, a clearly anomalous 
position. Hence logically, only one or the other can be legally valid at a given time. 
The question which of the two is valid cannot be ascertained solely from description. 
Some people within a legal system may act out of a misplaced belief that a will needs 
only one witness. However deeply entrenched in society the practice may be, it  is 
clearly not a practice that is mandated by law. (Neither indeed does the fact of social 
acceptance  automatically  confer  legal  validity  on  it.)  However,  if  the  practice  is 
entrenched  deeply  enough,  an  individual  compiling  a  descriptive  account  only 
through observation (and not by examining the validity of rules) may conclude that a 
131 Perry 1998: 427.
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legal rule to the effect does exist. This is akin to Hart’s illustration of an individual 
observing  a  chess  game,  recording  “the  regularities  of  observable  behaviour”  and 
inductively inferring from it the rules that govern chess.132 The players may, for purely 
strategic reasons, choose to move their queens only horizontally or vertically, leaving 
the observer no wiser to the fact that the rules permit diagonal moves too. 
Hence (a) in the legal sciences, description does not of itself establish validity, and (b) 
establishing the legal validity of the rules and practices being described, or at least 
their validable components, is necessary to determine whether the phenomenon under 
study  is  a  legal  phenomenon  or  not,  and  hence  essential  to  the  description’s 
comprehensiveness.  The  question  still  remains  what  should  be  the  basis  of  the 
validation. Substantive positivism is not the only method of doing this. All theories of 
law – divine law, natural law and so on – have their own criteria for separating law 
from non-law. But these theories rely not on formal requirements as positivism does, 
but on the content of a rule satisfying a priori criteria. The problem with this approach 
is  that  they  frustrate  what  Hart  identified  as  the  objective  of  methodological 
positivism,  viz. to generate a theory of law that is both general and descriptive. For 
example, if we go by Fuller’s conception of law’s internal morality,133 we would have 
to exclude from our discussion systems like the Nazi legal regime, which according to 
Fuller did not amount to a legal system altogether.134 Since this is not a universally-
132 Hart 1994: 89.
133 See e.g. Fuller 1958: 644-46.
134 Fuller 1958: 646.
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accepted conclusion,135 excluding the Nazi regime would prevent our account from 
being general in nature.
We may therefore conclude that (a) even if the description of a legal phenomenon 
includes some elements that require to be described from an internal point of view, it 
must include other elements that lend themselves to objective validation; (b) in the 
absence  of  such  elements,  the  phenomenon  cannot  be  called  legal;  (c)  hence  a 
descriptive  account  independent  of  validation  is  inadequate  from a  jurisprudential 
perspective because it is not capable of determining whether the phenomenon under 
study  is  legal  in  nature  or  not;  (d)  consequently,  to  determine  the  legality  of  a 
phenomenon,  description  must  involve  some  degree  of  validation;  and  (e)  this 
validation must be conducted on the basis of substantive positivism, otherwise the 
resulting  descriptive  account  will  not  be  general  in  nature,  that  is,  applicable 
universally across legal systems.
135 See e.g. Hart 1958: 617-18.
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CHAPTER 3 – THE BOUND CONDITION
I. STATEMENT OF CONTEXT
In the previous chapter we inferred that one characteristic of legal positivism sets it 
apart  from other  types  of  positivism.  Both  validation  and description  individually 
fulfil critical functions within its framework, and in the absence of either, the basic 
requirements of legal positivism will not be satisfied.  In the subsequent chapters, we 
confine ourselves to a specific phenomenon, namely legal rights. Within this, we shall 
examine what a descriptive account of it entails. 
The objectives of the present chapter are twofold. The first is to demonstrate that, 
simply put, there is more to upholding (and specifically enforcing) legal rights than 
appears at first sight, and that conventional theories do not adequately explain this 
phenomenon.  This  also  creates  the  need  for  a  new theoretical  approach,  which  I 
contend  my  concept  of  the  bound  condition  fulfils.  The  second  objective  is  to 
ascertain  the  nature  and specific  characteristics  of  this  bound condition.  I  do  not 
attempt here to relate the bound condition to legal rights, or even to state action in 




In both popular and legal parlance, the term “bound” is used in several senses. Austin 
identifies “legally bound” with little more than being threatened by sanctions unless 
some  conduct  is  complied  with.136 “Morally  bound”  derives  not  so  much  from 
sanctions as from appeals to a greater good. Similarly, holding someone bound to or 
by  certain  social  practices  amounts  to  implying  liability  to  considerable  social 
criticism in the event of deviation from those practices. These instances all feature 
certain common characteristics. Each involves a set  of norms or rules intended to 
constrict individual behaviour, with various degrees of stringency, usually to ensure 
conformity with a specified course of conduct.
I suggest the possibility that an individual may be “bound” to a specific conduct in a 
yet deeper sense. As a working definition, I mean by the phrase “X is bound to Φ” a 
condition where the concerned normative system places so stringent a requirement to 
comply with Φ that it allows for only the possibility of compliance, and simply does 
not contemplate the possibility of any deviation.  Hence, if a deviation from Φ does 
take place, it necessarily and ipso facto occurs outside the parameters of the normative 
system. It is my argument that not only does this state exist, as in real-life instances 
can  be  found  that  correspond  to  its  parameters,  but  also  it  bears  a  necessary 
136 See e.g. Austin 1954: 14-15.
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connection with the mechanism for upholding legal rights.
The relationship between legal rights and this “bound condition” I shall examine in 
the  following  chapter.  Presently  I  shall  confine  myself  to  two interim objectives. 
Though the relationship between them will not be clear at this stage, it is expedient to 
address both objectives here in order to set the foundations for the next chapter.
The first concerns the need for such a stringent construction of the term “bound”. This 
need is a consequence of the relation between legal rights and their enforcement. We 
cannot take enforcement as a given merely because the legal system recognises rights, 
or even if it generally enforces them. A cursory overview of legal practice the world 
over reveals numerous discrepancies between the two; even the most “mature” among 
legal systems (to  use Austin’s term) are  known to have occasionally  defaulted on 
enforcement. On the other hand, there exist instances of rights being honoured under 
the most seemingly adverse of circumstances. These circumstances call for a deeper 
investigation into the mechanics of right enforcement. Moreover, it is my contention 
that this can be effectively achieved through this “bound condition”.
The second objective relates to the nature and characteristics of this bound condition. 
Clearly  the  above  working  definition  cannot  be  treated  as  an  exhaustive  or  even 
adequate treatment of the concept. For one, we must establish how it is different from 
conventional reasons or motives for compliance, that is, what might according to Raz 
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be  called  first-order  reasons.137 Once  we  do  so,  we  need  to  examine  our  bound 
condition in the light of Raz’s exclusionary reasons.138 I might mention at the outset 
that the bound condition owes much to it. Yet it would be misleading to identify the 
one with the other. For this reason it becomes incumbent on us to examine where the 
two are similar, and where they differ. Lastly, it is just as important to know how to 
ascertain if an entity is bound to a conduct or not. It may be conjectured that the 
behaviour of such an entity will be demonstratably different from others not under a 
similar  condition.  Therefore,  what  we  are  required  to  do  here  is  identify  those 
behavioural characteristics that an entity displays when under a bound condition. 
2. Legal Rights
The state  can be said  to  engage  with legal  rights  in  three  different  ways.  First  it 
establishes rights  in  fulfilment  of  its  legislative  functions.  Secondly,  it  recognises 
individuals’ rights; to be precise, it recognises instances where individuals’ rights have 
been  violated  –  this  it  does  through its  judicial  functions.  And finally,  once  such 
violations are recognised, it enforces the rights, or remedies the breaches, in exercise 
of its executive functions. Recognition and enforcement may be treated together as 
the process in which already-established rights are upheld.
137 See Raz 1999: 14-35. Here he does not expressly use the phrase “first-order” reasons, but 
subsequently (p. 35-48) he uses the term “second-order” to distinguish specific reasons such as 
exclusionary reasons from the former.
138 Ibid. at 35-48.
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In this thesis, I shall confine myself to addressing right enforcement.  The reasons and 
factors behind the establishment of a right is more properly the subject of a normative 
enquiry. The process of recognition, on the other hand, can be certainly subjected to a 
descriptive enquiry (demonstrating the limitations of which is the objective of our 
immanent critique). But the problem here is that the question of how the judiciary 
functions, and whether they are subject to the bound condition, is simply too vast and 
complex a topic to be effectively addressed in the present dissertation. In any case, 
our purpose is served if we demonstrate that even one of the three aspects requires 
binding the state to extra-legal standards.
3. Background to the Bound Condition
The first  question we must undertake to examine is why at  all  the issue of rights 
enforcement  is  a  contentious one,  and why a concept  like the bound condition is 
needed to address it. At first sight there seems to be little controversy – “mature” legal 
systems enforce rights, while others either ignore them altogether, or enforce them 
selectively.  In actuality,  this  is  not the case.  There can be three kinds of systemic 
attitudes to the enforcement of rights:
1. One, where the state does not recognise rights at all.
2. Two, where state enforcement of rights is made subject to some overriding 
requirement,  moral or otherwise.
62
3. The  third,  where  right  enforcement  is  not  subjected  to  any  overriding 
consideration or discretion.
Idi  Amin’s Uganda conforms to the first type,  that  is,  where state recognition and 
enforcement of rights is negligible and wholly dependent on the whim of the ruler. 
Hitler’s Germany can considered an example of the second type, if we assume the 
Nazi ideology comprises a type of morality. To be strictly accurate it lies somewhere 
between  the  first  and  second  types.  Puender’s  case,  which  we  shall  discuss 
subsequently  exemplifies  officials  ignoring  rights  more  for  personal  gains  than 
prevalent moralities. Austin’s conception of “mature” legal systems139 comprises the 
third type. 
Idi  Amin’s  reign-by-terror140 is  known alike  for  its  violence  and its  contempt  for 
legalities or the rule of law. It  was marked by a near-total  extinction of civil  and 
political  rights.  Political  opponents  were  routinely  tortured  and  extra-judicially 
executed;141 security  forces  were  given  blanket  immunity  for  their  actions;142 
perceived political threats, including Chief Justice Ben Kiwanuka, were murdered;143 
the  press  was  gagged  (and  journalists  also  killed);144 Ugandan  citizens  of  Asian 
ethnicity were forced to leave the country.145 This lawlessness also extended to civil 
139 We recall Austin differentiated between “the ampler and maturer systems of refined 
communities” and “scanty and crude systems of rude societies.” Austin 1911: vol. 2 at 1072.
140 See Kasozi et. al. 1994: 112-16.
141 Ibid. at 112-14, 249-53.
142 Ibid. at 114.
143 Ibid. at 114-15.
144 Robins 1997: 124; Kasozi et. al. 1994: 115-16.
145 See Kasozi et. al. 1994: 119-20,
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law issues. Inconvenient court verdicts were disregarded; for good measure lawyers 
representing interests inimical to the regime were kidnapped and tortured.146 
Perhaps the most egregious  example concerning civil  law was the infamous Land 
Reform  Decree,  which  made  all  land  the  property  of  the  state.  Freeholds  were 
converted  to  leaseholds,  customary  tenancy rights  were  de-recognised.  Customary 
tenants were subjected to eviction at  six months’ notice.147 All  this was ostensibly 
undertaken to boost agricultural production but, as Mugambwa points out, the plan 
was too simplistic to succeed.148 Ultimately, it remained “largely unimplemented”,149 
or “never . . . systematically implemented”.150 Among the reasons given by scholars 
for this  non-implementation was the political turmoil that the country faced at  the 
time: “During the period, government activities were almost at a standstill.”151
How brutal was Idi Amin’s regime? Scholars frequently club it with Nazi Germany, 
Pol  Pot’s  Cambodia  and  Stalin’s  Russia  as  among  the  most  oppressive  in  recent 
times.152 Uncertainty  still  prevails  about  the  precise  extent  of  the  regime’s 
consequences. It  is  estimated conservatively that in all,  about 100,000 were killed 
during Idi Amin’s rule.153 In statistical terms, the brutality of Nazi Germany is of a 
146 Kasozi et. al. 1994: 115.
147 Kisamba-Mugerwa 1998: 97.
148 Mugambwa 2007: 45.
149 Ibid. at 45.
150 Kisamba-Mugerwa 1998: 97.
151 Mugambwa 2007: 45.
152 See e.g. Borneman 2003: 31; Shestack 1982: 459.
153 “The most conservative estimates by informed observers hold that President Idi Amin Dada and 
the terror squads operating under his loose direction have killed 100,000 Ugandans in the seven 
years he has held power.” Ullman 1978: 529.
64
different magnitude altogether. One source estimates the total death toll to be around 
20,946,000 with Jews alone accounting for 5,291,000.154 
The Third Reich also shared with the latter a contempt for law and legality. Fuller 
paints a truly gloomy picture of law as it existed in the Third Reich.155 Lawyers were 
one of the most harassed and humiliated sections of society.156 Then-contemporary 
accounts  detail  the  restrictions  placed  on  members  of  the  legal  profession.157 Yet 
strangely enough, on closer inspection Nazi Germany appears to have had a better 
record of upholding legal rights than Idi Amin’s regime did.
Several theories have sought to account for this. Among the most notable is Ernst 
Fraenkel’s  “dual  state”  thesis.  It  postulated  that  Germany  was  actually  governed 
simultaneously  by  two  states,  a  “prerogative  state”  invested  with  the  power  of 
“unlimited  arbitrariness  and  violence  unchecked  by  any  legal  guarantees”,  and  a 
“normative state”, that is an “administrative body endowed with elaborate powers for 
safeguarding the legal order as expressed in statutes, decisions of courts, and activities 
of the administrative agencies.”158 Others have also commented on this dichotomous 
arrangement.159 The dichotomy manifested itself on numerous occasions, especially 
154 Rummel 1997: 112.
155 Fuller 1958: 650-55.
156 See Willig 1976.
157 Shartel & Wolff 1943: 526. About the Nazi conception of lawyers as officers of the courts, see 
also Jarausch 1986: 118.
158 Fraenkel 1941: xiii.
159 “Behind the debate over the ‘future of administrative jurisdiction’ stood, right up to the end of the 
regime, the conflicts betweeen the ‘normative state’ and the ‘prerogative state’, between state and 
party, between party chancery and Reich Interior Ministry (allied in this fight with the Reich 
Justice Ministry and the Academy for German Law), between administration and administrative 
65
when  the  interests  of  the  prerogative  state  conflicted  with  the  principles  of  the 
normative state.  In these situations, such as the Puender case,160 as a rule the first 
would predominate over the second. When the two did not conflict, it is by and large 
acknowledged that the rule of law was observed:
At the level of constitutional law, to overstate it somewhat, political life was 
dominated by the struggle for power and the authoritative decision that was 
revocable at will. At the same time, however – and this is what makes such a 
state schizophrenic – adherence to the rules could be certainly be demanded 
and implemented at the level of day-to-day administrative decisions, violations 
of  the  law  could  be  reprimanded,  and  even  a  certain  measure  of  legal 
protection  could  be  preserved.  This  explains  why  certain  spheres  of 
administrative law – for instance, the non-political parts of tax law, the law of 
eminent domain,  commercial  law, and so on – were able to maintain legal 
procedures virtually untouched from beginning to end of the Nazi regime.161
Broadly speaking, it is in areas conventionally associated with private law, such as 
property law and commercial law, that  we find the rule of law upheld (except,  of 
justice. To that extent the issue was typical of the unresolved contradictions in the entire system.” 
Stolleis 1998: 127-28. Cf. “In an sense the government of Germany is both a dictatorship and a 
series of rival dictatorships within the Nazi high command.” Galbraith 1939: 468.
160 Puender was a lawyer representing the widow of an official whose death was officially listed as 
“suicide”, but who was actually killed by the SS. Pursuing the widow’s claim against an 
insurance company required challenging the “suicide” verdict. Puender proceeded to do so only 
after obtaining guarantees from the Interior Ministry and the Justice Ministry. Despite the 
guarantees, he was arrested by the Gestapo immediately after filing the suit, and incarcerated in a 
concentration camp till the suit was “voluntarily” dropped. See Willig 1976: 10-11.
161 Stolleis 1998: 98.
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course,  when it  concerned Jews’ property).  Buchheim and Scherner  note  that  that 
though industrial activity was heavily circumscribed by government directives and 
political objectives, no industry was taken over by the state.162 Land rights were, if 
anything, further entrenched.163 Though noted economist John K. Galbraith speculates 
this could have been done to create a rural caste-system of sorts or, as he put it, a class 
of  “agrarian  Brahmans”,164 he  concedes  that  the  predominant  purpose  was  to 
consolidate landholdings,165 and as such to ensure the welfare of farmers generally.166 
(A comparison with Uganda is irresistible here. While both regimes enacted laws to 
improve agricultural conditions and productions, they adopted diametrically opposite 
strategies; one that made land rights less secure, and the other that intensified them.)
However, it would be simplistic to mark the boundaries of this “schizophrenia” on the 
lines  of  strict  public-law/private-law  or  criminal-law/civil-law  distinctions.  The 
Puender  case  was  essentially  a  private-law matter  (though it  did  have  public-law 
overtones, which is what led to his imprisonment). On the other end of the spectrum, 
there have been instances (albeit very few) of the state upholding public-law rights 
even when it conflicted with state interests or Nazi ideology. One instance is when in 
1935 two courts  refused to follow a law that allowed Jewish lawyers to represent 
indigent clients. Franz Schlegelberger, then the state secretary in the Reich Justice 
Ministry, “ . . . responded with stiff notes to the presidents of the responsible district 
162 Buchheim & Scherner 2006: 391, 394.
163 The 1933 Reichserbhofgesetz, or State Hereditary Farm Law, held that hereditary farms or 
Erbhöfen could not be sold, mortgaged, seized for existing debt, or even divided amongst heirs – 
at the death or retirement of the owners they were to pass undivided to a single successor. See 
Galbraith 1939.
164 Ibid. at 470-71.
165 Ibid. at 469.
166 Ibid. at 468.
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appeals courts” demanding explanations why the law was not followed, and what was 
the nature of the “instructions from above” that apparently directed them to do so.167
In the light of the foregoing, let us examine the third type, Austin’s conception of 
“mature”  legal  systems.168 “Mature”  clearly  does  not  indicate  a  pinnacle,  as  in 
“perfectly just” or “perfectly moral”; it denotes merely a certain level of development. 
Some theorists use the term “rule of law” in this sense. Joseph Raz postulates two 
conceptions of this term; a thick one approximating concepts like justice and morality, 
and  a  thin  one  defined  by  certain  basic  characteristics  such  as  judicial  review.169 
Surely any version of the rule of law, no matter how thin, must stipulate that rights be 
enforced  in  due  form  once  they  are  recognised?  And  on  similar  lines,  we  may 
conjecture that a legal system can be considered mature only if it upholds rights that 
its own laws have established.
And yet, a cursory survey of state practice around the world reveals that even among 
the most mature systems, non-enforcement or inadequate enforcement of established 
rights are not uncommon. By any reckoning, legal systems of UK and USA must rank 
among the most mature. Take the English case of Liversidge v. Anderson,170 where the 
law mandated a person could be arrested only if reasonable cause existed to believe 
she has hostile associations. This implied a right not to be arrested if no reasonable 
167 Nathans 2000: 292.
168 We recall Austin differentiated between “the ampler and maturer systems of refined 
communities” and “scanty and crude systems of rude societies.” Austin 1911: vol. 2 at 1072.
169 Raz 1977: 198-202, specifically 201.
170 [1942] A.C. 206.
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cause existed. Nevertheless, the House of Lords held that reasonability is satisfied if 
the  concerned  authority  merely  thinks he  has  reasonable  cause.171 Controversy 
surrounds the incarceration of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay while denying them their 
basic  rights.172 The  US  government  position  has  been  that  neither  American 
constitutional law, nor the Third Geneva Convention on prisoners of war, nor any 
other instrument of international law, is applicable to it. Many scholars challenge the 
validity of this claim, and contend that the detention is illegal under both American 
and international law.173
If the legality of Guantanamo Bay is ambiguous, there is no doubt that CIA’s practice 
of running “black sites”, or top secret detention and interrogation centres at various 
locations  across  the  globe,174  is  unambiguously  and  manifestly  illegal.  Their 
existence, their location, the identity of their inmates, the interrogation methods used, 
and the manner of determining who was to be detained there and how long, were 
meant  to  be  a  secret  to  all  but  the  topmost  echelons  of  governments  involved. 
According  to  media  reports,  the  use  of  torture  and  other  unlawful  means  of 
interrogation  was  widespread.175 Ultimately  the  US  government  admitted  their 
existence  and  shut  them  down,  reportedly  because  CIA interrogators  themselves 
refused to continue till the legality of their actions was clarified.176 
171 Ibid. at 220.
172 Steyn 2004: 9-10.
173 See Steyn 2004; Fletcher 2004.
174 Priest 2005.
175 See e.g. Mayer 2005.
176 Dinmore 2006.
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4. Need for the Bound Condition
These examples lead to inferences that are counter-intuitive. First, the incidence of 
right enforcement is not correlative to the brutality of a regime – Germany was clearly 
more brutal  than Uganda.  Neither can we conjecture  prima facie that enforcement 
bears a pervasive relationship with notions of liberal democracy, legality and good 
governance.  It  certainly  does  not  apply  even  remotely  to  Nazi  Germany.  “Good 
governance” was almost as low a priority for the Third Reich as it was for Idi Amin. 
And to a regime so openly contemptuous of legality, the idea of the state being legally 
obligated would be almost laughable.
Explanations based on morality also make for an uncomfortable fit. Fuller famously 
declared the Nazi legal system to be so immoral that it had ceased to be a legal system 
altogether.177 An adherent of Nazism would naturally take the diametrically opposite 
view point that the philosophy of the Third Reich is indeed moral in nature. In either 
case, the question before us does not strictly pertain to this issue. Schlegelberger was 
no closet liberal - his Nazi affiliations are too well-documented for that. Despite his 
misgivings about the ensuing violence, he enthusiastically supported the extra-legal 
killings of SA members in 1934, the infamous “Night of the Long Knives”;178 and 
even defended as “secret but still legal” Hitler’s euthanasia programme to eradicate 
handicapped people.179 And yet, by upholding the rights of Jewish lawyers, he acted in 
177 Fuller 1958: 660.
178 Nathans 2000: 290.
179 Ibid. at 296-97.
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a manner not only politically inexpedient but also inconsistent with his own moral 
convictions.
In short,  prima facie no clear answer exists as to why states recognise and uphold 
legal rights of private individuals. Those commonly adduced do not fully explain why 
the Third Reich,  despite  its  overt  contempt for law and legality,  respected private 
property;  why  tax  laws  were  implemented  in  due  form;  why  land  rights  were 
intensified; or why especially a committed Nazi like Schlegelberger chose to uphold 
the rights of Jewish lawyers. And on the other hand, neither do they explain how the 
most “mature” of legal systems have occasionally defaulted on right enforcement, 
despite  placing  such heavy emphasis  on it  and,  indeed,  routinely  enforcing rights 
otherwise. Manifestly, there exists a need to study this issue more closely. It is for this 
purpose that I resort to a concept like the “bound condition”. It may be noted that the 
above discussion was merely an overview of sorts. Its intention was to highlight a gap 
in existing explanations. In the following chapters I shall address at greater depth the 
issues  raised  here.  In  particular,  I  shall  examine  the  inadequacy  of  existing 
explanations, as well  as the relevance of the bound condition and how it  yields a 
better  explanation.  In  this  chapter,  I  shall  confine  myself  to  the  definition  and 
implications of the bound condition.
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III. REASONS FOR COMPLIANCE – A TAXONOMY
An essential difference between the causative and the normative world is that human 
action  is  subject  to  human  judgment.  For  this  reason,  individual  conduct  can  be 
regulated only through providing to the individual a reason or motive for complying 
with a directive. These reasons for compliance vary widely in character and severity. 
Bribing,  pleading,  urging,  ordering,  persuading,  sermonising,  commanding  and 
threatening all entail some such reason.
According to Joseph Raz, such reasons for action may be divided into two classes, 
first-order  and  second-order  reasons.180 First-order  reasons  are  reasons  as  we 
conventionally understand them. They are of the form “X is a reason for Θ” or “A’s 
reason for doing Θ is X” and so on.181  An important characteristic of these reasons is 
that  they possess a dimension of strength.  Some reasons are regarded as stronger, 
weightier  or  more  consequential  than  others,  and in  the  event  of  a  conflict,  such 
reasons shall prevail over the weaker or less consequential.182  “[C]onflicts of reasons 
are  resolved  by  the  relative  weight  or  strength  of  the  conflicting  reasons  which 
determines which of them overrides the other.”183 
Second-order reasons are defined as “ . . . any reason to act for a reason or to refrain 
180 See Raz 1999: 14-48.
181 Raz identifies five such forms of sentences. See ibid. at 16.
182 Ibid. at 25.
183 Ibid. at 35.
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from acting for a  reason.”184 An exclusionary reason is  defined as  a  second-order 
reason  to  refrain  from  acting  for  a  particular  reason.185 Suppose  I am  keen  on 
watching a cricket match, but which would mean missing a very important deadline at 
work. My interest in cricket will constitute a first-order reason here. But my duty to 
meet the deadline is so significant that it not so much outweighs as  negates all the 
first-order reasons present.  This is an example of an exclusionary reason, because it 
overrides first-order reasons not by outweighing them but “ . . . by a general principle 
of  practical  reasoning  which  determines  that  exclusionary  reasons  shall  always 
prevail, when in conflict with first-order reasons.”186 
I shall not attempt here an exhaustive taxonomy of reasons for compliance. Such an 
endeavour both requires and deserves an essay to itself. For now, I restrict myself to 
briefly enumerating what can be considered the three principal categories, along with 
their salient features. 
1. Subjective Reasons
“Subjective reasons” function by appealing to the actor’s subjective interests. They 
are of two types, positive and negative. Inducements are positive in nature in the sense 
that they confer some benefit to the actor in return for her compliance. Bribes, reward 
points,  and  tax  breaks  all  fall  within  this  category.  Of  itself  this  type  attracts  no 
184 Ibid. at 39.
185 Ibid. 
186 Ibid. at 40.
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disapprobation in case of non-compliance. An individual is not usually censured if she 
declines to take advantage of a tax break (let alone a bribe!). Of course, it can coexist 
with other reasons for compliance  as well – one can have a perfectly valid scenario 
that  involves  reward  for  performance  as  well  as  sanctions  imposed  for  non-
compliance.
Subjective reasons of the second type do not benefit the actor, but cause the actor 
some loss or pain at a personal level in case of her non-compliance. A typical example 
is a subjective appeal, such as a child requesting or pleading for a second ice-cream. 
The parent might occasionally indulge a tantrum of this sort, but she does not do so 
because it  will benefit her,  or because it is good (surely too many ice-creams can 
never be a good idea!). Her motive for compliance is to not see the child too unhappy.
2. Normative Reasons
Normative reasons function by invoking morality, justice, fairness, benevolence, the 
divine  will  and  other  standards  considered  to  be  virtuous  at  a  general level. 
Characteristically,  their  validity is not restricted to the actor (as subjective reasons 
are), but apply across individuals. 
Normative standards conform to either of two types, which Fuller classifies as the 
moralities  of  duty  and  aspiration  respectively.187 Failing  to  observe  a  morality  of 
187 Fuller 1964: 5-9.
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aspiration  does  not  ipso  facto attract  censure,  that  is,  non-compliance  with  this 
morality is not rendered unjustified merely because the morality exists. One is usually 
not  criticised  for  not  feeding  stray  dogs,  or  helping  the  needy,  or  engaging  in 
community service. On the other hand, the existence of the morality not only justifies 
the actor’s compliance with it, but also singles her out for especial approbation. 
The morality of duty works in a precisely opposite way. It imposes a duty on the 
actor, and so makes compliance non-optional. This is done when it is considered that 
the good-ness, right-ness or other virtue the parent standard serves can be best upheld 
by  making  compliance  non-optional.  Thus  a  failure  to  comply  becomes  both 
unjustified  and  deserving  of  censure.  Characteristically,  neither  does  conformity 
confer any especial approbation on the actor. 
Subjective reasons discussed earlier are by definition not considered good, right, or 
otherwise virtuous at a general level. That is why they are not regarded as imposing a 
duty on the actor. It is ridiculous to think of a parent being under a duty to buy her 
child a second ice-cream. On the other hand, surely every parent can be said to have a 
moral duty to give her child proper food?
Proponents of normative standards may require them to be recognised as good, right, 
representative  of  the  divine  will,  or  otherwise  virtuous,  either  absolutely  and 
universally across peoples, communities and societies, or at least among  members of 
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the community to which it is applied. According to this paradigm, such good-ness or 
right-ness itself comprises the reason for compliance; the actor is required to comply 
because it is good or right. In other words, she is required to recognise this good-ness 
or right-ness, and then, as a consequence of this recognition, act in compliance with it.
However, in practice, normative standards are often considered valid even when they 
are not accepted universally, or even by all individuals within a specified domain. 
Antebellum America’s approbation of slavery as morally valid is often cited as an 
example of how moral values change over time.188 More interestingly, even within 
that  timeframe,  alternate  moral-political  positions  on  slavery  were  concurrently 
prevalent, and viewed as valid by different groups of people, on either side of the 
parallel  36°30' N.189 Social  psychologists Tetlock,  Armor and Peterson isolate four 
distinct  classes  of  such  positions:  (a)  abolitionists;  (b)  free-soil  Republicans,  who 
tolerated slavery in the South but not its expansion in new territories; (c) Buchanan 
Democrats, who supported expanding slavery into new territories if local majorities 
approved; and (d) defenders of slavery.190
A weaker version of normativity therefore requires only that the standard be generally 
accepted within a community or domain. Due to this fact, it is treated as being at a 
higher plane as compared to other standards that are not similarly recognised, and thus 
188 See e.g. Hart 1994: 200.
189 The Missouri Compromise was an agreement between the proponents and opponents of slavery 
within the United States Congress. It marked out a boundary, largely conforming to the parallel 
36°30' N. Slavery was to be prohibited to the north and permitted to the south of this boundary.
190 Tetlock, Armor & Peterson 1994: 11-18.
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compliance with whom is a matter of choice. In the eyes of those who accept it, this 
fact establishes a hierarchical relationship between the standard and the members of 
the community.
This general acceptance results in pressure to conform imposed on members of the 
community. As Hart puts it, “With morals . . . the typical form of pressure consists in 
appeals  to  the  respect  for  the  rules,  as  things  important  in  themselves,  which  is 
presumed to be shared by those addressed.191” This is not the only kind of pressure 
exerted, though. At times, the possibility of ill-luck and even divine wrath may be 
brought to bear on dissenters in conjunction with social pressure. A classic illustration 
is found in Huckleberry Finn’s predicament in the eponymous novel, who fears both 
both social castigation192 and divine retribution193 for not betraying the runaway slave 
Jim.
3. Imperative Reasons
I use the term “imperative” in a restricted sense here. Grammatically, requests, pleas 
and  warnings  are  also  examples  of  the  imperative  form  or  mood,  as  Hart  also 
acknowledges.194 But unlike, for example, the exercise of power and authority, these 
191 Hart 1994: 180.
192 “And then think of me! It would get all around that Huck Finn helped a nigger to get his freedom; 
and if I was ever to see anybody from that town again I'd be ready to get down and lick his boots 
for shame.” Twain 1991: c. 31 at 366.
193 “[H]ere was the plain hand of Providence slapping me in the face and letting me know my 
wickedness was being watched all the time from up there in heaven, whilst I was stealing a poor 
old woman’s nigger that hadn't ever done me no harm . . ..” Ibid.
194 Hart 1994: 18-19.
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do not of themselves make their intended conduct non-optional. Moreover, we already 
addressed some of them earlier, as subjective reasons for compliance. Hence, here we 
restrict ourselves to those imperatives where a conduct is imposed on an individual 
(and  therefore  made  non-optional)  overriding  her  volition,  i.e. what  MacCormick 
terms “acts of will”.195
Some uncertainty exists about what constitutes an act of will. Austin had characterised 
commands in terms of threatened sanctions: “If you express or intimate a wish that I 
shall do or forbear from some act,  and if you will visit me with an evil in case I 
comply  not  with  your  wish,  the  expression or  intimation of  your  wish  is  a 
command.196” Correlative to command, he proposes, there should exist a duty on the 
part of the actor.197
To this, Hart  famously pointed out that  this construction applies equally well to a 
gangster  ordering  a  bank-clerk.198 According  to  him,  commanding  requires  as  a 
precondition the existence of a hierarchical relationship between the person issuing 
the command, and the actor: “ This word (i.e. command), which is not very common 
outside  military  contexts,  carries  with  it  very  strong  implications  that  there  is  a 
relatively  stable  hierarchical  organization  of  men,  such  as  an  army or  a  body of 
disciples in which the commander occupies a position of pre-eminence.199” He also 
195 “What kind of conduct is denoted by the words “act of will” may not be entirely clear, but 
certainly legislating and commanding are included.” MacCormick 1973: 101.
196 Austin 1954: 13-14.
197 Ibid. at 14.
198 Hart 1994: 19-20.
199 Ibid. at 20.
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points  out:  “To command is  characteristically  to  exercise  authority  over  men,  not 
power to inflict harm . . ..200” 
This  would  seem to  carve  a  clear  distinction  between  the  exercise  of  power  and 
authority.201 Because of her capacity to cause harm, the gunman is said to wield power 
over the teller. This creates a temporary hierarchy between the two, which subsists 
just so long as the gunman retains her capacity to injure. On the basis of this, she 
issues  what  Hart  calls  an  “order  backed  by  threat”202 or  “coercive  order”,203 with 
which the teller is required to comply. 
The concept of authority, on the other hand, presupposes what Hart calls a “stable 
hierarchy”.204 The individual in the hierarchically superior position gives an order (as 
opposed to merely ordering),205 or issues a command, to the person in the inferior 
position. The latter is required to comply with it not from fear of sanctions, but out of 
respect for authority.206 Of course, Hart acknowledges that authority may be combined 
with the threat of sanctions, but that is only a secondary consideration.207
200 Ibid.
201  Some have disagreed with this. Kelsen, for example, used “act of will” to cover alike the orders 
of gangsters and tax-collectors. Moreover, he saw no difference between them, and derived both 
from the threat of sanctions or unpleasant consequences. Kelsen 1967: 8.
202 Hart 1994: 20.
203 Ibid. at 82.
204 Ibid. at 20.
205 Ibid. at 19.
206 Ibid. at 20.
207 Ibid.
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An important characteristic of both power and authority must be highlighted here. 
Normative standards attain their hierarchically superior position because they are, or 
to be precise their content is, regarded as good, right, just, moral, divinely ordained or 
otherwise virtuous. Consequently, it is on the basis of their content that they are able 
to impose a duty on the actor. But the exercise of power and authority derive their 
superiority from a capacity to cause harm and a pre-existing hierarchy respectively. In 
other words, their superiority flows not from the content of the conduct they specify, 
but from extraneous circumstances. We may say even that their validity is  content-
independent.
A question may be raised here whether the exercise of power also imposes on the 
actor a duty to comply. Austin argues that duty exists as a correlative to command or, 
to be precise, his conception of command (what we would call a coercive order).208 
Hart, on the other hand, points out that in ordinary language we would say the bank 
teller was obliged to hand over money, but not that she had an obligation.209
Hart also points out that in the case of coercive orders, the actor is obliged only if (a) 
the issued threat is serious enough to justify compliance, and (b) there is a reasonable 
likelihood of the power-holder actually carrying it  out.210 If either condition is not 
present, the hierarchical relationship is not sustained, and the actor may freely refuse 
to comply. On the other hand, if a person is obligated to a conduct, the obligation 
208 Austin 1954: 14.
209 Hart 1994: 82.
210 Ibid. at 83.
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remains even if there is no likelihood of her being made to suffer the consequence of 
her disobedience. For example, if by escaping to another jurisdiction one avoids being 
drafted, she nevertheless remains under an obligation to report for military service.211 
On the  other  hand,  if  the  gunman’s  gun turns  out  to  be  an  air-pistol  (capable  of 
causing only minor  harm),  then surely the teller  is  no longer  obliged to obey her 
orders.
As such the issue is not directly relevant to the present work. Hence, we can afford to 
leave it unresolved, and without going into it in too much detail.
IV. FIRST-ORDER REASONS FOR COMPLIANCE
1. Bound Condition and Exclusionary Reasons 
We begin by examining how Raz’s conception of first-order and second-order reasons 
differs  from ours.  Subjective reasons are clearly first-order reasons.  Their  efficacy 
derives from the extent of their appeal; the greater the inducement, the more their 
influence  on  the  actor.  It  is  difficult  to  envisage  a  situation  where  an  appeal  to 
subjective  interests  is  so  significant  as  to  not  outweigh  but  override  all  other 
competing reasons.
It is when we address moral and imperative reasons that we begin to face problems 
211 Ibid. at 84.
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reconciling Raz’s conception with ours. Perhaps this can be best achieved by keeping 
in mind this distinction: while Raz treats second-order reasons in terms of rules, our 
endeavours  connects  second-order  reasons  with  duties or  obligations.  That  is,  our 
framework  entails  not  so  much  exclusionary  reasons  or  rules,  but  specifically 
exclusionary obligations. The difference between the two is considerable. According 
to Raz, mandatory norms, of which rules comprise a sub-class,212 entail both a first-
order reason to perform the prescribed act, as well as an exclusionary reason not to 
perform any conflicting acts.213 Both moral  and imperative reasons can be said to 
derive  from  rules.  According  to  this,  both  moral  and  imperative  reasons  for 
compliance are in the nature of second-order reasons.  Manifestly,  they both entail 
what Raz calls mandatory norms, that is, standards of conduct that are non-optional in 
character. Raz also states  that when second-order reasons conflict, the one with the 
greater strength or weight prevails.214 The problem with this is that it does not satisfy 
our objectives. We may establish this through two examples.
First, let us take the case of Huckleberry Finn. Recognising that he has a moral duty to 
reveal the runaway slave Jim’s whereabouts, he writes a note to Jim’s owner. But then 
he concludes that, regardless of his moral duty, regardless of even the possibility of 
social sanctions and divine retribution, he still cannot betray his friend.  In one of the 
most moving parts of the book, he reflects to himself, “All right, then, I’ll go to hell” 
212 Raz 1999: 58.
213 Ibid. at 58-59.
214 Ibid. at 47.
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and  tears  up  the  note.215 And  so,  through  the  very  act  of  rationally  accepting 
consequent sanctions, he succeeds in liberating himself from the binding imposition 
of a morality his conscience cannot accept.
The above situation involves two different reasons for action. The first derives from 
the morality associated with slavery. It imposes on Finn a first-order reason (to betray 
Jim), as well as a second-order reason (to exclude all competing first-order reasons 
not to give Jim away). The second reason derives from his own personal morality. It 
too entails a first order reason (to protect Jim) and also an exclusionary reason (not to 
comply  any first-order  reason to  betray  Jim).  Since  two conflicting  and mutually 
exclusive second-order reasons are imposed on Finn, he has to choose between them. 
That is, he has to ascertain their comparative strengths or weights, and select the one 
that  scores  over  the  other.  Ultimately  that  is  exactly  what  he  does,  choosing  his 
conscience over the other morality. But in such circumstances, can it be said that to 
Finn, the reasons provided are any different from first-order reasons? This argument is 
difficult to sustain. Finn is confronted with two competing reasons, neither of which 
excludes the other. Consequently he has to take into account the comparative strength 
or weight of either reason. In simple terms, even though the mandatory norms operate 
as second-order reasons, their net effect in terms of the  obligation they impose on 
Finn, is indistinguishable from first-order reasons.
215 Twain 1991: c. 31 at 368.
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This is underscored even more in the second example we take up. Earlier also we 
referred to Hart’s contention that escaping to another jurisdiction does not diminish a 
person’s  obligation to  report  for military service.  This  situation also involves two 
competing reasons. However, they are not of the same type. The desire to avoid being 
drafted  is  a  subjective  reason,  and  hence  a  first-order  reason  simpliciter.  The 
obligation to be drafted, however, derives from a legal rule to that effect, and thus 
entails a second-order reason. According to Raz’s scheme, the second-order reason 
excludes the first-order reason. Or at least, that is what is intended to happen, but does 
not.  What  occurs is  that,  just  like Finn does,  the actor ascertains  the comparative 
strengths of each of the reasons before her, and selects the most attractive one. In 
short, the second-order reason also operates on the basis of strength or weight, and not 
by negating competing first-order reasons. 
At the same time, it cannot be said that she was bound to get drafted. We may safely 
say that escaping implies gaining freedom, and it is surely paradoxical to say one is 
bound and free at the same time. Just as it is not contradictory to state one is under a 
duty and at the same time free of its consequences, so is it logical to say one is under a 
duty and yet not bound by it.  Escaping to another jurisdiction does not diminish a 
person’s obligation to report for military service. At the same time, it cannot be said 
that she was bound to get drafted. We may safely say that escaping implies gaining 
freedom, and it is surely paradoxical to say one is bound and free at the same time. 
Just as it is not contradictory to state one is under a duty and at the same time free of 
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its consequences, so is it logical to say one is under a duty and yet not bound by it.
It would therefore seem that the meaning of the word “bound” is not susceptible of an 
easy explanation. Even if we take its conventional meaning, many instances can be 
identified where “being bound” and “being obligated” are not coextensive. Neither 
can “being bound” be identified with the threat of sanctions alone. Several instances 
exist  where  the  actor  considers  herself  bound  even  when  she  neither  faces  the 
prospect of sanctions nor has an obligation imposed on her. For example, she may 
consider herself ethically or morally bound to honour a time-barred debt, even though 
she will no longer attract legal sanctions or even social opprobrium if she declines. 
Conversely, so may she decline to remain bound even in the face of sanctions. 
Another situation we need to examine is where the prospective draft-dodger decides 
neither  to  escape  to  another  jurisdiction  nor  get  herself  conscripted.  Instead,  she 
chooses simply to disobey the legal rule and undergo whatever consequences the law 
metes out to her. Effectively, she enjoys a nominal choice in obligations and liabilities 
–  either  comply,  or  face  the  consequences.  The  stipulated  consequences  of 
disobedience  are  designed to  be heavy enough to  far  outweigh the  inconvenience 
entailed by compliance. Hence though the nominal choice remains, the alternative to 
the desired conduct is made impracticable. In this way compliance is sought to be 
ensured. But here also,  the efficacy of the legal rule depends on the weight of its 
sanctions. If nevertheless the actor opts for the alternative irrespective of its onerous 
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nature, as Finn did, then the rule stands outweighed just as a first-order reason does.
This  is  where  the  difference  between  Raz’s  exclusionary  reasons  and  the  bound 
condition lies. The bound condition can be construed as an exclusionary obligations. 
An obligation of this  nature not  only requires the actor  to  adhere to  a prescribed 
conduct, but it also negates all other competing obligations in the same manner. So 
when such an obligation is imposed on the actor, she is left with no choice but to 
comply  with  it.  Consequently,  she  is  bound to  the  conduct  imposed  on  her,  in  a 
manner  that  mere  obligation  cannot  achieve.  This  is  what  I mean  by  the  bound 
condition.
V. BOUND CONDITION – DEFINITION AND CHARACTERISTICS
Having identified the fundamental characteristic of  the bound condition, and in the 
bargain also having distinguished it from Raz’s exclusionary reasons, we now need to 
gain a more detailed understanding of the concept. We achieve this through further 
comparisons with first-order reasons for action.
1. Bound Condition and Duty
We have already seen that being under duty and being bound by a duty are not the 
same thing. Being under a duty does not preclude other choices. When Hart’s draft 
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dodger escapes the consequences of her infraction, she still remains under a duty. But 
can we say she remains bound to that duty? A person may even repudiate obligation 
while being under the threat of sanctions; we have already seen Huckleberry Finn’s 
example. The very act of repudiating one’s obligation implies an absence of the bound 
state. (Clarification: imposition of sanctions may bind the actor to a normative system, 
but it cannot be said to bind her to a specified  conduct. And it is being bound to a 
conduct that is of concern to us in this thesis.) We gather from the above that first-
order reasons characteristically account for at least the possibility of non-compliance. 
Usually they do so by specifying the consequences of non-compliance. Even if they 
do not, they remain valid in case of non-compliance – the draft-dodger remains under 
a duty even when she jumps state lines.
Another characteristic of first-order reasons is that when they are imposed, they do 
not  ipso facto invalidate other reasons (i.e. at the first stage). Finn’s dilemma stems 
from the fact that both moral imperatives presented to him are valid on their own 
terms.  They  are  mutually  inconsistent,  and  require  choosing  one  over  the  other. 
Moreover,  at  least  in  this  case,  neither  do  Finn’s  moral  beliefs  dictate  a  choice 
between the two, or privilege or rank one over the other. So what he is faced with is a 
dilemma with no mitigating factors. He is forced to choose between them. However, 
what is of importance here is that until he makes his choice, it cannot be said that 
either takes precedence over the other.
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A corollary to this  is  that  ultimately the actor must make a choice between these 
competing  motives.  Hence  first-order  reasons  require  her  to  exercise  judgment to 
determine her preferred course of action. This process of judging or making a choice 
is an essential aspect of first order reasons, for only through it does the transition 
occur from the first stage to the second. Making a choice can thus be treated as the 
third characteristic of first-order reasons.
2. Nature of the Bound Condition
By now some contours  of  the  bound condition  should  be  apparent.  Much of  the 
foregoing problems are a direct result of theorists failing to discern the distinction 
between the two stages, and thereby taking the second stage for granted. It is my 
contention that none of the characteristics outlined above apply to the bound condition 
(which I refer to as a second-order reason for compliance).
Let us understand the bound condition through a classic instance. Take the Battle of 
Balaklava, the infamous “Charge of the Light Brigade” immortalised by Tennyson in 
his eponymous poem. It is significant to note here that the first-order reasons provided 
to the soldiers emerged from extremely dubious circumstances. The planning for the 
battle was marked by ineptitude, a faulty appraisal of the battleground’s terrain and, 
not the least, a vicious rivalry between the two commanders, Lord Raglan and Lord 
Lucan. Even the success it achieved (in that it did capture the guns intended) did not 
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translate into any significant tactical advantage, so poor was the planning that had 
gone into it.216 In other words, the waste of lives was as futile and unnecessary as it 
was terrible. These facts were apparent even before the charge took place; the troops 
themselves knew it.
Was the situation very different from what Hart had in mind when he suggested a 
valid law may be disobeyed as too evil? Evil or not, the futility of the whole venture 
offered powerful reasons not to comply with the order. Against this, what were the 
reasons  offered  for  complying  with  battle  orders?  The  authority  of  patently 
incompetent  and  egotistic  generals,  perhaps  an  abstract  sense  of  duty  (even  if 
complying with the duty did not gain anything for the cause). It may argued with 
excellent justification that the incentives to disobey (i.e. to desert) were far stronger 
than the reasons to obey. And yet not one in the entire Brigade failed to comply with 
orders:  “Was  there  a  man dismay’d?/  Not  tho’ the  soldiers  knew/  Some one  had 
blunder’d:” The question is, what was the motive that impelled them? Was it merely 
the command issued by a military superior? Under normal circumstances, respect for 
216 The following brief account of the battle indicates just how unsatisfactory the situation was. Lord 
Raglan, the commander of the army, was situated at a height and thus had some conception of the 
lie of the land. His subordinates, including the commander of the cavalry Lord Lucan, were 
situated lower down and thus could not see anything of what was going on. Raglan’s original 
instructions were to capture guns mounted on a hill to a side of the valley. Captain Nolan was 
entrusted to convey the order to Lucan. When Lucan asked him which guns were to be captured, 
he reportedly made a vague gesture at the guns at the end of the valley. Why Nolan did so, or 
whether indeed he did so, remains a mystery as he died in the battle very shortly after. Such an 
attack was clearly catastrophic in tactical terms, as it meant charging at the guns in full view of 
the Russian forces on top of the hill. Nevertheless, Lucan ordered Lord Cardigan, commander of 
the Light Brigade, to lead the charge. (It has been speculated that the intense mutual dislike 
between Lucan and Cardigan might have been a factor here.)  So the Brigade charged, and was 
duly decimated. “Into the valley of death/ Rode the six hundred.” See Woodham Smith 1953: 
239-62.
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authority might comprise a reason strong enough to make what sentimental Victorian 
novelists termed the “ultimate sacrifice”. But this situation was exceptional, because 
the command required troops to die  pointlessly. It is difficult to imagine respect for 
authority so deeply ingrained as to make every single soldier accept near-certain death 
with the knowledge that no tangible benefit to anyone will derive from it. The only 
way  this  could  be  achieved  was  if  all  the  individual  actors  refused  to  even 
contemplate the existence of alternate conducts. And to my mind, that is what the 
bound condition is all about.
We define the bound condition here as a reason for compliance so compelling that it 
invalidates all other competing reasons or motives for action. This is the fundamental 
distinction between first-order reasons and the bound condition. We noted earlier that 
first-order reasons operate on the basis of their relative attractiveness or “weightage”. 
In contrast,  second-order reasons such as the bound condition operate on what we 
may term a “winner takes all” principle. If a motive is considered binding, then all 
other competing motives are ipso facto nullified. Hence there is simply no scope for 
weighing the relative merits of competing motives, and then selecting the one that 
carries the most weight.
This is a definitional characteristic of second-order reasons, and one that serves to 
maintain  their  distinction  with  first-order  reasons.  If  we  had  defined  the  bound 
condition  as  functioning  on  the  basis  of  relative  “weightage”,  then  no  difference 
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would  have  remained  between  it  and  first-order  reasons!  And  the  very  object  of 
carving a distinction would have been lost.
But why make a distinction at all, in the first place? The reason for this is that certain 
situations do exist which first-order reasons by themselves cannot explain adequately. 
When the general commands a soldier to sacrifice his life pointlessly because of the 
general’s own stupidity, then the reason for compliance given to the soldier is simply 
not enough as a first-order reason. Something extra, some additional attribute must be 
added to it if it is to overcome the much stronger motives for not complying with the 
command.  If  not,  then  the  soldier  will  have  the  discretion  to  rank  the  various 
competing motives on the basis of their relative merit, and quite possibly choose not 
to comply with the general’s order and sacrifice his life needlessly. On the other hand, 
if a situation is created where all scope for alternate conducts is taken away no matter 
how tempting  the  alternatives  may  be,  then  the  soldier  must  necessarily  comply, 
simply because he has no choice but to do so: “Their’s not to make reply/ Their’s not 
to reason why/ Their’s but to do and die.”
What the bound condition does, therefore, is negate other competing reasons, thereby 
establishing the concerned first-order reason as the sole course of action. Therefore a 
distinction emerges between being under a duty and being bound by a duty. The latter 
implies a much stronger level of compulsion. When the individual is under a duty, she 
can  still  consider  alternate  courses  of  action,  and  even  opt  for  one  of  them  – 
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Huckleberry Finn was under a duty to turn Jim in, which he disobeyed. Had he been 
bound to this duty, he would have had no option but to do so.
As an aside, can a person be bound to a coercive order? Just as earlier we left the 
issue unresolved whether a coercive order imposes a duty on the actor, here also we 
restrict ourselves to a cursory look at the question. Coercive orders play only a limited 
role in the rights mechanism, not as reasons for compliance in themselves but only as 
adjuncts  to  commands  or  normative  standards.  Consequently,  the  issue  is  not 
particularly relevant to our thesis. In any case, it would seem that a coercive order can 
be considered binding only in a limited sense. The validity of such an order is directly 
correlative to the efficacy of the associated threatened sanction.  If  the actor has a 
choice of conducts, it necessarily means the threatened sanction is not efficacious, and 
consequently, the order is no longer valid. The bound condition assumes significance 
in situations when a person is under a command, or a legal or moral duty, which 
remain valid even when they cannot be enforced.
Is the bound condition a mental state, then? Ought we construe it from Hart’s internal 
point of view? To be sure, the relationship between the bound condition and Hart’s 
hermeneutical approach is such a vast area that it deserves a thesis all to itself; any 
comprehensive exegesis lies well beyond the scope of this dissertation. For the time 
being, I restrict myself to acknowledging that the condition is indeed a mental state 
appreciable from the internal viewpoint, rather than a phenomenon whose causes may 
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be determined empirically and whose consequences may be predicted in a manner 
approaching  scientific  precision.  When  an  actor  has  a  legal  obligation,  external 
observers are able to perceive the specific legal provision applying to her, the courts 
then  recognising her  obligation,  and finally  the  possibility  of  sanctions.  What  the 
internal point of view does is examine the reasons for the actor’s compliance from the 
perspective of the participant (i.e. the actor herself) rather than of an outsider.
But how is all this applicable to us? Someone may insist X behaves in a particular 
manner because she is obligated. We may contend instead that she does so out of a 
sense of being bound,  and that  being bound and being obligated are  qualitatively 
distinct. But this will lead us nowhere. We will remained locked within the realm of 
abstract hypothesis unless we are able to substantiate that (a) the distinction between 
obligated and bound does exist in practice; and (b) that the bound condition is a better 
descriptor than mere obligation of certain situations, such as the state’s enforcement 
of rights.
The  way  I  seek  to  avoid  this  pitfall  is  by  ignoring  the  question  relating  to  the 
antecedents of the bound condition. This encompasses a wide range of reasons, of 
which some could be considered voluntary in nature (such as the person honouring a 
time-barred  debt),  and  some  imposed  from  above  (such  as  the  Light  Brigade 
example). Addressing the gamut of reasons lies well beyond the scope of  the present 
dissertation,  and in  any case it  is  not  directly  relevant  to our  research objectives. 
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Instead, we examine the implications of this bound condition. Questions relating the 
manner in which the actor became bound, or the reasons for her becoming so, we 
shall not countenance. Presently, our concern lies solely with the fact of being bound, 
its characteristics, and how it can be identified. I contend that a bound entity behaves 
in a different way from entities that are not bound. We saw the Light Brigade behave 
in a way many other military personnel would not.  Similarly the sea captain who 
believes in going down with her ship behaves in a manner other captains do not. In 
other words, when an actor is bound to a conduct, her consequent behaviour exhibits  
certain characteristics peculiar to the bound condition. These may be discerned even 
by an external observer. And consequently, when we see the individual displaying 
those  behavioural  characteristics,  we  may  infer  therefrom that  she  is  bound  to  a 
conduct.
The reason for this is as follows. The internal point of view can only indicate why an 
actor complies with a particular conduct. To be precise, it does not achieve even that. 
It only specifies the reasons why the actor is required to comply; her real motives for 
compliance might be altogether different. On the other hand, the nature of the bound 
condition is such that it requires the actor to not only comply, but also to do so in a 
certain way. In other words, it supplies not only the reason why, but also the manner 
how. As we recall from our exegesis on the natural sciences, the question how (as 
opposed  to  the  question  why)  falls  within  the  domain  of  objective  validation. 
Consequently, from an observation of behavioural characteristics (i.e. of how the actor 
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goes about fulfilling the required conduct)  we are able to determine if the actor’s 
compliance is because she recognises herself as bound, or merely because she feels 
obligated, or for some other purpose.
3. Characteristics of the Bound Condition
We observed earlier that the bound condition’s first and fundamental characteristic is 
that it  ipso facto invalidates all other competing reasons. The second characteristic 
flows from the above. In the case of first-order reasons, the transition from the first to 
the second stage involves an exercise of judgment or discretion on the part of the 
actor,  i.e. where she chooses between competing motives. But the bound condition 
expressly excludes alternative conducts. The need to choose is also thereby obviated. 
Hence, the second characteristic of the bound condition is that it expressly precludes 
any judgment or discretion on the part of the actor. Only one course of action is open 
to her, that is, compliance. Hence, the second characteristic of the bound condition is 
that it precludes the exercise of judgment or discretion.
One last characteristic is that in certain situations the actor may recognise the bound 
condition  even  if  she  does  not  the  first-order  reason  it  is  founded  on.  Maritime 
traditions have long required sea captains to “go down with their ships” in case of 
wrecks. In modern times, this is regarded as largely irrelevant. Consequently, one no 
longer attracts legal, social or moral opprobrium if one chooses not to follow it. Yet it 
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may  occur  that  some  mariner,  even  if  she  does  not  personally  believe  in  such 
antiquated traditions, may yet elect to follow it for no better reason that she considers 
herself bound to do the “done thing”. Then again, a person may choose to honour a 
rash promise made in an inebriated condition that nobody takes seriously, not even the 
promisee. Once again, she does so not because she is legally or morally required to 
uphold  it,  but  merely  because  she  considers  herself  bound.  In  other  words,  it  is 
possible  that  the  original  first-order  reason  from  which  the  bound  condition  is 
established may be tenuous at best, or may erode to a nullity after a point. In these 
situations, the fact of being bound becomes its own reason for compliance. The actor 
needs no further justification. If under the bound condition the actor is precluded from 
exercising her judgment, then it becomes irrelevant as to why or for what reason the 
condition has been imposed: she is bound because she is bound, and that is all there is 
to it. To put it in another way, we agreed that the bound condition precludes judgment. 
This would also mean the actor, after being bound, is no longer free to ascertain if at a 
subsequent point in time the initial first-order reason is still valid.
The second set of characteristics applies to situations where the actor already has a 
bound condition imposed on her, or at least is presupposed to be so. Here again, if the 
actor’s behaviour possesses certain features, then the external observer may infer from 
them that the bound condition has ceased to apply onto the actor, that is, she no longer 
remains bound.
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We noted that first-order reasons remain valid even when the actor does not comply 
with them; the duty to enlist continues to be valid even when the actor successfully 
avoids drafting. This does not hold true of the bound condition. Suppose a soldier in 
the Light Brigade decided to desert.  This would mean (a) that he had a choice of 
options, and (b) he exercised his judgment and selected an alternate conduct. Both 
these factors are inconsistent with our bound condition. In simpler language, if the 
actor  considers herself  to  be free to  exercise  her  judgment,  she can no longer  be 
considered bound.  Once again we decline to  scrutinise  whys and wherefores,  and 
restrict ourselves to the fact and its implications:  If the actor exercises her choice,  
particularly if she selects an alternate conduct, then the bound condition no longer  
remains valid, or at least validly binding. Or, in other words, exercise of choice is in  
itself conclusive of the fact that the actor is no longer bound.
Lastly, we may derive a correlative from the above proposition. We saw that if an 
actor  breaches  the  bound condition,  then  the  bound condition  ceases  to  be  valid. 
Consequently,  any  deviation  from the  prescribed  conduct  must  occur  outside the 
source of the bound condition. Let us say the members of the Light Brigade were 
bound by a sense of loyalty and military discipline. Now if a soldier had decided to 
desert,  obviously he could not have done so  within the parameters of this military 
discipline,  because  the  bound  condition  by  definition  does  not  contemplate  any 
deviation.  Consequently,  any  deviation  (in  this  case  desertion)  must  take  place 
outside the parameters of the bound condition. 
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4. Test for the Bound Condition
The last objective of our present chapter concerns how to identify the bound condition 
in real-life legal situations. As I have already mentioned, we forsake the internal point 
of  view  here.  Instead,  from  an  assessment  of  the  actor’s  external  behavioural 
characteristics  displayed,  we  may  determine  if  the  actor  is  bound  or  not.  By 
assessment, I mean a process of determining whether the actor’s behaviour conforms 
to the criteria set out in a test designed for this purpose. This proposed test derives 
directly from the characteristics we identified in the previous sub-section. To avoid 
unnecessary repetition, here I simply rephrase those characteristics in point form.
There are  two sets  of characteristics we identified.  The first  pertains  to  situations 
where the bound condition is observed. This set of characteristics may be considered 
definitive of the bound condition:
1. The bound condition  ipso facto invalidates or nullifies all  other  competing 
reasons for compliance.
2. The bound condition precludes any exercise of judgment, choice or discretion.
3. Once the bound condition is established, it effectively forms its own reason for 
compliance.  No  further  justification  from  external  (and  hence  first-order) 
factors is required.
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As observed, the foregoing criteria are per se enough to establish the bound condition. 
The second set of characteristics indicate the  consequences of breaching the bound 
condition. That is, if (a) the bound condition is established, and (b) this condition is 
subsequently violated, then the following characteristics are necessarily satisfied:
1. If the actor chooses an alternate conduct, this fact is in itself conclusive that 
she is no longer bound to the prescribed conduct.
2. Unlike first-order motives, the bound condition is  ipso facto invalidated as a 
bound condition (though not necessarily as a first-order motive) in case of 
breach or non-compliance.
3. Any deviation must therefore take place outside the parameters of the bound 
condition.
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CHAPTER 4 – LEGAL RIGHTS AND THE BOUND CONDITION
I. STATEMENT OF CONTEXT
The previous chapter is significant to the present one in multiple ways. A key role it 
plays is to prepare the ground for what we shall discuss here. First, it identifies certain 
inconsistencies in state practices as they relate to right enforcement. Specifically it 
points out that right enforcement and the perceived “maturity” of legal systems are by 
no means correlative;  just  as  rights  have been upheld in  despotisms,  so has  their 
enforcement  even  in  the  most  committed  of  liberal  democracies  been  subject  to 
serious  lapses.  This  establishes  the  need  to  treat  right  enforcement  as  an  area  of 
theoretical enquiry in its own right, rather than treating it as a given, or an inevitable 
consequence of the concept of rights.  Secondly,  it  outlines the underpinnings of a 
possible theoretical resolution to this issue. It characterises what I term the “bound 
condition”. It also distinguishes this condition from conventional motives or reasons 
for  action,  specifies  how it  differs  from Raz’s  exclusionary  reasons,  identifies  its 
salient characteristics and implications, and finally devises a test for determining if an 
entity is “bound” in the sense that I have outlined here.
This  chapter  establishes  the  link  between  the  bound  condition  and  legal  rights.  I 
commence by examining gaps in prevalent theories of legal rights. One set of scholars 
take enforcement as a given inevitability (which is precisely what our examination of 
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state practice in the previous chapter does not bear out). Another school of thought 
treats rights in terms of the will of the state. This provokes the question what happens 
when the state has to enforce a right against its own interests. Even if we separate the 
state’s interests from the state’s will, and hold that the state’s will can be inferred from 
the very fact of right enforcement, such a conjecture fails to explain certain facts, such 
as the state being compelled to enforce rights that are patently unjust or immoral. We 
shall  examine  this  in  detail  subsequently.  For  now,  it  is  enough  to  note  that  the 
respective drawbacks of both schools of thought leads to the possible inference that 
right enforcement is a consequence of a reason or motive for compliance acting on the 
state. I next undertake to ascertain that this motive is qualitatively distinct from the 
first-order reasons for compliance we discussed in  the previous  chapter.  The final 
objective  of  this  chapter  is  to  demonstrate  that  this  motive  contains  the  defining 
characteristics of the bound condition, and is therefore rightly classified as a second-
order reason.
II. THE NATURE OF RIGHTS
1. Background
The subject  of rights  comprises  in its  entirety  a vast  and varied area.  It  has been 
approached  from  many  different,  even  mutually  unrelated  perspectives,  spanning 
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disciplines  as  diverse  as  theology,217 morality,218 politics  and  political  economy,219 
economics stricto sensu,220 sociology221 and, of course, law and jurisprudence. Each of 
these approaches has generated right-related debates in such profusion and intricacy, 
that entire dissertations can be devoted to merely enumerating and cataloguing them.
Jeremy Waldron’s excellent introduction to “Theories of Rights”222 sets out some of 
the  more  significant  debates  within  legal  and  political  philosophy.  Though  by  no 
means  exhaustive  in  nature,  it  comprises  a  sufficiently  detailed  outline  of 
contemporary rights-discourses to offer us a convenient and useful starting-point. The 
first such debate concerns the nature of rights. This involves questions like whether 
right and duty are correlative, or whether they correspond to each other in some other 
way, and if not, then what is the nature of the relationship between right, duty and 
obligation.223 An allied question pertains to the foundation of rights.224 It examines the 
relationship between rights and  legality,  and whether the concept of rights has any 
meaning outside the framework of law. It also addresses the concept of natural rights, 
their nature and content, whether they can exist a priori to any given legal order, and 
their applicability in a morally relativist context. Similarly, it looks at human rights, 
the idea that certain rights are inalienable and irreducible under all circumstances.
217 See e.g. Villa-Vicencio 1992.
218 See e.g. Sumner 1997.
219 See e.g. Busse 2004.
220 See e.g. Barzel 1997.
221 See e.g. Cox 1998.
222 Waldron 1984.
223 Ibid. at 2.
224 Ibid. at 2-3.
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The  third  debate  Waldron  identifies  is  about  ambiguities  in  the  use  of  the  term 
‘right’.225 Hohfeld isolated at least four senses in which the word is used, viz. (to use 
his own terminology) as “claim”, “privilege” (later amended by Glanville Williams to 
“liberty”226), “power” and “immunity”. The relationship between the right-holder and 
the duty-bearer constitutes another debate.227 Two distinct views presently prevail on 
what a right means to its holder, namely the “choice” theory and the “interest” theory. 
The  second  treats  a  right  as  a  “protected  interest”,  that  is,  a  duty  imposed  upon 
another to perform an act in the right-holder’s interest.228 
Scholars  like  Hart,  on  the  other  hand,  emphasise  the  fact  that  the  enforcement 
mechanism is activated only when the right-holder wills it  so. Moreover,  in many 
cases the holder enjoys a choice whether to enforce or not; a creditor may institute 
proceedings against a defaulting debtor, or agree to a compromise, or even choose to 
ignore the matter altogether. Conferring a right therefore amounts to giving the holder 
not  merely a  protected interest,  but also a  discretion to decide when to  have that 
interest executed. 
2. Tripartite Nature of Legal Rights
While it is an exaggeration to say these debates obscure a fundamental truth about 
225 Ibid. at 5-8.
226 Williams 1956: 1131-34.
227 Waldron 1984: 9-12
228 Bentham 1970: 264-65. See also Austin1911: 395.
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legal rights, we may nevertheless contend that they confine themselves to only one of 
its aspects. They treat legal rights as essentially bipartite arrangements between right-
holder and duty-bearer, and do not place much emphasis on the roles of other parties, 
especially the state.
The choice theory is notable in this regard. One could even say it treats rights as a 
species of acts of will. Its implication is that the holder’s discretion to either enforce 
or waive the bearer’s obligation effectively gives her a power over the latter. She may 
use it as a potential sanction to impose a conduct on the bearer, which conduct may 
not even be related to the right involved. For example, the holder may threaten the 
bearer  with  legal  proceedings  or  foreclosure  of  mortgage,  unless  she  gives  her 
concessional terms in a completely different transaction.
When  we  examine  the  nature  of  the  sanction,  however,  we  encounter  a  very 
significant issue. In general, the efficacy of orders backed by threats depends on the 
control the orderer has over the threatened consequences. If the orderer cannot impose 
the consequence as and when she wants to, the coercive value of the threat inevitably 
diminishes. Which is why most models of coercion, such as Austin’s conception of 
commands229 and Hart’s gunman example,230 locate the source of the threat within the 
orderer herself. That is, they give us to understand that the person issuing the order is 
herself responsible for imposing undesirable consequences. This clearly does not hold 
229 Austin 1954: 14-15.
230 Hart 1994: 19.
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true of a legal right. One of its most fundamental defining characteristics is that  it  
involves enforcement by the state and not the holder herself.
The  proto-positivist  Bentham231 and  the positivist  Austin232 both define  legal  right 
exclusively in terms of state enforcement. Hence instead of the bipartite arrangement 
characteristic of most acts of will, a legal right implies a tripartite structure involving 
the holder, the bearer, and the state. The holder presents a claim before “magistrates” 
as Bentham calls it, i.e. the judicial branch of the state, which deliberates on its merits. 
Once the claim is recognised as valid, the bearer is commanded to fulfil her duty. 
And if she fails to do so, then the legislator (Bentham’s term) or sovereign (Austin’s) 
enforces compliance, by imposing suitable sanctions on the bearer.
The role of the state in recognising and enforcing legal rights is what contemporary 
theories of right do not address. Which is strange, because the state’s role, especially 
state  enforcement,  is  what  really  distinguishes legal  rights  from social,  moral  and 
other legally unrecognised rights on the one hand, and power,  authority and other 
231 “He (the legislator) causes me to perform certain acts for your benefit, that is, for the sake of the 
benefit which such acts seem calculated to produce to you: but he leaves not the motives by 
which I am to be induced to perform these acts, nor the time of applying those motives, to your 
choice . . .. He therefore reserves these points to the determination of the magistrates who in cases 
like this are specially commissioned to execute his will. Accordingly, he either of himself 
commands me at once to perform the acts in question, or shows himself to be in readiness to 
adopt any command issued on your part to the same effect in case of your thinking fit to issue 
such command: reserving in his own hands in either case the enforcement of such command. In 
doing so he gives you a right to my services . . ..” Bentham 1970: 264-65.
232 “In short, the term ‘right’ and the term ‘relative duty’ signify the same notion considered from 
different aspects. Every right supposes distinct parties: A party commanded by the sovereign to 
do or to forbear, and a party towards whom he is commanded to do or to forbear. The party to 
whom the sovereign expresses or intimates the command, is said to lie under a duty: that is to say 
a relative duty. The party towards whom he is commanded to do or to forbear, is said to have a 
rights (sic) to the acts or forbearances in question.” Austin 1911. vol 1: 395.
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“acts of will” on the other. It would seem that the theories we examined all presume 
the state’s role as a given. Ascertaining the precise reason or reasons why is clearly 
difficult.  However, the following conjecture offers a very plausible explanation for 
this phenomenon, on which we may safely place reliance.
The conjecture runs on these lines: Law is frequently characterised in terms of the 
state’s will. Bentham adduces extensive arguments why laws should be understood as 
mandates of the sovereign,233 and even suggests the word “mandate” comprises the 
genus of which law is a sub-class.234 And Austin’s definition of law as a command 
made by a  superior  to an inferior  precludes  any disjunction between law and the 
state’s will. And so enforcement of laws amounts to the enforcement of the state’s 
will. This can be extended to legal rights also. Positivists recognise no rights outside 
legally recognised ones. And legal rights derive from laws, which are but expressions 
of the state’s will. Consequently, just law enforcement is equivalent to enforcing the 
state’s will, so is the enforcement of legal rights.
Indeed, positivism does relate upholding rights to the state’s will. We recall Bentham, 
when  defining  legal  rights,  construes  magistrates  as  “specially  commissioned  to 
execute his (the legislator’s) will”. In this manner he links to the state’s will even the 
recognition of rights. Austin, predictably, associates right enforcement entirely with 
the  state.  He  reduces  the  holder  to  only  the  person  at  whose  behest  the  state 
233 Bentham 1970: 13-15
234 Ibid. at 16.
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undertakes the enforcement process, and is frankly dismissive of the idea that rights 
are in the nature of powers given to the holder:235
What is meant by saying that a right is a power? The party invested with a 
right, is invested with that right by virtue of the corresponding duty imposed 
upon another or others. And this duty is enforced, not by the power of the 
party invested with the right, but by the power of the state. The power resides 
in the state; and by virtue of the power residing in the state, the party invested 
with the right is enabled to exercise or enjoy it. (footnote omitted)
3. Dichotomy between Two Streams of Right Theory
From  the  foregoing,  we  may  discern  at  least  three  facts.  One,  significant 
inconsistencies may be discerned from what we may call two streams of right theory, 
viz. contemporary discourses and classical positivist definitions. Secondly, it would 
seem that both resort to excessive simplifications, with the result that neither can be 
taken  to  be  accurate  descriptions  or  representations  of  rights.  Thirdly  and  most 
important,  these  inconsistencies  and  simplifications  indicate  that  some  significant 
gaps still remain in our understanding of the rights mechanism, that is, of the structure 
and especially the functioning of legal rights.
It could be said that each of these approaches has got  half its theory right. Putting 
235 Austin 1911. vol 1: 398.
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together the two halves yields a further question why the state performs the task of 
enforcement  at  the  instance  of  the  right-holder.  On  the  one  hand,  since  it  is 
responsible for both recognising and upholding rights, a theory that altogether ignores 
its role amounts to at best a partial explanation. Hence classical positivism is correct 
in saying that right enforcement occurs due to the state’s intervention. On the other 
hand, so is it an oversimplification to identify right enforcement with the will of the 
state.  Contemporary theorists are closer to the mark here, when they point out that the 
enforcement is done at the instance of the right-holder. 
4. Difference between Law and Right
The “state’s will” theory may be defended by either of two possible conjectures. One, 
the state’s will can be presumed from the very existence of the legal rule from which 
the  right  derives.  The  second  alludes  to  notions  like  good  governance  and  the 
goodwill of citizens, all of which are ensured by upholding legal rights. The second 
we shall address subsequently, when we discuss first-order reasons in the light of state 
action. Here we examine only the first. It is my contention that this conjecture does 
not account for the distinction between a law and a legal right, particularly from the 
perspective of enforcement. And when this distinction is factored in, then the “state’s 
will” approach must be rejected as inadequate. 
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In primitive legal systems laws may not be distinguishable from the ruler’s interests. 
As  such  systems  develop  in  maturity  and  complexity,  though,  this  correlation 
becomes difficult to sustain. But more important, even if we assume that a particular 
law is a direct reflection of the state’s interests, it certainly does not follow that the 
rights deriving from that law will necessarily be be so. Take John Steinbeck’s classic 
novel  The Grapes of  Wrath,  which we shall  also refer to when we discuss moral 
reasons. Here the concerned law (of contracts and mortgages) was intended to protect 
the interests of creditors against defaulting debtors, but was used by large banks to 
repossess the lands of small farmers who had lost their crops due to drought.236  Indian 
law offers an amusing though equally pertinent example. In  Secretary, Ministry of  
Information & Broadcasting v.  Cricket  Association of  Bengal  (CAB),237 the Indian 
Telegraph Act, 1885 was invoked to prevent CAB from giving satellite telecast rights 
to a broadcaster of its choice. While the Supreme Court acknowledged that the 1885 
Act was “wholly inadequate” for regulating broadcasts, and urged the Parliament to 
make new laws in this regard,238 it acknowledged that: “The CAB did not ever apply 
for a license under the first proviso to Section 4 of the Telegraph Act  . . .. In the 
absence of such a license, the CAB had no right in law to have its matches telecast by 
an agency of its choice.239
One, can we really treat the 1885 Act as an expression of the state’s will, even though 
236 Steinbeck 1958: 42-47.
237 A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 1236.
238 Ibid. at 1309.
239 Ibid. at 1311.
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it  was  enacted  more  than a  hundred  years  prior  to  the  legal  dispute,  even  before 
wireless communication had been invented? To this one may tentatively contend that 
the fact that such a law has not been repealed yet itself indicates the state’s will. But 
even this does not resolve the issue. A legal right emerges when a law is applied to a 
set of facts. Hence it is a creation not of the law alone but also the applicable facts. 
The “state’s will” theory would presume the state’s will in respect of them both, that 
is, of law and facts equally. But these facts are created not by the state but through the 
acts of private parties. And the legal rights emerging from them might well  differ 
greatly from what the state desired or even contemplated. Surely we may assume the 
state’s intention was not to dispossess farmers already suffering due to droughts? But 
if dispossession took place nevertheless, it must have been in spite of, and not because 
of, the state’s will. 
The last  observation in this connection concerns the objective of a right.  It  is the 
interests  of  private  individuals  rather  than  the  state  that  comprise  the  main 
consideration behind the right recognition process. This is difficult to reconcile with 
Bentham’s view that magistrates are commissioned to execute the legislator’s  will 
when upholding legal rights. Even if one contends this is meant in the sense that legal 
rules are themselves representations of the state’s will, it does not explain why the 
state’s will is geared towards enforcing the interests of a private individual. In many 
instances, moreover, the right in question may be inimical to the state’s own interest. 
In such cases also, the state is required to enforce it regardless of consequences. 
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III. RIGHTS AND THE STATE
1. Need for a Re-Think
In  trying  to  understanding  the  state’s  role,  we have  so  far  restricted  ourselves  to 
existing theories of rights. This approach is problematic for several reasons, some of 
which we have already encountered. It is expedient at this stage, therefore, to cease 
our dependence on these theories. This in turn entails two things. First we need to 
understand where exactly the lacunae of the foregoing approaches lie. Having done 
that, we need to make a fresh start.
Let us begin from the distinction between mature and immature legal systems. As we 
had  noted  in  Chapter  3,  the  term “mature”  only  indicates  only  a  certain  level  of 
achievement, not a pinnacle or an ideal condition. In this regard, the concept of rule of 
law  may  be  profitably  invoked,  particularly  Raz’s  thin  conception,240  which  is 
characterised by only certain basic characteristics such as judicial review. It can be 
conjectured  that  any version of  the  rule  of  law,  no matter  how thin,  includes  the 
condition that once rights are recognised, they must be enforced.
The singular feature about this is that it commits the state to enforce something over 
whose  content  it  (the  state)  has  no  real  control  beyond  enacting  the  applicable 
240 Raz 1977: 198-202, specifically 201.
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legislation. Certainly the state cannot control the facts from which the right arises, or 
the individuals whose actions lead to those facts. In most “mature legal systems” (to 
use Austin’s phrase), neither can the state, that is the executive, control the judiciary, 
that  is,  regulate  judicial  outcome  in  accordance  with  its  own  interests.  It  is  this 
commitment of the state that the foregoing theories fail to account for. This calls for a 
deep re-think on the nature and extent of the state’s commitment, its parameters, and 
its causes.
2. Circumstances of Enforcement: The “How” of State Compulsion
The first question before us, therefore, relates to this element of compulsion. Neither 
contemporary theories nor the conjectures of early positivists accurately reflect how 
legal rights actually work. Treating rights in terms of the state’s will, which we shall 
refer  to  as the “will  theory”,  leads to  conceptual  inconsistencies.  The very use of 
words like “will”, “volition” or “desire” implies the existence of choice, a lack of 
compulsion: the state enforces rights because it wants to, not because it has to. But 
such a situation is clearly inconsistent with what we understand of legal rights. 
Most  modern  municipal  or  “mature”  legal  systems  do  not  envisage  any  such 
discretion on the part of the state. They treat rights in the nature of what Dworkin 
calls “trumps”, that is, they hold that “ . . . it is for some reason wrong for officials to 
act in violation of that right, even if they (correctly) believe that the community as a 
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whole would be better off if they did.241” Indeed, there exist some benefits over whose 
conferment the state has a discretion. For these one has to appeal to the state’s better 
judgment, that is, show some extra or special cause why an allotment ought to be 
made in her favour. If nevertheless she is denied the benefit, she does not thereby gain 
a  cause  of  action.  Only  in  exceptional  cases,  such  as  blatant  mala  fides in  the 
conferment of such benefits, can she approach the law courts for redress. On the other 
hand, in the case of a right, the holder needs to establish merely (1) the existence of a 
specific law that confers this right, and (2) that the involved facts satisfy the criteria 
laid out in that law. Once she does so,  the state is deprived of any discretion to not 
uphold her right. She need not show any special reason and, moreover, if the state 
denies her that  benefit  despite her fulfilling these two conditions, this  gives her a 
cause of action to approach the courts.
Let us, for example, imagine a situation where Y’s contractual debt to X has been 
upheld by the law courts, and yet the executive legitimately possesses the discretion to 
enforce or not. While indeed such cases may exist, and surely do exist in despotic 
systems of governance, we can say unequivocally that these  do not exemplify legal  
rights as they are commonly understood. An essential characteristic of a legal right is 
that once X’s claim is recognised as valid, the state no longer enjoys any discretion 
over enforcement. In a manifest sense, the state is compelled to enforce X’s right. This 
element  of  compulsion  cannot  be  reconciled  with  the  will  theory.  If  a  person  is 
compelled  to  do  something,  it  means  she  is  doing  so  irrespective of,  rather  than 
241 Dworkin 1984: 153.
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because of, her will. And this characteristic is what leads choice theorists to suggest 
the holder exerts a certain control over the rights process.
3. Circumstances of Non-Enforcement: The “Why” of State Compulsion
However,  it  is  not  enough  if  our  descriptive  theory  merely  accounts  for  state 
enforcement of rights. Had that been the only issue involved, we could have simply 
stipulated enforcement as a condition precedent to the concept of legal rights. We 
have already seen this is not always the case. The actual state of reality is complicated 
and not susceptible of a facile explanation.
Let us recall the three attitudes to right enforcement we had identified in Chapter 3  – 
one where the state does not recognise rights at all (such as Idi Amin’s Uganda); the 
second,  where  state  enforcement  of  rights  is  made  subject  to  some  overriding 
requirement of morality or ideology (such as the Third Reich); and the third, where 
the state does not have the discretion not to enforce rights. It is the third category that 
is  of most  interest  to us.  And yet several  examples can be found where the most 
mature and democratic  among legal  systems have  consciously  declined  to  uphold 
rights. In Liversidge, for example, the state chose to interpret a statute in unreasonably 
wide terms and, on that basis, deprive a person of his liberty (which was subsequently 
upheld by the House of Lords). Then we have the CIA black sites,242 where the state 
chose to ignore obligations the law had placed on it directly. And contrast these with 
242 Priest 2005.
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Schlegelberger’s  upholding  of  Jewish  lawyers’ interests  even  though  they  were 
inconsistent with the state’s interests and morality.243 
This would imply that enforcement is caused by certain motives or reasons for action 
offered to the state, which are efficacious only in certain circumstances. This in turn 
raises several vital questions. What is the nature of this reason for action? From what 
or whom does it derive? And most perplexingly, why is it that its efficacy not only 
varies across legal systems, but also at times alters selectively within a given legal 
order?  Admittedly,  such  non-enforcement  is  rare  in  mature  legal  systems.  They 
certainly cannot be treated in as matter-of-fact a manner as the Puender affair can be. 
The  fact  that  they  do  occur  but  only  exceptionally  ipso  facto indicates  that  their 
occurrence is not susceptible to a prima facie explanation, i.e. that there is some sort 
of a mechanism behind such selective violation.
4. Parameters of Re-Think
The  above  exegesis  indicates  that  conventional  theories  are  beset  with  serious 
shortcomings.  Enforcement  does  not  arise  of  the  state’s  unfettered  will.  Nor  is  it 
because  enforcement  is  somehow  “hardwired”  into  the  state’s  existence,  or  is  a 
“condition precedent” to civil society, or some other esoteric reason that cannot be 
objectively ascertained. We cannot assume the state is always willing to uphold rights, 
243 Nathans 2000: 292.
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neither can we assume the state always upholds rights irrespective of its will. Above 
all, we cannot take it as a given that the state always does uphold rights, even though 
the concept of legal rights requires it to do so. At the same time, instances like the 
Schlegelberger episode indicate the state does at times uphold rights even when it 
runs against the demands of both expediency and the prevalent morality.
From the  above,  one  may  conclude  that  the  very  manner  in  which  conventional 
theories have approached the issue of right  enforcement  is  flawed. The issue is  a 
complex one in nature. Indeed, within it three separate problems can be discerned, 
each of which features its own singular characteristics. And a descriptive theory can 
be  considered adequate  only if  it  identifies  these three  issues  and addresses  them 
individually. By not recognising the complexity latent in the issue, and specifically by 
conflating its three separate aspects into a singularity of sorts, conventional theories 
have rendered themselves inadequate.
These three issues are as follows: First, the rights mechanism requires the state to act 
in a particular way. So our theory must be able to (a) describe the causes behind it; 
and  (b)  map  out  the  manner  in  which  the  state  behaves  in  these  circumstances. 
Secondly, the most mature of legal systems,  such as the United States and the United 
Kingdom,  have  also  in  rare  instances  evaded  enforcing  rights.  Their  otherwise 
exemplary  right  enforcement  record  firmly  establish  that  such  enforcement  is  not 
haphazard or subject to chance, like for example it was in Nazi Germany. And yet 
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even in such systems deviations have taken place on occasion. Our descriptive theory 
must cover such cases as well. That is, it must be able to describe the contours of the 
state’s behaviour in these circumstances.  Thirdly and most significantly, the theory 
must  be  able  to  explain  the  mechanism through which  the  state  is  able  to  evade 
enforcement, but only selectively and on occasion. 
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to only the first question. This involves what 
the concept of rights requires of the state, the nature of this requirement, variations of 
this requirement across the different branches of the state, and so on. The second  and 
third issues shall be examined in the next chapter.
IV. RIGHTS AND FIRST-ORDER REASONS FOR COMPLIANCE
We concluded above that the state  enforces  rights  neither of its  free will  and nor 
because  enforcement  is  somehow  “hard-wired”  into  the  system  (as  a  condition 
precedent or otherwise). So if the motive behind enforcement is intrinsic to neither the 
state’s (or rather the ruler’s) volition nor to the structure of legal rights, it can only be 
extrinsic to them both, that is, it must derive from an outside source. This raises two 
questions. The first, which relates to its source, we shall examine in the following 
chapter. In the present chapter we address the nature of the motive offered to the state.
Two possibilities lie before us, namely that the state acts out of either a first-order 
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reason, or a second-order reason. We begin with first order reasons. As we recall, 
these can be sub-divided into three further types or classes, each of which we examine 
in turn. For this endeavour, Hart’s “internal point  of view” approach may be used 
profitably. That is, we look at enforcement not from an external perspective but from 
the state’s point of view. What precisely is required of it, and does this requirement 
come within any first-order reason, or even a combination of two such reasons?
1. Subjective Reasons
Certain types of subjective reasons are favoured by one kind of positivists, especially 
the early ones. It is easy to see why – they are compatible with the will theory of 
Bentham and Austin, and  even with the notion of illimitable sovereignty. According 
to  this  view,  the  state  enforces  rights  in  the  interests  of  good  governance;  not 
upholding them would lead to widespread discontent with the government, and may 
even cause the populace to revolt. Austin cleverly weaves this idea within his concept 
of sovereignty:244
For example, To [sic] an indefinite, though limited extent, the monarch is the 
superior  of  the governed:  his  power being commonly sufficient  to  enforce 
compliance with his will. But the governed, collectively or in mass, are also 
the superior of the monarch: who is checked in the abuse of his might by his 
fear of exciting their anger; and of rousing to active resistance the might which 
244 Austin 1954: 25.
118
slumbers in the multitude. 
We saw earlier that  according to Austin,  a right is nothing more than a command 
issued by the  sovereign to  the duty-bearer,245 and  that  a  defining  characteristic  of 
command is that it emanates from a superior to an inferior.246 From these, it can be 
inferred that the sovereign upholds individuals’ rights (i.e. issues commands to the 
respective duty-bearers) because she herself is implicitly commanded to do so by her 
superiors, namely the populace. If she unduly neglects to do so, the latter’s discontent 
may even galvanise it  into rebellion.  It  is the fear of this  sanction that causes the 
monarch  to  uphold  others’ legal  rights  and  thereby  keep public  discontent  within 
discontent within tolerable limits. Hence this would require the state to balance its 
various  interests,  in  an  almost  Utilitarian  manner.  If  enforcing  rights  is  more 
conducive  to  the  state’s  interests,  then  enforcement  should  be  carried  out,  not 
otherwise. 
The flaws in this conjecture are numerous. To begin with, a conjecture thus rooted in 
expediency would hold good for all legal systems, even the most “primitive” ones. Idi 
Amin sustained his hold over Uganda through sheer brute force. But suppose he found 
his hegemony weakening, he could take recourse to enforcing  legal rights, more as a 
means of placating people than out of any serious commitment to rights, justice or the 
rule  of  law.  Likewise,  if  a  “mature”  or  modern  municipal  legal  system  finds  it 
245 Austin 1911. vol 1: 395. See also Austin 1954: 29-30.
246 Austin 1954: 24.
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inexpedient to enforce a particular right,  it is as much at liberty to disregard it as a  
primitive system is. In other words, if the threat of rebellion and other considerations 
of expediency are the most significant factors, then at least as far as right enforcement 
is concerned, the difference between mature and immature systems is eroded away.
This conflicts directly with the theoretical basis of rights as well as state practice the 
world  over.  As  we  saw earlier,  the  very  ethos  of  legal  rights  entails  compulsory 
enforcement. A “primitive” legal system is free not to enforce rights purely because it 
does not recognise this non-optional characteristic. But this also means that it does not 
countenance the notion of legal rights as we understand it! On the other hand, the very 
fact that mature legal systems do recognise legal rights as it is understood here also 
means that it acknowledges the non-optional nature of enforcement. Moreover, just as 
legal  rights  conceptually  preclude  options  or  alternatives,  so  do  they  exclude 
judgment or evaluation. This we shall examine in detail in the following subsection 
on moral reasons, so I shall not enter into a discussion here.
In any case, subjective reasons specifically engender two more consequences which 
are difficult to reconcile with legal rights as we understand it. First, where does this 
place  minority  rights,  such  a  significant  aspect  of  public  law  in  so  many mature 
systems? If suppose an ethnic majority objects to a particular practice of an ethnic 
minority, then prima facie the immediate interests of the state will be better served by 
acceding to the demands of the majority; at least this will diminish the chances of 
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social unrest. But such rights are not only recognised but also enforced routinely in 
most mature legal systems, sometimes even at the cost of tremendous social unrest, 
and therefore at great loss to the interests of the state. Indeed, upholding such rights 
might even cause rather than avoid rebellion, as it did in the case of the US Civil War.
The  second  issue  relates  to  when  the  threat  of  rebellion  or  other  such  extreme 
consequences is faint. For despotisms based on brutal suppression of dissent, for Nazi 
Germany as  much as  for  Idi  Amin’s  regime,  public  goodwill  comprises  a  remote 
consideration, and large-scale insurrection a still more remote possibility. And yet we 
saw the Third Reich had a tolerable record in upholding rights – on occasion even 
when it clashed with the regime’s ideological or other interests. What could be the 
motive  for  upholding  cases  like  Schlegelberger’s?  Was it  to  earn  the  goodwill  of 
Jewish lawyers? Or from fear of an insurrection at a time when the Reich had already 
begun to send Jews to concentration camps and confiscate their property? Even in 
regard to the less controversial cases, this theory cannot explain why the state must 
take the pains to uphold individuals’ rights when it otherwise routinely used more 
brutal methods to secure its interests.
2. Normative Reasons
The  concept  of  rights  in  general  has  been  long  associated  with  moral  and  other 
normative  considerations.  Civil  and  political  rights  in  particular  have  traditionally 
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derived from political  moralities and ideologies.  Some contend these rights  inhere 
naturally to individuals by virtue of their existence, and therefore enjoy an existence 
independent  of  legal  recognition;  a  position  Bentham  famously  condemned  as 
“nonsense  upon  stilts”.247 This  of  course  relates  to  recognising rights,  while  our 
concern is with enforcing them. Nevertheless, the deep association between rights and 
morality constitutes perhaps the most challenging conjecture that we need to address: 
states enforce rights because they have a moral obligation to do so. 
This is where Hart’s internal aspect comes in most useful. Let us place ourselves in 
the position of a state (or ruler – surely we may treat them as equivalent in the present 
context) confronted with a moral obligation to enforce a right. The first question we 
encounter is, what is the nature of this obligation? Do we treat the morality of the 
right as a given or condition precedent? That is, are we supposed to assume the right 
is moral solely because it has been recognised as a right? Or are we ourselves required 
to recognise the morality of the right, and on that basis enforce it? The first possibility 
is  inherently  problematic.  Because  there  we  enforce  the  right  not  because  of  its 
morality  per  se,  but  because  someone  else  (the  judge)  has  bestowed  a  certain 
recognition upon it. In which case it is the fact of recognition, rather than the moral 
nature of the right, that is the impelling motive. And this motive thus devolves into a 
content-independent imperative akin to an act of will.
247 Bentham 1997: 53.
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On the other hand, if the moral nature of the right is what directly impels us to enforce 
it, then this means we are first required to recognise its morality, and then enforce it 
for that reason alone. Recognition entails evaluation. If we are to enforce the right 
solely because it is moral in nature, then we ourselves need to be first convinced of its 
morality, which would require evaluating or ascertaining the moral nature of the right 
for ourselves. Now suppose we are presented with a right whose morality we are not 
convinced of. Do we then have the option of not enforcing it? If we do not, then what 
is the point in requiring us to appreciate the morality of the right? On the other hand, 
if we do have the option, we will end up in a situation akin to the Third Reich, where 
rights  otherwise  legally  valid  were  not  enforced  because  they  conflicted  with 
prevalent moral or political ideologies. In the earlier discussion on subjective reasons 
I  pointed  out  that  basing  right  enforcement  on  subjective  reasons  erodes  the 
distinction between mature legal systems and primitive systems like Idi Amin’s. Here 
I contend that basing rights on morality similarly chips away distinctions between 
mature legal systems and regimes like the Third Reich.
This holds true even if we argue for a morality-based content-independent act of will 
(as in once a right is recognised, the state has a moral duty to enforce it even if it feels 
the right is not moral). Let us take recourse to an example here. The law of contracts 
can be said to derive from the principle that promises must be honoured – pacta sunt  
servanda.  And yet  rigid adherence  to  this  principle  may yield situations  certainly 
incompatible  with most  conceptions  of  morality.  Take the initial  chapters  of  John 
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Steinbeck’s The Grapes of Wrath, where farmer all over the “dust bowl” states were 
unable  to  keep  up  with  their  mortgage  payments  because  the  rains  failed 
consecutively for three years, consequent to which the banks rendered hundreds of 
thousands homeless at one stroke.248 Undoubtedly, the banks were within their rights 
to foreclose the mortgages, in that there was nothing legally wrong in what they did. 
At the same time, the morality of their action is surely open to doubt; some would say 
they were taking advantage of a situation where the farmers had committed no wilful 
default but were only victims of their own misfortune.
There is every reason to believe that this unfortunate situation was an unforeseen and 
undesirable consequence of the law. The laws of contract and mortgages were devised 
to  protect  the legitimate interests  of creditors (and other  parties).  At least  we can 
conjecture that the state did not create those laws expressly to dispossess drought-hit 
marginal  farmers;  moreover,  neither  did  the  state  ever  want  such  farmers  to  be 
dispossessed  because  of  a  natural  calamity.  And  yet,  that  is  exactly  what  has 
transpired,  and  the  state  is  entrusted  with  enforcing  something  it  regards  as 
undesirable and unjust.
Now suppose the state is  under a moral  duty to enforce the banks’ rights.  In our 
discussion on normative reasons,  we noted that  the generally  good, just,  moral or 
otherwise virtuous nature of the required action itself impels the actor to comply with 
it. Hence it can be efficacious only when the actor recognises the good, just, moral or 
248 Steinbeck 1958: 42-47.
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otherwise  virtuous  nature  of  the  prescribed  act.  If  we  apply  this  to  the  present 
situation, it will mean that the state is required to first recognise that the banks’ claim 
is  indeed,  good,  just,  moral  or  otherwise  virtuous  in  nature.  And  this  even  as  it 
recognises  that  the  situation  is  an  unintended  consequence  of  laws  meant  for  an 
altogether different purpose; that it has been precipitated by a natural calamity and not 
through any fault or shortcoming of the farmers themselves; and that if the banks’ 
rights are enforced, it will result in terrible injustice meted out to the farmers for no 
fault of theirs. Since both competing moral imperatives are in the nature of first-order 
reasons, the state possesses the discretion to compare their relative merits and select 
the one it ranks higher than the other. Given the circumstances, it is entirely possible 
that the state ranks the farmers’ claims higher than the bankers’. If so, it ought to be 
open to the state not to enforce the bankers’ rights on grounds that the interests of 
morality or justice will be better served thereby.
But this simply does not hold good for legal rights as we know it. Modern municipal 
legal systems treat rights as “trumps”, or absolutely valid and compelling motives for 
state action. This precludes the state from any discretion about whether to enforce or 
not. It is required to enforce no matter how unjust it feels the right’s consequences 
might be. This flies completely in the face of the normative reason for compliance, 
where the actor’s action is directly dependent on her acknowledging the moral-ness or 
justness of the prescribed action. Clearly, then, moral or other normative motives are 
not particularly useful or appropriate in respect of state enforcement of rights.
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3. Imperative Reasons
Among first-order reasons for compliance,  the only remaining possibility is  that  a 
“stable hierarchy” obligates the state to enforce the holder’s right in the same way that 
it obligates the individual to obey the law. Even if we choose not to go into how and 
why such a hierarchy is  established,  a lacuna apparent at  first  sight rules out this 
conjecture as an explanation of rights. Which is, like the “moral duty” theory, such an 
imperative will provide to the state only one out of possibly several reasons for action. 
Suppose the state finds itself obligated to enforce the banks’ manifestly unjust claim. 
At the same time it feels that a refusal to enforce better serves the ends of justice or 
morality. In such a situation, clearly two possible conducts are open to it, with no 
guidelines or rules existing on the basis of which one may be selected over the other. 
Once again we cast ourselves in the role of the state required to enforce a right we feel 
is  immoral  or  unjust  or  otherwise  wrong.  Within  the  parameters  of  first-order 
imperative reasons, there are three alternatives to compliance theoretically open. The 
first,  viz. escaping to another jurisdiction like Hart’s draft dodger, can be dismissed 
outright. Such a thing is possible for the individual but surely not for the state itself! 
But there exists another option open to us which the draft-dodger cannot avail of: in  
order to circumvent the enforcement of a right, we can enact appropriate legislation. 
Such an expedient is not without precedent. Indeed, it has been done before in several 
cases. We shall examine this in detail in the following chapter (when we discuss the 
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possibility of being bound to positive law). Hence in this section we will not treat it at 
any depth. Instead, we focus on the third possibility, which is to react as Huckleberry 
Finn did, that is, decline to comply and instead render ourselves open to consequent 
sanctions. (In the context of state action, sanctions amount to a doubtful affair as the 
state itself is responsible for their imposition and implementation. On occasion the 
state may impose sanctions against itself. But then the state may just as easily ignore 
sanctions it is supposed to impose on itself, as it was wont to do in Idi Amin’s regime. 
Bereft of sanctions, therefore, the imperative to enforce rights reduces to the same 
level of precedence as other courses of action before the state.)
Supposing that faced with having to enforce a right like the banks’ claim, we decline 
to do so and instead justify ourselves by invoking a competing moral reason. First-
order imperative reasons permit this; at least, as we saw above, more than one course 
of action is open to us. But if we opt for any of these, will we be justified in doing so 
even if we invoke a moral reason? As the state we will not, and there is a cogent 
reason behind this.  The act  of choosing between alternatives  as well  as justifying 
something on moral reasons involve the use of judgment. But we have seen already 
that the rights mechanism does not allow for either of the two! That is, once the right 
is recognised, the state does not have the option of using its judgment or discretion to 
avoid doing so.
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In  summation,  therefore,  first-order  reasons  are  incompatible  with  the  concept  of 
rights. They allow for the possibility of non-compliance on the basis of a competing 
reason for compliance. But these options are not really open to the state. It cannot 
decline to enforce on moral grounds. It can most certainly not do so on grounds of 
expediency or  self-interest!  If  it  does  so,  then  it  lapses  into  an  analogue  of  Nazi 
Germany or Idi Amin’s Uganda respectively. It can no longer be considered a “mature 
legal system”, precisely because it does not uphold legal rights.
4. Exclusionary Reasons, Generally
Much of what we have to observe about legal rights and exclusionary reasons (in the 
Razian sense) has been already covered in our discussion on moral and imperative 
reasons. So we may be brief here. In the previous chapter we saw that from the point 
of view of the actor, the obligations exclusionary reasons impose are actually similar 
to  first-order  reasons  in  their  functioning,  since  their  efficacy  depends  on  their 
comparative strength or weight. One consequence of this is that such reasons offer the 
actor a certain choice or discretion, which is inconsistent with what we have inferred 
about  rights.  This  holds  true  of  exclusionary  reasons  in  general  as  long  as  the 
obligations imposed are in the nature of first-order obligations.
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V. RIGHTS AND THE BOUND CONDITION
If first-order reasons are conceptually incompatible with right enforcement, then the 
only option before us is to treat the latter in terms of second-order reasons, that is, the 
bound condition. In a way this is a foregone conclusion. Even in the course of our 
earlier  exegeses,  several  resemblances  between  right  enforcement  and  the  bound 
condition have emerged. Here we formally ascertain whether this resemblance is only 
coincidental,  or  whether enforcement  does conform to the criteria  establishing the 
bound condition.  In  the  previous  chapter  we had  identified  four  such  definitional 
criteria (and three more in the nature of necessary consequences of these). Here we 
take each in turn and examine each in the light of right enforcement:
1. The bound condition ipso facto invalidates or nullifies all other competing reasons 
for compliance
From what we saw of legal rights in “mature” systems, surely there can be no doubt 
about this. We recall that in such systems rights are treated as “trumps”, that is, the 
existence of the right precludes the state from disregarding it, even if doing so serves 
the common good.249 Hence even competing reasons as laudable as the common good 
are not considered powerful enough to validly permit the disregard of a legal right.
249 Dworkin 1984:153.
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2. The bound condition precludes any exercise of judgment, choice or discretion
Once again, from our earlier discussions, we know this is an essential aspect of rights 
as  understood  in  mature  legal  systems.  Along  with  the  nullification  of  alternate 
motives, it is also a direct consequence of treating rights as trumps.
3. Once the bound condition is established, it  effectively forms its own reason for  
compliance. No further justification from external (and hence first-order) factors is  
required. 
To examine this, let us go back to the Grapes of Wrath example. Let us also assume 
that the right in question was originally established with an express moral purpose in 
mind, namely the need to protect creditors from the wilful or negligent default of their 
debtors.  When  the  same  right  is  used  to  exploit  marginal  farmers,  this  moral 
justification disappears. But this has no effect on the state’s obligation to enforce it. 
Moreover,  the state  is  even denied the discretion to  examine whether  the original 
moral or other justification for the right was still valid. Thus this criterion also holds 
good for legal rights.
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VI. THE WAY FORWARD
Thus we see, the enforcement of legal rights meets all four definitional characteristics 
of  the  bound condition.  Even at  first  sight,  this  fact  is  apparent.  When a  right  is 
recognised,  the  state  needs  no further  justification  to  enforce  it,  neither  does  any 
competing motive justify  non-enforcement.  In this  way the state is  robbed of any 
discretion in the matter, nor is it free to question whether the right so recognised is 
actually consonant with the objective it was established to uphold. In short, the state is 
presented with only one option, namely to enforce without going to the whys and 
wherefores behind it. This is nothing but the bound condition.
In the next chapter, I will seek to establish that the source of this bound condition lies 
outside of positive law. Once that is achieved, our thesis will be complete. We would 
have established that the functioning of legal rights can be accounted for only if the 
state is acknowledged to be bound to an extra-legal standard. Which means that at a 
comprehensive  description  of  legal  rights  must  also  incorporate  the  extra-legal 
standard from which the bound condition emerges. Consequently, the objectives of 
methodological positivism (i.e. an account of law that is general and descriptive) can 
be  achieved  only  by  stepping  beyond  the  formally  validated  rules  of  substantive 
positivism. This will also link back our current findings to what we had started out 
with in Chapter 2.
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CHAPTER 5 – SOURCE OF THE BOUND CONDITION
I. STATEMENT OF CONTEXT
In the last two chapters, we succeeded in establishing certain key points of our thesis. 
We  outlined  the  characteristics  of  the  bound  condition;  in  the  process  we  also 
distinguished it from conventional (or first-order) reasons for action and exclusionary 
reasons; and finally we established that the behaviour of the state when enforcing a 
legal right corresponds to this bound condition rather than the operation of a first-
order reason. What we now have is an accurate descriptive account of how the state 
behaves  when  it  enforces  a  right.  It  is  more  accurate  than  conventional  theories, 
because it models more closely the state’s behaviour in such circumstances. At the 
same time, there are several issues that remain to be answered, and without which our 
descriptive account cannot be considered complete.
For example, we still have not accounted for situations where even in a mature legal 
system, the state declines to enforce a right. I had mentioned in the last chapter that 
this may be effected in more than one way. And at least one such means is available to 
the state but not the individual, that is, the power to make legislative changes in order 
to circumvent right enforcement. As I shall examine in this chapter, several instances 
of this can be identified. Moreover, in some cases the state simply declines to observe 
rights, that is, by acting outside of the law altogether rather than by making at least the 
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letter of the law conform to its actions. This poses a challenge for our descriptive 
objectives. Surely in order for our account to be comprehensive, it must be able to 
explain how at times the state is able to disregard the bound condition in either of the 
two ways.
Secondly, we saw what effect the bound condition has on the actor, but so far we 
know little about the condition itself. We need to first ascertain what determines its 
imposition, that is the purpose or objective for which it is imposed on the state in the 
context of right enforcement. Secondly and equally important, we need to locate the 
source of this bound condition. When we say it is imposed on the state, the question 
arises who or what imposes it. Is it something the state imposes on itself? Does it 
derive from the law itself, that is, from formally recognised standards of positive law? 
Or is this source extrinsic to it? This issue is linked to the first. Once we ascertain the 
source and determinants of the bound condition,  we will  automatically understand 
why the condition does not work at times. Which is to say, the bound condition not 
working can be understood as a failure of the determinants behind it.
Three possibilities lie before us at this stage. The first is that this bound condition can 
itself be explained through the use of theoretical constructs already prevalent among 
scholars. We have already examined and rejected conventional first-order reasons as 
explanations  of  the  bound condition.  Here  we scrutinise  another  likely  candidate, 
namely Hart’s internal aspect of rules. The second possibility is that the condition 
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derives  from  positive  law  itself.  And  the  third,  as  mentioned  above,  locates  the 
condition in a source external to the framework of positive law. It is manifest that this 
last possibility bears considerable consequences for legal positivism. If our account of 
right enforcement must extend to the source of the bound condition, and this source 
lies outside the domain of positive law, then it necessarily means that an account of 
legal rights cannot be complete if it confines itself to positive law and, vice versa, it 
can be complete only if it looks beyond formally recognised standards.
II. BOUND CONDITION AND INVALIDABLE ASPECTS
 
The  relationship  between  the  bound  condition  and  invalidable  aspects  of 
methodological positivism (such as Dickson’s notion of indirect evaluation, Leiter’s 
epistemic values, or Hart’s concepts of the internal aspect and the internal point of 
view) is complicated and not susceptible of a simple exegesis. It requires a research 
project dedicated to itself; in any case it is too big a topic to be adequately addressed 
within the present dissertation. Here we shall examine Hart’s internal aspect (which 
arguably  bears  the  strongest  resemblances  to  the  bound  condition),  identify  the 
reasons why it does not constitute an adequate explanation of the bound condition, 
and then briefly dwell on the other invalidable aspects (such as indirect evaluation and 
epistemic values).
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1. The Internal Aspect
We noted in Chapter 2 that Hart’s internal aspect of law marked a notable departure 
from then-contemporary  positivist  thought.  Hart  himself  defined  in  the  following 
terms:  “ . . . if a social rule is to exist some at least must look upon the behaviour in 
question as a general standard to be followed by the group as a whole.250” He further 
specified that it  was not a matter  of feeling,  but more in the nature of a “critical 
reflective attitude” to use his own picturesque phrase.251 This distinction between on 
the one hand the acceptance of a rule, and on the other a feeling of compulsion due to 
this acceptance, is very significant. By accepting a rule,  the actor recognises it as a 
standard on whose basis she, as a participant in the system, may evaluate her own and 
other participants’ actions. What is significant here is that Hart chooses the indefinite 
‘a standard’  over the definite ‘the’. This choice is notable, especially in the context of 
the bound condition.
2. Internal Aspect and the Bound Condition
There exist several prima facie reasons that suggest a relationship between our bound 
condition and Hart’s internal aspect. In Chapter 3 we had noted that the internal point 
of view is more appropriate than an empirical, external one for appreciating the nature 
250 Hart 1994: 56.
251 “There is no contradiction in saying that people accept certain rules but experience no . . . 
feelings of compulsion. What is necessary is that there should be a critical reflective attitude to 
certain patterns of behaviour as a common standard, and that this should display itself in criticism 
(including self-criticism), demands for conformity, and in acknowledgements that such criticism 
and demands are justified . . ..” Ibid. at 57.
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of the bound condition. Secondly, Hart himself uses the terms “bound” and “binding” 
to describe the internal aspect.252 This, however, does not bear up to close scrutiny.
Let  us  begin  from what  Hart  says.  He characterises  “feeling  bound” in  terms  of 
“psychological experiences analogous to restriction or compulsion” which individuals 
may have when a social group generally accepts a rule.253 This needs to be understood 
in the light of two postulates about the bound condition, our bound condition, that we 
had specified in Chapter 4. First, we had said that this condition is in the nature of a 
mental state appreciable only from the internal viewpoint. This implies that as far as 
our construction of the bound condition is concerned, there is no difference between 
being bound and feeling bound; as a matter of fact the former derives from the latter. 
Secondly, we had distinguished between being under a duty and being bound by that 
duty. Hence being obligated does not of itself imply being bound.
Reverting to Hart, we see that according to him, these experiences are not necessary 
for  a  rule  to  be  binding.254 Hence  a  rule  being  binding  and  an  individual  actor 
“feeling” bound denote two different things. Hart identifies the internal aspect with 
the  first,  whereas  it  is  clear  from the  preceding  paragraph  that  we  associate  our 
binding  condition  with  the  feeling  of  being  bound,  and  not  merely  a  rule  being 






Neither does Hart’s concept of bound seem similar to ours. We noted in the previous 
paragraph  that  Hart  defines  his  version  solely in  terms  of  certain  psychological 
experiences, namely those similar to restriction or compulsion. (Through this, we may 
also  distinguish  between  his  versions  of  being  bound  and  being  obligated;  he 
explicitly  states  that  being  obligated  need  not  entail  these  psychological 
experiences.255)   But  these  experiences  are  certainly  not  enough  in  themselves  to 
establish our bound condition. It is possible to experience these feelings and yet not 
be bound. Huckleberry Finn felt them deeply, and that too at two distinct levels, legal 
and moral. And yet even their combined impact was not enough to bind him to the 
legal and moral imperatives imposed on him.
It is indeed possible to redefine in stronger terms Hart’s concept of being bound, so 
that it approximates our version. Indeed, we may even enhance the internal aspect to 
achieve a similar end. But will such an expedient serve any purpose? Hart invokes the 
internal aspect in order to merely distinguish habits from rules, that is, all rules in 
general. It is another matter that in his opinion the requirements of a legal system are 
fulfilled merely if officials recognise secondary rules as common public standards of 
official behaviour – individuals need only generally obey primary rules, that is, “for 
their parts only”, and without recognising them as  common standards.256 This would 
mean that the internal aspect concept applies to all valid rules, even though it may not 
255 Ibid. at 88.
256 Ibid. at 116.
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be recognised as such universally. Hart also makes it clear that the binding nature of 
rules does not always engender feelings of being bound, even his weaker version.
Therefore, if we augment the criteria for the internal aspect so as to bring it closer to 
our concept of being bound, it will surely cease to hold good for all rules, as Hart 
intended it  to.  Which  means  that  the  very  purpose  of  the  internal  aspect  (viz. to 
separate rules from habits) will be lost in our proposed modification. This holds true 
from  a  common-sense  perspective  too.  Surely  not  all  rules  engender  a  bound 
condition. And yet this fact does not lessen their status as rules in any manner. A rule 
remains a rule even if we actors do not feel bound to it. Which is precisely why Hart 
made the distinction in the first place!
Even though the internal aspect as it stands cannot be applied to our bound condition, 
can an approach based on the internal aspect used to understand and account for this 
condition? This would imply that just as rules per se comprise standards of reflective 
criticism, there are some rules among them which, purely by virtue of belonging to 
that special class of rules,  ipso facto impose the bound condition on the state when 
enforcing legal rights.  If such a thing is at all possible, it  necessarily rests on the 
presumption that rules alone can generate the bound condition, that is, the source of 
the  bound  condition  is,  or  can  be  at  times,  located  within  formally  recognised 
standards.  If  we are  to proceed with this  approach,  we must  first  ascertain if  this 
presumption  is  valid,  that  is,  whether  it  is  possible  that  the  source  of  the  bound 
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condition is located within positive laws themselves.
3. Bound Condition and Other Versions of the Invalidable Aspect
We can afford to be brief here. All the other accounts of the invalidable aspect of 
methodological  positivism,  such  as  Dickson’s  indirect  evaluation257 and  Leiter’s 
epistemic  values,258  involve  evaluation.  Evaluation  implies  choices,  which  is 
something the bound condition specifically excludes.  Consequently, trying to locate 
the bound condition in the invalidable aspect of description will not aid us much.
III. POSITIVE LAW AND THE BOUND CONDITION
1. Background
Now that we have ascertained that the bound condition describes more accurately than 
first-order  reasons  the  state’s  conduct  in  enforcing  rights,  the  question  emerges 
whether this can be reconciled with positivism’s fundamental tenets, or whether the 
nature or sources of the bound condition is inconsistent with the latter. Let us proceed 
by assuming the validity  of the first  conjecture,  viz. that  legal  positivism and the 
bound condition as applied to right enforcement are not mutually inconsistent.
257 Dickson 2001: 64.
258 Leiter 2003: 34-35.
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It can be said with some assurance that a valid legal rule may itself provide a reason 
for action. If a law requires the actor to act in a certain manner, then the mere fact that 
the conduct derives from a recognised legal rule is of itself enough grounds to justify 
the actor’s compliance. This holds true of the state as well as the individual. The state 
may well consider the law’s requirement a good and valid reason for action, it may 
also justify its conduct solely on that ground, i.e. that that is what the law specifies. 
But that is clearly not enough to establish the bound condition. Such a scenario will 
not generate a reason for compliance so strong that all other competing reasons are 
rendered nullified ipso facto. Which is precisely what our hypothesis requires, that is, 
that  at  least  as  far  as  state  enforcement  of  rights  is  concerned,  the  reason  for 
compliance emanating from the law operates to the exclusion of all others.
2. Drawbacks of the Hypothesis – Two Cases from Indian Law
From our exegesis of imperative first-order reasons, we recall that when such reasons 
are imposed on the actor, she has several other courses of action open to her apart 
from compliance.  One  such alternative,  which  Hart  also  refers  to,  is  escaping  to 
another jurisdiction. This is not available to the state, naturally. However, it does have 
an option not open to private individuals, it can enact suitable legislation. On occasion 
states have even actually done so. Here I cite two examples from Indian law.
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The first relates to what is known as the Bhopal gas tragedy. On 3 December 1984, 
gas from a pesticide factory at Bhopal, India leaked out from its tank, causing the 
world’s worst single industrial disaster to date.259 It was owned by a company called 
Union Carbide (India) Limited (UCIL). The multinational Union Carbide Corporation 
(UCC) held 51% of UCIL’s shares, and the government of India held 22% through 
financial  institutions.  Official  estimates  place  the  death  toll  at  around  5,000,  but 
experts consider about 20,000 deaths 120,000 chronically ill survivors to be a more 
realistic  figure.260 Most  victims  came  from  the  economically  weakest  sections  of 
society, and thus made potential targets for unscrupulous lawyers. To prevent such 
malpractices and to ensure proper legal representation to victims, the government took 
the unprecedented step of invoking the parents patriae principle. Through the Bhopal 
Gas  Leak  Disaster  (Processing  of  Claims)  Act,  1985,  it  arrogated  to  itself  the 
exclusive right to represent victims in court.261 Although S. 4 permitted individuals to 
retain  their  own  lawyers,  they  were  required  to  work  in  conjunction  with  the 
government’s efforts.
Effectively, then, the legislation took away individual victims’ right to litigate in their 
own  standing.  In  exchange,  the  state  undertook  to  provide  effective  legal 
representation.  In  the  event,  the  legal  battle  ended  rather  abruptly.  UCC  had 
259 For a concise narrative of the involved events as well as legal developments, see Abraham & 
Abraham 1991: 334-36.
260 See Dinham & Sarangi 2002: 92.
261 Section 3 (1) states: “Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the Central Government shall, 
and shall have the exclusive right to, represent, and act in place of (whether within or outside 
India) every person who has made, or is entitled to make, a claim for all purposes connected with 
such claim in the same manner and to the same effect as such person.” 
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approached the  Indian  Supreme Court  on the  issue  whether  the  US$ 195 million 
interim  compensation  ordered  by  a  lower  court  was  too  high.  Instead,  in  Union 
Carbide  Corporation  v.  Union of  India,262 the  Supreme Court  held that  the  entire 
matter  itself  should be settled expeditiously.  The settlement,  to which both parties 
agreed, entailed total damages of US$ 470 million, in exchange for which all civil and 
criminal proceedings against UCC would be quashed.263 
This  settlement  was  controversial.  Commentators  have  described  the  amount  as 
“paltry”,264 and a victory for UCC.265 It was certainly less even than UCC’s highest 
previous offer,266 and following its announcement, UCC shares rose by two Dollars.267 
This, moreover, was at a time when punitive damages of US$5 billion were awarded 
in the Exxon Valdez disaster. (Ultimately in 2008, the US Supreme Court in  Exxon 
Shipping  Company  v.  Baker268 reduced  punitive  damages  to  equal  compensatory 
damages of US$ 507 million already awarded, that is, a total of US$ 1.01 billion.) It 
has also been contended that the Bhopal settlement was based on unrealistically low 
statistical data,269 and the government itself should have been made a co-defendant 
since it was negligent in enforcing safety regulations;270 through financial institutions, 
it also owned 22% of UCIL. But perhaps the most glaring aspect of the episode was 
262 A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 273.
263 Ibid. at 275.
264 Hosein 1993: 299.
265 Cassels 1991: 37.
266 See Hazarika 1989.
267 Ibid. See also Hosein 1993: 299.
268 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008). See also Liptak 2008.
269 For an in-depth analysis, see Sarangi 1995.
270 See Ramaseshan 1984.
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that the victims themselves were not consulted or heard before the settlement was 
finalised.271 This  in  itself  constituted  a  serious  deviation  from  the  natural  justice 
principle audi alteram partem, or the right to be heard.
Public  outcry  was  considerable:  a  letter  signed  by  leading  members  of  the 
intelligentsia, including senior academics, journalists, and a former Delhi High Court 
judge,  stated:  “In  many  ways,  the  in  court  settlement  which  was  announced  on 
February 14 is even worse than an out of court settlement, because it legitimises what 
is in effect  an arbitrary act.”272  But these opinions sit  singularly at odds with the 
Supreme Court’s view in  Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of  India,273 where it upheld the 
constitutional validity of the Act even as it admitted certain lapses had occurred. All 
through,  the  judges  were  openly  appreciative  of  both  the  Act  and  the  settlement. 
Mukherjee, C.J., speaking for the majority, remarked: “The Act was conceived on the 
noble promise of giving relief and succour to the dumb, pale, meek and impoverished 
victims of a tragic industrial gas leak disaster, a concomitant evil in this industrial age 
of technological advancement and development.”274 So deeply were they convinced 
about  the government’s  action,  that  they were  inclined to  dismiss  its  lacunae and 
shortcomings as inconsequential in the light of what it had purportedly achieved. For 
example, denying victims a hearing in the course of the settlement process meant only 
that justice has been done but has not appeared to have been done.275 Moreover, “‘To 
271 See Sarangi 1995: 3271.
272 Haksar et al. 1989: 534.
273 A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1480.
274 Ibid. at 1547.
275 Ibid.
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do  a  great  right’ after  all,  it  is  permissible  sometimes  ‘to  do  a  little  wrong.’”276 
Similarly, notwithstanding the government’s 22% stake in UCIL, nemo iudex in causa 
sua did  not  apply,  since  the  government  was  only  representing  the  victims  as  a 
litigant, and not judging the matter.277
The second case,  Mohd. Ahmed Khan v.  Shah Bano Begum,278 comprises an even 
more instructive instance. Section 125 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 
provides for maintenance to be given to wives. Explanation (b) of the Section makes 
this applicable also to divorced wives who have not remarried. Section 127 (3) (b) 
renders divorced women ineligible for such maintenance if they are paid what the 
parties’ customary laws stipulates  is  payable  on such divorce.  The Islamic law of 
marriages stipulates the payment of mehr (or dower) by the husband to the wife. Part 
of it  (or prompt dower) is paid at  the time of the marriage itself,  and the rest  (or 
deferred dower) when the marriage terminates through death or divorce. The question 
was whether  mehr (or at least its deferred portion) amounted to a sum “payable on 
divorce” within the meaning of Section 127 (3)(b). A five-judge bench of the Supreme 
Court held (per Chandrachud, C.J.) that though divorce may mark a convenient time 
for  payment,  the  reason  behind  the  payment  is  not  the  divorce  but  the  marriage 
itself.279 Consequently,  Section  127  (3)(b)  is  not  applicable  here,  and  the  wife  is 
entitled to maintenance under Section 125 even after mehr is paid.
276 Ibid. at 1545.
277 Ibid. at 1536-37.
278 A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 945.
279 Ibid. at 952-53.
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This seemingly innocuous judgment caused a furore. Criticisms from fundamentalist 
(and even other conservative) sections of Muslim society were vociferous, ranging 
from  the  demagogic  “Islam  is  in  danger!”280 to  resentment  against  a  perceived 
incorrect  interpretation  of  Islamic  personal  laws,281 to  objections  to  obiter  dicta 
disparaging the  status  of  woman in  Islam and calling  for  a  uniform civil  code.282 
Hindu fundamentalists  predictably favoured the judgment.283 Liberal  thinkers were 
torn between supporting either minority, namely Muslims and women.284 Many liberal 
Muslims openly supported the judgment, even as some scholars among them faulted 
the Court’s legal and Quranic interpretation.285
Ultimately, it was the prospect of electoral losses that prompted the government to 
act. The ruling Congress Party suffered a series of electoral setbacks, which could all 
be attributed to the Muslim community, traditionally a Congress vote-bank, moving 
away from it.286 Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was perceived as largely secular, but 
inexperienced  and  not  above  exploiting  communal  sentiments  to  secure  electoral 
advantages.287 Months after lambasting other Congress leaders for allowing “phoney 
280 Pathak & Sunder Rajan 1989: 567.
281 Mody 1987: 939.
282 Ibid.
283 Pathak and Sunder Rajan paraphrase into one line the Hindu right’s stance on the issue –  “Hindu 
men are saving Muslim women from Muslim men”  –  a claim they themselves describe as 
“bizarre as well as sinister”. See Pathak & Sunder Rajan 1989: 566-67.
284 E.g. “Feminist discourses have tried to steer clear of choosing between supporting a minority 
community or condemning them on feminist grounds . . ..” Ibid. at 568-69.
285 See Mody 1987: 939-42.
286 See Ibid. at 948.
287 “The assault on secularism and the disregard that Indira Gandhi had evinced for institutions 
would continue under her inexperienced son and successor, Rajiv Gandhi, albeit in a more 
complex and convoluted fashion. Some of the same imperatives drove mother and son. Like her, 
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issues shrouded in medieval obscurantism to occupy the centre of the stage”,288 the 
government  passed  the  Muslim  Women  (Protection  of  Rights  on  Divorce)  Act, 
1986.289 Section  3(1)  specifies  divorced  Muslim  women’s  entitlements,  in  which 
maintenance is restricted to only a customary period  called iddat, defined in Section 
2 (b). The legislation had the net effect of negating all the significant rulings of the 
Shah Bano judgment.
3. Implications
It  will  be simplistic to dismiss the above as simply instances of right deprivation. 
Certain  singular  features  that  they  share  compel  further  scrutiny.  To  begin  with, 
initially  they  were  both  private-law disputes,  brought  in  by  one  set  of  private 
individuals against  another.  They neither involved the state as a party nor directly 
affected its interests. Moreover, both cases concerned rights legally well established 
and recognised.  The  Bhopal  case  concerned the right  of  individuals  to  seek  legal 
remedy, which is not only recognised by statutes290 but also regarded as inherent by 
commentators.291 Shah Bano, of course, concerned the right to maintenance, which no 
he was a secularist personally, but found the idea of scoring quick electoral gains by tampering 
with secularist institutions and norms too tempting to turn down.” Ganguly 2003: 17.
288 Quoted in Mody 1987: 948.
289 It is another matter that many perceived this as tantamount to appeasing minorities, which led to 
the Hindu vote eroding away from the Congress. See Ganguly 2003: 18.
290  Section 9, Code of Civil Procedure (1908): “The Courts shall (subject to the provisions herein 
contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their 
cognizance is expressly or impliedly barred”.
291 “There is an inherent right in every person to bring a suit of a civil nature and unless the suit is 
barred by statute one may at one’s peril bring a suit of one’s choice. It is no answer to a suit 
however frivolous the claim may be that the law confers no such right to sue.” Saha 1996: vol. 1 
at 59.
146
less than the Supreme Court had recognised as valid. These rights bound the state to 
very  specific  courses  of  action,  namely  to  protect  and  enforce  litigants’ interests 
accruing to them under existing law. It was free to neither exercise discretion, nor 
make choices, nor otherwise intervene in the issue except in the manner prescribed by 
the bound condition. 
Yet that is what it did not do. It exercised its legislative powers specifically to deny 
holders  their  rights  otherwise recognised by law.  For  what  motives  it  did  so,  and 
whether  ultimately  the  holders  benefited  by  it,  are  at  best  highly  contentious 
questions.  We  saw  earlier  just  how  appreciative  the  Supreme  Court  was  of  the 
government’s action against Union Carbide, and on the other hand, eminent women’s 
activists like Flavia Agnes now contend that the 1986 Act actually benefits Muslim 
women.292 But that is beside the point as far as we are concerned. What matters to us 
is that in both cases, the state was under a bound condition; it violated this condition 
and negatived or circumvented the right it was bound to enforce; and most crucially, 
its violating the bound condition did not result in a breach of law.
This last characteristic is of the utmost significance for us. We started out this section 
with the hypothesis that the bound condition derives from positive law. But in the 
foregoing instances we see the state breaching the bound condition, not by declining 
to follow it but by directly modifying the source of the condition! As a result, not only 
the bound condition but also the main first-order reason for enforcing the right (viz. 
292 See A.M. 2003. 
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that  the  law requires  it)  is  also  obliterated.  Once  the  circumventing  legislation  is 
enacted, the law from which the right derives itself ceases to be a legal rule, that is, a 
standard of criticism and self-criticism.
A natural question arises at this juncture: is it not paradoxical to say that X is bound to 
Y, which in turn is controlled by X itself? To my mind, “bound” and “control” are 
ideas irreconcilable under any and all circumstances. “Bound”, in fact, implies “being 
controlled”  more  than  anything  else;  when  X is  bound to  Y,  it  means  X has  no 
discretion to act in a manner inconsistent with Y, hence Y controls X. And if we hold 
that X controls Y at  the same time, it  means X effectively controls itself,  or X is 
bound to itself, which is as good as saying X is not bound at all. So where do we stand 
now? Does this mean our theory is invalid altogether?
Let us briefly take stock of what we have established so far. We saw that first-order 
reasons, or even the assumption that right enforcement is “haphazard” (i.e. subject to 
the  state’s  unfettered  will)  do  not  provide  an  adequate  explanation  of  right 
enforcement. This is because the concept of legal rights requires the state to enforce 
even when it is faced with strong reasons why it should not, such as when its own 
interests  are threatened,  or when it  is inconsistent with commonly-held notions of 
morality  or  justice  (cf. the  Grapes  of  Wrath example).  Even  if  the  two  are  put 
together, still their combined “weight” will not be enough to justify the state declining 
to enforce the right. (To be sure, it may be justified through some external criteria, but 
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not from within the framework of legal rights.) The way right enforcement may be 
explained is  by holding that the state is  bound to enforce rights.  Since the bound 
condition renders as null all competing reasons, no matter how strong, neither the 
demands of morality and justice nor its (the state’s) own interest remain significant.
But as we saw, in the face of an exceptionally strong competing reason, the state does 
violate  the bound condition imposed on it,  and and so avoids  not  enforcing legal 
rights. At times it does so by not violating but amending the legal rule from which the 
right stems. But if it has the power to amend (and hence control) the content of that 
rule, the state cannot be considered bound to the legal rule. 
IV. BOUND CONDITION AND EXTRA-LEGAL STANDARDS
The  above situation  is  resolved  if  we identify  the  source  of  the  bound condition 
outside the domain of positive law, that is, if we contend that the bound condition 
derives  from standards  not  formally  validated  or  significant.  In  such  a  situation, 
although the right may derive from a proposition of positive law, the state’s bound 
condition  (which  compels  it  to  enforce  the  right)  is  sourced  from  a  formally 
insignificant  standard.  There  exist  several  standards  that  fit  our  requirements,  i.e. 
which can be adduced as reasons why the state  is  supposed to  be bound to  right 
enforcement. These may include teleological objectives that individual legal rights are 
intended to serve; or a morality intrinsic to the notion of legal rights itself; or a set of 
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socio-political or theological values that the nation’s constitution explicitly subscribes 
to;  or  indeed  any  other  extra-legal  standard  that  might  be  considered  appropriate 
under the circumstances.
It  is  not important to determine which of these standards forms the source of the 
bound condition, or to otherwise ascertain the nature and content of the source. Such 
an endeavour might even require evaluating these standards on their respective merits, 
which  would  place  it  beyond  the  remit  we  started  out  with,  viz. to  generate  a 
descriptive account of right enforcement. Our immediate objective is satisfied if we 
establish  merely  that  the  source  of  the  bound condition  lies  outside  positive  law, 
because that would mean that no comprehensive descriptive account of how legal 
rights exist and function is possible exclusively on the basis of formally recognised or 
validated standards.
At the end of Chapter 3, we had isolated three characteristics of breaching the bound 
condition:
1. If the actor chooses an alternate conduct, this fact is in itself conclusive that 
she is no longer bound to the prescribed conduct.
2. Unlike first-order motives, the bound condition is  ipso facto invalidated as a 
bound condition (though not necessarily as a first-order motive) in case of 
breach or non-compliance.
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3. Any deviation must therefore take place outside the parameters of the bound 
condition.
The  third  characteristic  is  particularly  significant  because  our  previous  conjecture 
(about the bound condition deriving from positive law) so palpably violates it. In the 
two cases discussed, the state breaches the bound condition, and yet remains within 
the parameters of legality. It is able to do so because it exercises  control over the 
positive legal rule concerned. To locate the source of the bound condition, therefore, 
we must look at areas beyond the state’s control, and hence beyond legal rules since 
the  state’s  control  over  them  is  immense.  This  leaves  us  only  with  extra-legal 
standards,  to  be  precise  those  extra-legal  standards  over  which  the  state  has  no 
control.
This conjecture satisfies all three of the criteria specified above. Take the example that 
the state is expected to be bound to, say, a particular standard of morality, because of 
which it enforces a particular right. In such circumstances, the state clearly does not 
have  the  option  to  simultaneously  accept  its  bound condition  and also  decline  to 
enforce  the  right.  If  it  declines  enforcement,  that  very  fact  implies  it  no  longer 
considers  itself  bound,  and  therefore  the  morality  no  longer  amounts  to  a  bound 
condition.  Lastly,  it  is a condition precedent of our argument that the state cannot 
modify as per its convenience the source of the bound condition. Given these, if that 
morality  dictates  enforcement,  any  deviation  from  enforcement  must  take  place 
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outside its scope.
Similarly,  in  Chapter  4  we  had  specified  what  constitutes  an  adequately 
comprehensive theory of legal rights. First, the theory must be able to describe the 
manner in which the state acts when enforcing rights, and also the causes behind it. 
Secondly, it must be able to account for occasional deviations from enforcement. And 
thirdly,  it  must explain the mechanism through which these lapses occur but  only 
selectively.
The bound condition adequately describes the state’s behaviour in enforcing rights (in 
that it does not exercise any discretion, select one among several choices, and so on). 
Locating within positive law the source of the bound condition unfortunately yields a 
situation where the state is virtually not bound at all. However, by locating the source 
within extra-legal standards, that lacuna is addressed effectively. More significantly, it 
can also account for occasional deviations and explain why they occur so selectively. 
Let us consider that the state regards itself bound to some extra-legal standard, say 
some moral or other normative standard. Because this standard acts on it as a second-
order reason and not as a first-order normative motive, the state by and large enforces 
rights  without  exercising its  discretion  or  considering  other  choices.  Occasionally, 
though, circumstances may be so compelling as to fleetingly cause the state to lapse in 
its recognition. And since for that brief period of time the state no longer considers 
itself bound, it becomes open to consider alternate conducts and ultimately select one 
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of them on the basis of its relative weightage. For example, in the aftermath of the 
Shah Bano judgment,  the prospect of electoral losses was so compelling that it forced 
the  Indian  government  to  reconsider  its  commitment  to  enforcing  rights.  So  it 
considered alternatives, ultimately decided to circumvent the right through legislation 
and then, after the public outcry had died down, it revived its commitment to enforce 
rights just as it had done prior to this deviation.
I agree that as descriptive models go this is somewhat complex, certainly as compared 
to  more  direct  explanations  based  on  first-order  reasons.  However,  two  reasons 
compel us to adopt this in preference to the latter. First, take the  Grapes of Wrath 
example. Had enforcement there been based on a first-order reason, it would have had 
to  be exceptionally  compelling  in  nature,  since  on its  basis  the  strong competing 
claims of justice and community welfare were summarily ignored. These and other 
similar  examples  make  it  more  sensible  to  abandon  seeking  reasons  of  such 
compelling  magnitude  where  none  may  even  exist,  and  instead  adopt  a  different 
approach  altogether.  However,  once  we  accept  second-order  reasons  as  the  most 
accurate  explanation,  we  are  faced  with  a  new  problem,  where  states  very 
occasionally and fleetingly deviate from their second-order bound conditions. Such 
deviations invariably take place in the presence of manifest  and extremely strong, 
indeed compelling first-order reasons, unlike what we saw when we tried to explain 
the Grapes of Wrath instance in terms of first-order reasons. It is only natural, then, to 
attribute the deviation to the compelling first-order reason present. And so we arrive at 
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the model we so painstakingly devised.
V. BOUND CONDITION AND NORMATIVE STANDARDS
The last issue we need to examine here is what kind of extra-legal standards can form 
the source of  the bound condition.  In Chapter  2,  we saw that  some difference of 
opinion exists about whether the invalidable zone lies outside the area of descriptivity 
or not. According to Dickson it does;293 Leiter contends it does not.294 We need not 
address this question as such. What we do need to look at is whether the source of the 
bound condition lies in the hermeneutic or invalidable zone. Whether this aspect is 
extra-legal  in  character  or  not  is  relevant  to  us only in  the light  of  the foregoing 
question.
There are good reasons to hold that the source of the bound condition lies outside this 
hermeneutic zone. Dickson talks of qualities like simplicity, comprehensiveness and 
clarity;295 so  does  Leiter  talk  of  evidentiary  adequacy,  simplicity,  explanatory 
consilience  and  other  “truth-conducive  desiderata”.296 He  goes  further  and  says, 
“Honor those values –  even the explicitly pragmatic ones like simplicity –  and, we 
hope, we will acquire knowledge.”297  Knowledge of what? Surely of law, i.e. positive 
law. In other words, they help in helping us understand positive law better. Whether 
293 Dickson 2001: 64.
294 Leiter 2003: 42-43.
295 Dickson 2001: 33. At 33-34 she quotes Perry (1998: 438) as saying much the same thing.
296 Leiter 2003: 34-35.
297 Ibid. 
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this makes them a part of law or not is not important at this stage. What matters is that 
they are not extra-legal in any substantial sense of the term, that is, their existence is 
not independent of positive law. And since the state exercises considerable power over 
the content of positive law, these values cannot be considered altogether beyond state 
control either. So this does not fulfil our requirement when we say that the source of 
something to be extra-legal in nature, that is, beyond the control of the state. Which 
means that the source of the bound condition cannot be located in the invalidable 
component. And it must therefore lie in the normative aspect, well beyond the domain 
of descriptivism. 
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CHAPTER 6 – CONCLUSION
I. OVERVIEW
Chapter 2 establishes the foundations for our main thesis. Validation and description 
are  the  two  fundamental  aspects  of  positivism,  and play  distinct  roles  within  the 
framework of the latter. Through a comparison of positivist/empiricist traditions in the 
natural, social and legal sciences, we ascertain how each entails  its own individual 
equilibrium between the two. In doing so, we also establish that legal positivism is the 
only one of the three which is equally dependent on validation and description (i.e. 
substantive  and  methodological  positivism  respectively).  While  in  the  natural 
sciences, description itself entails validation, the same does not happen in the case of 
the law. Legal phenomena entail a normative component, which naturally cannot be 
validated through mere description. Even its descriptive component contains validable 
and invalidable aspects.  Hence only a portion of  what is covered by normatively-
neutral description (as Perry puts it) can be objectively validated. Since the ambit of 
description is greater than that of validation, it follows that what is described does not 
inevitably become validated. For this reason, validation does constitute an endeavour 
independent  from  description.  At  the same  time,  description  is  fundamentally 
dependent on validation.  Otherwise one cannot ascertain if  the phenomenon being 
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studied is a legal phenomenon or not.
Having established that description bereft of validation cannot be sustained, in the 
subsequent  chapters  we  examine  if  the  two  together  can  achieve  the  goals  that 
positivism sets out for itself. In Chapter 3 we outline the bound condition, and specify 
how it differs from (a) conventional reasons from action, and (b) Raz’s exclusionary 
reasons; in Chapter 4 we observe that the motive given to the state in enforcing legal 
rights conforms to this bound condition and not other reasons for action; and finally in 
Chapter 5 we demonstrate that the source of this specific bound condition (i.e. the one 
that impels the state to enforce rights) lies outside the domain of positive law.
II. CONSEQUENCES
At this stage, we need to analyse our findings and interpret them in terms of what they 
imply for positivist jurisprudence. The first question we need to examine is, where is 
the bound condition located? Not in the normative aspect of law. The concept of legal 
rights exists in almost all mature legal systems across normative orientations. Hence 
what we require is a  general, normatively neutral descriptive account of rights. The 
bound condition  has  to  be  an essential  component  of  such a  descriptive  account. 
Consequently, it cannot be located in the normative aspect of law. Neither can it be 
located in the invalidable aspect of what methodological positivism covers. This we 
can  say  for  several  reasons.  First,  most  accounts  of  the  invalidable  aspect  are 
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evaluative in nature. And as we saw, even the internal aspect does not really apply to 
our case. Even the legal rules that establish the legal right the mechanism of rights 
enforcement can be validated objectively.
But this last statement is surely true of any and every legal phenomenon. That is, the 
legal rules relating to all legal phenomena must be objectively validated. We saw that 
unless this is the case, it cannot be recognised as a legal phenomenon. Furthermore, 
we also saw that descriptive accounts of many legal phenomena feature a validable as 
well as an invalidable aspect. For example, any legal rule must derive from validated 
standards of conduct; otherwise we will not be able to say for certain whether the rule 
is legal or not. At the same time, it will also carry some invalidable elements, for 
instance, the internal aspect which distinguishes it from a mere habit, or epistemic 
values evaluation on the basis of which will lend clarity to understanding of the rule. 
Examining these invalidable aspects yields interesting insights. Take Hart’s internal 
aspect. According to it, the character of obligation a rule imposes is best understood 
not objectively from the perspective of an external observer, but from the point of 
view of the actor. Similarly, Dickson’s example of evaluating a Roman Catholic mass 
indicates evaluating values like clarity and efficacy is best done from the perspective 
of the participant rather than that of an external observer. However, in our analysis of  
legal rights and the bound condition, at no point of time do we adopt the participant’s  
perspective. The existence of legal rules bearing legal rights is established objectively, 
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as is the central role played by state enforcement. The failure of conventional reasons 
for action to account for the state’s role, and the consequent need for (and success of) 
the bound condition in this regard, are also established from an external viewpoint. 
Lastly, even the fact that the source of the bound condition lies in the domain of the 
extra-legal, that is, the normative, was established in this manner. 
III. LARGER IMPLICATIONS FOR POSITIVISM
Three facts are clear now. One, that the basis of a legal right,  i.e. the legal rule that 
establishes  it,  is  itself  validable.  Secondly,  the  nature  of  what  we  may  call  the 
propulsive force needed to make a legal right function, viz. the bound condition, can 
also be inferred  objectively. And thirdly, we may also infer objectively that the source 
of the bound condition lies in the normative zone. This means that even though the 
structure  of  legal  rights  may  derive  from  validated  positive  law,  its  functioning 
depends on something that lies outside its domain.       
This carries considerable implications for positivism’s descriptive ends. As we have 
mentioned, methodological positivists position the hermeneutical as an intermediate 
zone between the normative and the validated. Through this device, positivists have 
sought to overcome classical positivism’s inadequacy in dealing with elements within 
a  legal  phenomenon  that  cannot  be  considered  normative  (except  by  people  like 
Perry),  but  are  not  validable  by  nature  either.  Such  elements,  which  require  a 
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subjective viewpoint to be understood, are nonetheless retained within the ambit of 
the descriptive through this device.
This may be expressed in a simpler manner: Since the bound condition is intrinsic to 
right  enforcement,  it  follows  that  in  enforcing  rights,  the  state  necessarily takes 
recourse to normative standards. But these standards are by definition not general in 
nature; they are particular to only some normative systems. So when a state enforces a 
right, it takes recourse to a normative standard that it considers appropriate. This may 
not be the same standard that some other legal system, or even the same legal system 
on another occasion, may refer to when enforcing some other right. Consequently, if 
the normative standard,  i.e. the source of the bound condition,  varies across legal 
systems, or even within the same legal system, then inevitably no account of right 
enforcement  that  is  general  or  universally  applicable,  leave  alone  descriptive,  is 
possible.
Consequently, an exhaustive description of this phenomenon must extrude beyond the 
descriptive and into the normative. This would compromise its normatively neutral 
nature.  And hence, we may conclude that the descriptive goals of methodological 
positivism stand frustrated when it comes to generating a descriptive account of legal 
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